Upjohn Press

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-1990

Passing the Torch: The Influence of Economic Incentives on Work
and Retirement
Joseph F. Quinn
Boston College

Richard V. Burkhauser
Syracuse University

Daniel A. Myers
Western Kentucky University

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press
Part of the Labor Economics Commons

Citation
Quinn, Joseph F., Richard V. Burkhauser, and Daniel A. Myers. 1990. Passing the Torch: The Influence of
Economic Incentives on Work and Retirement. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780880994996

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

SJ3/W V |3|U9Q

jasneippng "A pj
uujno -J ijdasor

'/<

PASSING
the TORCH
The
Influence
of
Economic
Incentives
on
WORK
and
RETIREMENT
Joseph F. Quinn
Richard V. Burkhauser
Daniel A. Myers

1990
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE for Employment Research

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Quinn, Joseph F.
Passing the torch : the influence of economic incentives on work
and retirement / Joseph F. Quinn, Richard V. Burkhauser, Daniel A.
Myers.
p.
cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-88099-091-0 : $22.95. - ISBN 0-88099-092-9 (pbk.) : $13.95
1. Old age pensions United States. 2. Retirement income United
States. 3. Retirement age United States. 4. Age and employmentUnited States. 5. Aged Employment United States. 6. Labor
mobility United States.
I. Burkhauser, Richard V. II. Myers,
Daniel A. III. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
IV. Title.
HD7105.35.U6Q55 1990
331.25'2'0973 dc20
oo

90-12352
CIP

Copyright
1990
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization, was established on July 1, 1945.
It is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was
formed in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn for the
purpose of carrying on "research into the causes and effects of unemployment and
measures for the alleviation of unemployment."

The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

To Diane and Ginger

Acknowledgments

We are very grateful to the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
for funding this research. We would also like to thank Eric Kingson and John
Williamson of Boston College, Herbert Raraes of The Ohio State University,
and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of
the entire manuscript. Robert Clark, Alan Gustman, Richard Ippolito, Elizabeth
Johnson, Olivia Mitchell and Thomas Steinmeier offered helpful suggestions
on parts of the text, and John Turner provided some unpublished Department
of Labor statistics. We also owe thanks to Judy Gentry, Allan Hunt, Robert
Spiegelman and Steve Woodbury of the Upjohn Institute for support and
assistance along the way.

IV

Policy Summary

Work and retirement patterns of older Americans, especially men, have
undergone major changes during the past two decades. Policymakers need to
understand how economic incentives embedded in Social Security and employer
pension plans influence the short- and long-term decisions of older workers
in order to craft new policy initiatives or adjustments to existing policy.
Life-cycle analysis shows that pension rights are a component of compensa
tion and that workers base labor market participation decisions throughout their
lives on retirement income at the close of a career. Research on the quantitative
effects of policy, both public and private, on individual decisions of older workers
shows that workers behave as though they understand and respond to the in
centives they face.
A central finding of the study is that many older workers seek alternate
employment after leaving career jobs that span many years. The authors show
that incentives affect the way older workers leave career jobs for one of several
options: self-employment, part-time work, a full-time second career, or full
withdrawal from the labor force. Correlates of the various retirement transi
tions include health, pension and mandatory retirement status, industry and
occupation, earnings and wealth.
Labor force participation rates of older workers have fallen dramatically over
the last two decades, and attempts to modify that trend by changing Social
Security rules alone are not likely to have more than a modest effect. Most
defined benefit pension plans continue to encourage workers to leave the career
job at the earliest possible retirement age. How these employer pensions re
spond to future labor market conditions will have a major effect on work and
retirement decisions. The authors are convinced that "older Americans would
respond to changed incentives in the future as they have in the past. What re
mains to be seen is whether the market firms responding to labor shortages
on the horizon will introduce the appropriate changes themselves, or whether
a more active government role is required."
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PASSING
the TORCH

-1Introduction and Overview
The artful policymaker can anticipate future crises and develop plans
to ameliorate them. These plans may seem puzzling to those concern
ed with present and past problems who do not foresee what lies ahead.
No demographic phenomenon has provided a greater continuing
challenge to the policy makers' skills than the aging of the postwar
babyboomers. During the 1950s, they created a demand for maternity
beds and four-bedroom houses in the suburbs. As they entered school,
they forced a massive increase in educational facilities and then left some
painful contractions in their wake. In the 1970s, they sorely tested the
economy's ability to create jobs for young adults, and they may soon
clog promotion paths as they progress up the occupational ladders. In
the early part of the next century, they will contemplate leaving the
labor force. Their decisions on when and how to retire will have dramatic
implications for the structure of society, the economy, and the finan
cial well-being of our public and private retirement income schemes.
The demographic projections are startling. In the United States, the
population aged 65 and over about 30 million today will nearly double
over the next 40 years. In stark contrast, the population under 65 is
estimated to increase by only 12 percent. As a result, the proportion
of the population over age 64 is projected to rise from 12 percent today
to nearly 20 percent by the year 2030. The nation then will look like
Florida today. 1
Those interested in issues of retirement finance often emphasize the
aged-dependency or support ratio the ratio of those of prime working
age (20 to 64) to those of traditional retirement age (65 and over). In
the United States, this ratio is nearly 5 to 1 today, but is estimated to
drop to about 2.6 to 1 by the year 2030 and to 2.4 to 1 by 2060 (Aaron,
Bosworth, and Burtless 1989). In fact, the actual story is even more
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significant because 65 is no longer the age of normal retirement. As
we will see, older workers have been leaving the labor force earlier
and earlier, decreasing further the ratio of those employed to those
retired. 2 The ratio of Social Security-covered workers to old-age and
survivor beneficiaries is forecast to drop from about 3.3 to 1 today to
only 2 to 1 by the year 2030 (Tobin 1988).
These changes are dramatic and extremely important. But some can
be predicted like the number of older Americans and others like
retirement patterns can be influenced by current and future public policy
decisions. The future is not exogenous. It depends on what we foresee
and how we respond to it. We will argue that individual retirement deci
sions depend in large part on the financial structures we have built into
our public and private retirement systems. These structures frequently
penalize workers who stay on the job too long or leave too early
and thereby influence labor supply decisions in important ways. The
financial incentives that currently exist may have made sense in the past,
but demographic trends suggest that they will not in the future. 3 Our
ability to forestall crisis depends critically on an understanding of how
these financial structures work, how they affect labor supply decisions,
and how they can be changed to alter retirement trends in the years ahead.
Dramatic changes in attitudes and public policy toward retirement
and in the employment patterns of older workers have occurred in the
United States over the past several decades. Americans are leaving the
labor force earlier than ever before. As recently as 1950, nearly half
of all American men aged 65 and over were employed. By 1960, this
figure had dropped to a third, and by 1970 to a quarter. Today, only
about one in six older men continue to work for pay.
These long-term trends in the age distribution of the population,
together with large increases in real Social Security benefits and adverse
economic conditions, led to a Social Security financial crisis in the
1970s. 4 Trust funds declined and were projected to disappear by the
mid-1980s, and the long-run financial stability of the system was
threatened. 5 As a result, the National Commission on Social Security
Reform, headed by Alan Greenspan, was appointed to analyze the ex
pected flows of funds into and out of the system and to propose changes
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to bring these two streams into balance. Major legislation followed in
1983, which raised the level of future Social Security contributions,
scheduled an increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 while
increasing the benefit reduction associated with retirement at age 62
(the equivalent to an across-the-board benefit cut), and made up to half
of the benefits taxable for certain higher income recipients.
At the same time, Social Security, traditionally an extremely popular
program among recipients and contributors alike, was subject to increas
ed scrutiny and criticism. Some younger workers, reacting to the in
creased tax levy and the lower rate of return they expected to receive
on their contributions, complained about continued participation in the
program. Confidence in the system's ability to pay benefits in the future
waned and some analysts suggested that participation in the Social Securi
ty system should be made voluntary. 6
Retirement trends and retirement policy leapt from the back to the
front page. They continue to be matters of public debate. Interest has
further intensified with concern over the federal budget deficit. Since
the outlay on old-age, survivors, disability and health insurance
(OASDHI) constitutes almost a quarter of all federal expenditures, Social
Security is part of the deficit discussion, even though many politicians
consider it off limits.
Too often in this public policy debate, specific reforms are proposed
without an adequate understanding of how such changes will affect labor
supply and retirement decisions. A major goal of this book is to pro
vide an overview of the American retirement system and how it in
fluences work across the life cycle. We will do so by reviewing what
economists have learned about the retirement process over the past two
decades.
As we will see, much of our increased understanding comes from
two outstanding longitudinal surveys of older Americans the National
Longitudinal Survey of older men (NLS), financed by the Department
of Labor, and the Retirement History Study (RHS), conducted by the
Social Security Administration. 7 Because of studies based on these and
other data, we now have a much better understanding of the nature and
magnitude of the financial incentives facing older workers. We are
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convinced that Social Security and employer pensions do influence retire
ment decisions and that people respond to these incentives in ways that
are consistent with economic theory and common sense.
We also have learned that public and private pension systems affect
labor market behavior throughout the life cycle—not only at retirement,
but before and after as well. As we will see, the literature on the actual
retirement decision is voluminous. Much less has been written, however,
on how pensions influence younger workers long before retirement
and those who have already left career jobs. We will show that work
after "retirement" (after departure from a career job) is a very com
mon event and suggest that it may become even more so in the future.
Relatively little research exists on labor force behavior during this grow
ing portion of the life cycle the years after departure from the career
job. 8
Our review of the literature is selective. We focus on the economic
determinants of retirement within a public policy framework. We chose
to do so for several reasons. This is the area, we believe, in which the
most important new insights have occurred. In addition, this is the arena
in which we have worked and which we feel most qualified to discuss.
And finally, these economic incentives can be changed through legisla
tion. These are the policy levers that affect aggregate behavior. Our
focus, however, should not imply that we think that other factors are
unimportant. Mental and physical health, social support networks, at
titudes toward work and leisure, and previous employment experience
obviously influence the retirement decision. But we, as authors, know
less about them and we, as a society, are less able to change them through
direct public policy initiatives.
A substantial portion of this book, then, is a detailed review of the
recent and current work of a select group of social scientists. We discuss
how views about the retirement decision have changed and where we
now stand. In the second part of the book we describe some shortcom
ings of this research and point out one direction that we think future
research should take.
Most of the retirement literature focuses on who retires, when, and
why. Retirement is usually modeled as a dichotomous concept an
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individual is either retired or not. Definitions of retirement vary great
ly. Some researchers use labor force participation and label as retired
only those who are completely out of the labor force. Others base their
definitions on the receipt of Social Security or employer pension benefits,
regardless of the recipient's labor force status. To others, retirement
means a substantial and discontinuous drop in earnings or hours work
ed. Finally, some analysts rely on subjective self-descriptions by in
dividuals themselves. Most researchers, however, use whatever defini
tion they adopt to classify people into two or sometimes three categories
and then analyze the determinants of their retirement status.
A major theme of this book is that these traditional classifications
are inadequate to describe the wide variety of labor market changes
that older Americans are making. Although the abrupt transition from
full-time work to complete labor force withdrawal (traditional retire
ment) is still the most common occurrence, many older workers are
utilizing intermediate steps between the two. Some first reduce their
hours of work to part-time status. Others leave a career job and then
start on another, either full or part time. Sometimes this new job is in
the same industry and occupation, but more often it represents a new
line of work altogether. Still others decide to retire completely, but then
change their minds and return to work.
Because of these diverse exit routes, the word "retirement" may well
conceal more than it reveals. There are too many variations for one
word to describe. The different definitions of retirement lead to confu
sion and seemingly contradictory research results. Our approach is not
to pose the question in terms of retirement, but rather to ask how and
when people leave their career jobs and what they do afterwards.
Career jobs are a very important part of most Americans' lives. Many
workers spend a substantial number of years on a single job. It is the
transition from this job that we will study. If this exit were to take place
at age 45, few would call it retirement. The behavioral patterns of many
older workers suggest the same thing that much of what we observe
does not look like the traditional concept of retirement.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the growth of our Social
Security and pension systems in the postwar period and the simultaneous
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changes in the employment behavior of older Americans. We docu
ment the changes in the labor force participation rates of older men and
women. We also discuss patterns in full-time and part-time work and
changes in the importance of self-employment. Finally, we document
the importance of career jobs in America in order to motivate the ap
proach we have chosen to take.

Growth of Social Security and Private Pension Plans
In 1935, the Social Security Act was passed to provide compulsory
retirement insurance for workers in commerce and industry about twothirds of the workforce in those days. It was financed by a flat rate payroll
tax of 1 percent, paid by both employees and employers on the first
$3,000 of annual earnings. The act also mandated federal participation
in the state-run old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, and
unemployment insurance systems.
The American Social Security system grew directly out of the ex
periences of the Great Depression, when more than a quarter of the
labor force was officially out of work. 9 Many of its features were bor
rowed from older systems in Europe. The program is government run
and mandatory for most workers. The benefits are earnings-related (and
weighted in favor of lower income workers) and financed by specifically
earmarked contributions. Benefits are paid as a matter of right, and there
is no means or overall income test.
Much of the motivation for retirement insurance in 1935 was to per
mit older workers to leave the labor force and thereby to create job
opportunities for the younger unemployed. For this reason, Social Securi
ty payment criteria included an earnings or retirement test. The original
legislation eliminated the entire monthly benefit for anyone with any
"covered wages from regular employment" (Schulz 1988). This was
soon replaced by a modest monthly disregard ($15), which retirees could
earn without loss of benefits. Today, as we will see, the rules are more
complex, but the earnings-test philosophy remains intact.
Over the subsequent half century, this social insurance system has
grown in both scope and coverage, much of which was anticipated by the
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founders (Ball 1988). In 1939, the survivors' and dependents' programs
were added. Disability insurance, which had been discussed in the 1930s,
was introduced in 1956, and health insurance (Medicare) followed in
1965. Over these same years, compulsory coverage was extended to
regularly employed farm and domestic workers (1950), the selfemployed (1950 through 1965), members of the armed services (1956),
the clergy (1967), and newly hired federal employees (1984). State and
local government employees may enroll if both the employer and a ma
jority of the employees agree. Mandatory coverage now includes 91
percent of all workers (Yeas and Grad 1987). Over 96 percent of all
wage and salary disbursements are covered by Social Security or by
analogous railroad or federal and state civil service programs. 10
At the same time that coverage was being extended, eligibility rules
were being liberalized. Beginning in 1956 for women and 1961 for men,
insured workers could claim retirement benefits at age 62. (Monthly
payments were reduced by about 7 percent for each year they were claim
ed prior to age 65.) Benefit calculation rules were adjusted frequently
after 1950, usually to reflect recent changes in the cost of living. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, following a decade of economic growth,
a series of benefit increases was passed that far exceeded the recent
inflationary experience, resulting in large real increments. 11 These in
creases were then frozen in place by the introduction of automatic costof-living adjustments in 1975.
In the years since its initial passage, the Social Security program has
grown dramatically, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall
economy. Social Security payments are now the single most important
source of income to aged households, providing over a third of their
money income in 1987. 12 For those in the lowest income quintile, the
proportion is about 80 percent (Grad 1989). Table 1.1 provides some
summary statistics, at five-year intervals, on the retirement, disability,
and survivors components of Social Security (OASDI).
In constant (1989) dollars, annual expenditures have grown from about
$5 billion in 1950 to over $235 billion today. The benefits are distributed
to nearly 40 million Americans. The initial surges of the program, as
it matured, can be seen in the real annual growth rates (averaged over

Table 1.1
Summary Statistics
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program
(dollar amounts in billions)

Year

OASDI
expenditure
(current $$)

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1989

0.06
0.3
1.0
5.1
11.8
19.2
33.1
69.2
123.6
190.6
236.2

I

OASDI/GNP
(percent)

OASDI/federal
expenditure
(percent)

OASDI
expenditure
(1989 $$)

Annual real
growth rate
previous 5 years
(percent)

0.06
0.14
0.35
1.25
2.3
2.7
3.3
4.3
4.5
4.7
4.5

0.65
0.33
2.4
7.4
12.8
16.2
16.9
20.8
20.9
20.1
20.7

5.2
23.5
49.4
75.5
105.8
159.5
185.9
219.7
236.2

35
16
9
7
9
3
3
2a

SOURCES: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1990 (tables 4.A1 and 4. A3) and Economic Report of the President (1990, tables
C-1, C-58, andC-76).
a. Growth rate over the previous 4 years.
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five-year periods) in the last column. In the early 1950s, real expen
ditures were growing at 35 percent per year as the coverage of the pro
gram expanded and disability insurance was introduced. The real an
nual growth rate then dropped to about 9 percent in the 1960s and ear
ly 1970s, and to about 3 percent, and recently 2 percent, since then.
But even until very recently, this has been faster than the economy has
grown, as can be seen in the third column. The retirement, survivors,
and disability expenditures of the Social Security system have grown
to equal 4.5 percent of the gross national product, and over 20 percent
of all federal government expenditures. 13
Social Security is a major institution in the United States. Nearly all
workers are covered by it or by an analogous public program, and nearly
all are eligible for retirement benefits when they reach age 62. The
system transfers a quarter of a trillion dollars annually (excluding
Medicare) from contributors to beneficiaries. As we will see below,
it does so with some very interesting incentives that penalize workers
who remain in the labor force too long.
Concurrent with this growth of Social Security has been the develop
ment of the private pension system in the United States. Summary
statistics for the past four decades are shown in table 1.2.
Since 1950, the number of private pension plans in the United States
increased from about 12,000 to well over 800,000, while the propor
tion of the wage and salary population covered by a private pension
plan doubled from a quarter to a half. 14 Coverage of state and local
government employees increased from 60 to 90 percent (Kotlikoff and
Smith 1983). Most of this growth in coverage occurred in the 1950s
and 1960s; the coverage ratio has increased only modestly since then.
Since 1950, real private pension assets increased 25-fold, from 80 billion
to almost two trillion dollars (in 1987). Private pensions now own over
a quarter of the corporate and foreign bonds and a sixth of the corporate
equities held by pensions, households, and other institutions in the United
States (Turner and Beller 1989).
Because pension members do not receive benefits until the end of
their work careers, the recipient statistics lag behind the coverage
numbers. The number of pension benefit recipients has continued to
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increase up to the present. In 1986, nearly 30 percent of Americans
aged 65 and over received a benefit from a private pension plan. 15 The
average annual amount was about $5,000 (Turner and Beller 1989).
In 1987, pension benefits constituted about a sixth of all the cash in
come of households with a head aged 65 or over (Social Security Bulletin
Annual Statistical Supplement, 1988).
Private pension plans are of two basic types. In defined benefit plans,
the employer promises to pay a particular benefit, with the amount deter
mined by an agreed-upon formula, usually based on some combination
of earnings (often over the last few years of work) and years of service
and age at retirement. In defined contribution plans, the employer makes
an annual contribution to a retirement account for the worker. These
funds are then invested and form the basis for benefits at retirement.
The size of the benefit depends on the size of the annual contributions,
but also on the performance of the fund over the years. As we will see
below, the retirement incentives that economists have emphasized oc
cur primarily in the defined benefit plans.
A new book on American pensions by John Turner and Daniel Beller
(1989) documents recent trends in the coverage and composition of these
plans. Between 1975 and 1985, the total number of plans more than
doubled, and the number of active participants increased by about 60
percent. 16 Despite this growth, there was almost no change in the pro
portion of the working population with pension coverage. This is because
of growth in the labor force and because, as seen in table 1.3, about
two-thirds of the growth in participants stemmed from supplementary
coverage. Supplemental pensions, such as profit sharing and employee
stock ownership plans, provided additional benefits to workers already
covered by a primary plan. Between 1975 and 1987, the number of
workers participating in two or more plans increased from 21 to 40
percent.
Most pension plans in America are small, covering fewer than 100
workers. But these small plans include only about one in 10 covered
workers. In 1985, the 6 percent of the plans with 100 or more workers
covered 88 percent of all participants.
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In primary pensions, defined benefit plans still dominate, covering
over 70 percent of all participants in 1985. But this proportion has fallen
significantly. The proportion of participants whose primary coverage
was in a defined contribution plan increased from 13 to 29 percent be
tween 1975 and 1985. 17 And virtually all of the supplementary coverage
(which is growing more quickly) is defined contribution. Overall, the
proportion of active participants (double counting those with more than
one plan) in defined benefit plans fell from 71 to 47 percent by 1985.
As we will see next, the dramatic growth of the Social Security and
private pension systems coincided with a significant decrease in the labor
force participation rates of older American men. There are several
reasons for believing that these trends are related. While the Social
Security system was maturing, the demographic structure of the popula
tion permitted the relatively small number of recipients to receive benefits
that far exceeded, in an actuarial sense, the current value of the con
tributions they had made. 18 These intergenerational transfers were financ
ed by the relatively large number of Social Security contributors and
resulted in a net increase in the wealth of older Americans. At the same
time, real wages were rising, pension rights were accumulating and home
equity was increasing in value. Older Americans reached normal retire
ment age wealthier than had earlier generations. According to economic
theory, this should increase their demand for leisure and, among other
things, result in earlier retirement.
In addition to this income or wealth effect, however, is a substitution
effect. The benefit calculation rules of both Social Security and many
private pension schemes alter the compensation patterns of older workers
over time, and therefore change the terms of the tradeoff between work
and leisure. At some ages, the rules subsidize work and provide a wage
supplement. At other ages, they penalize continued employment by im
posing a subtle pay cut. Much of the recent research that we discuss
below focuses on understanding the nature and magnitude of the finan
cial incentives that are embedded in these retirement systems. It strongly
suggests that the growth of Social Security and employer pensions and
the trend toward early retirement are related. There remains considerable
disagreement, however, on the size of the effects that these incentives
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have had and on their importance in explaining aggregate retirement
trends.

Trends in Employment Among Older Americans
Much of the research interest in the retirement decision stems from
the dramatic changes that have occurred in the employment patterns
of older American workers during the past 50 years. Among these
changes are decreases in the labor force participation rates of older men,
a movement from wage and salary work to self-employment, and in
creases in the importance of part-time employment late in the work
career.

Labor Force Participation Rates
Historical Data
It is well-known that American men are leaving the labor force much
earlier than they did in the past. We will document recent trends below.
What is less well-known is how long these changes have been under
way; in particular, whether they began prior to the growth and develop
ment of our Social Security and pension systems.
According to the conventional wisdom, employment rates among older
Americans were high as recently as the late nineteenth century, but have
been dropping steadily since then. Official data originally reported by
the Social Security Administration show rates of "gainful occupation"
among men aged 65 and over exceeding 80 percent in 1870 and drop
ping to below 60 percent by 1930 (Ransom and Sutch 1986). The cur
rent labor force participation rate for this group is now about 17 per
cent. A graph of these long-run trends (ibid.) suggests a very steady
decline over the past 110 years, from a time when retirement was ex
tremely rare, and over 80 percent of older American men continued
to work, to one today in which the proportions are almost exactly revers
ed. In this scenario, Social Security and employer pensions could not
have started the movement toward earlier retirement, since it had
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been underway for at least 50 years prior to their development. At most
they might have accelerated a trend with roots much older than their own.
Recent work by Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch (1986, 1988),
however, casts doubt on the accuracy of this generally accepted story.
Their evidence indicates that there was virtually no change in retire
ment rates among American men from 1870 to 1937 and, therefore,
that nearly all of the change in retirement patterns has occurred during
the past 50 years, after the inception of Social Security and the dramatic
growth of private pensions.
Ransom and Sutch's findings follow from two assertions: that the
definition of occupation changed significantly in 1890 (and later changed
back), and that the "official" statistics for 1870 and 1880 were actual
ly based on a backwards extrapolation of trends between 1890 and
1910. 19
Before 1890, persons were defined as "productively occupied" if
they were "earning money regularly by labor ... or appreciably
assisting in mechanical or agricultural industry" (Ransom and Sutch
1986). This is very similar to what we now mean by labor force par
ticipation. In 1890, however, the Census Bureau dropped the defini
tion based on active participation in production and adopted one based
on sources of income. Persons whose income came from property
holdings were classified as employed landlords; those with income from
stock dividends or bond interest were listed as employed capitalists. Many
of those individuals would have been defined as out of the labor force
and retired prior to 1890, as they would again today. When Ransom
and Sutch recalculated the statistics for men aged 60 and over, using
a consistent definition of employment, they found labor force participa
tion rates of 64 percent in 1870 and 1880, 66 percent in 1900, 64 per
cent in 1930, and 61 percent in 1937 (ibid.).
These numbers are much lower than the old official statistics, which
estimated that over 80 percent of those over 65 were working in 1870.
In addition, the new numbers are virtually constant between 1870 (or
at least 1900) and 1937. Since then, however, the participation rate for

16

Introduction and Overview

men over 60 has dropped precipitously, to 55 percent in 1950, 45 per
cent in 1960, 40 percent in 1970, and under 28 percent today. It is dur
ing the postwar period, then, when most of the action has occurred.
The long-term trend for women is very different. According to Golden
(1989), participation rates for married women increased sevenfold since
1920. Despite this, average years of work experience among employed
married women remained almost unchanged, since the new entrants were
women with very little experience, who kept the average down.
Current Data
Monthly Current Population Survey reports allow calculation of the
labor force participation rates of specific demographic groups. In figures
1.1 and 1.2, we illustrate recent trends for older men and women in
four age categories, from 1964 to 1989. The decline for all four groups
of older men is clear. 20
For the youngest group shown—men aged 55-59—the participation
has dropped over 10 points, from over 90 to less than 80 percent. The
next group is particularly interesting, since the age of earliest eligibili
ty for Social Security benefits was lowered from 65 to 62 for men in
1961 (as it had been for women in 1956). Partly in response to this
change and the growing availability of early retirement options in private
pensions, the participation rate of men aged 60-64 has plummeted over
those 25 years, from almost 80 to 55 percent. For men 65-69, the rate
remained steady through the early 1970s and then decreased by nearly
20 points. It is interesting to note that substantial increases in real Social
Security benefits (on the order of 50 percent) occurred over a five-year
period beginning in 1969. The 1970s were also a decade of very poor
economic growth. Both of these factors may have hastened the trend
already underway. Similarly, the economic recovery in the mid-1980s
may be responsible for the recent slight upturn for this group. Finally,
the oldest group, men aged 70 and over, has followed the same general
pattern, although more dramatically in percentage terms. Their participa
tion rate has fallen by almost half, from 20 to 11 percent, over the past
25 years.
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The trends for older women reflect two major demographic
phenomena—the decreased participation of older workers and the in
creased participation of women, particularly married women. 21 For the
youngest group shown, aged 55-59, the latter effect dominates, and
the rate has risen slightly and now is 55 percent. For those 60-64, there
is very little change observed. For the older two groups, a small decline
is noted. For all age categories, the participation rates are lower for
women than men, with the ratio of female to male rates dropping with
age.
The Department of Labor has unpublished data on labor force par
ticipation rates by individual ages. Since some of the financial incen
tives take effect at specific ages, these data are particularly interesting.
Figure 1.3 shows the trends from 1968 to 1989, for men aged 55, 60,
62, 65, and 70. All five lines drift downward over time, but the decreases
are most dramatic for those aged 62 and 65. Note also the acceleration
of the decline during the 1970s. Figure 1.4 illustrates the same detail
for men of each age between 60 and 65. The same overall patterns are
observed, as well as the sharp differences between ages 61 and 62 (the
age of earliest eligibility for Social Security benefits) and between 64
and 65 (the age of full eligibility).
Both trends, over age and over time, can be seen at the same time
in figure 1.5, in which we observe four cohorts of men—those aged
55 in 1968,1973, 1978, and 1983—and follow each group through 1989.
If we ignore the multiple bars at each age, the overall macro picture
shows the well-known movement out of the labor market with age. The
rate of exit accelerates as people move into their 60s, with particularly
large decreases at ages 62 and 65. 22 There is also a smaller, but still
substantial, drop of about five points at age 60, when many pension
enrollees become eligible.
The micro picture, holding age constant, is equally interesting. For
nearly every single age in figure 1.5, the male participation rates decline
with each successive cohort. The decreases after age 60, especially at
age 62, are particularly large. This is the well-documented movement
toward earlier retirement over time.
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The macro scenario for women is similar, as seen in figure 1.6. Fewer
women work at older ages. But the micro story—the record over time—is
different. Successive cohorts are not retiring earlier. The pattern is much
more irregular, and for many ages participation rates are on the rise.
Although the movement toward earlier retirement for men is most
dramatic after age 60, it is by no means confined to those ages. Figure
1.7 charts the absolute and percentage declines in the participation rates
of men between 1968 and 1989, for each age between 55 and 70. The
largest absolute declines are indeed found between ages 62 and 65, which
certainly suggests a role for Social Security in this drama. 23 But in
percentage terms, the size of the declines stays high after age 65—the
age at which the Social Security reward for continued work decreases
dramatically, as we will see below. The participation rate for men ag
ed 62 in 1989 was a third lower than it was for men that age only two
decades earlier. But at ages 65 and 68 it was over 40 percent below
the 1968 figures.
Figure 1.7 also shows that the decrease in labor force activity starts
long before eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits. The
declines are substantial at age 60 (where a 17 percent decline in par
ticipation rates over these two decades is observed) and even at age
55 (where the decline is 9 percent).
The summary story, then, is one of a significant decline over time
in the labor force participation of older men and a relative decline for
older women, when compared to patterns of younger women. 24 At
several ages important for Social Security and pension eligibility, the
declines are particularly large. Accompanying these statistics, however,
are several other interesting and relevant trends.

Trends in Part-Time Employment
Not only are older Americans retiring earlier than they used to, but
those who remain employed are more likely to be working part time.
The proportion working part time (fewer than 35 hours per week) in
creases dramatically at age 65. Table 1.4 shows the distribution for per
sons at work in nonagricultural industries during 1989.
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Figure 1.7
Decrease in Male Labor Force Participation Rates
1968-1989, by Age
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There is very little difference here between men aged 25-44 and those
aged 45-64. Part-time work is rare. Only about 6 percent are employed
part time and half of those are doing so involuntarily. But at age 65,
the proportion working part time rises from 6 to 48 percent, and almost
all of it is voluntary. Among the women, part-time work is more com
mon, but the age pattern is the same—about 20 percent of those under
age 65 (most of them volunteers) and almost 60 percent of those 65
and over. 25
Over the past two decades, there has been only a modest increase
in the proportion of the total workforce employed part time. As can
be seen in figure 1.8, part-time workers (voluntary and for economic
reasons) represented about 15 percent of the employed population in
the late 1960s, when these statistics began. By 1989, the percentage
had risen by only three points. When one looks only at the voluntary
part time, there is even less trend, from 12 (in 1967) to 14 percent (in
1989) of those at work. Among the elderly, on the other hand, there
has been significant growth in part-time employment (figures 1.9 and
1.10). The proportion of men 65 and over working fewer than 35 hours
per week has increased from 35 to 48 percent over the past 20 years,
an increase of nearly a third. Among older women, the proportion has
risen from 50 to 58 percent. In both cases, almost all of the increase
has occurred among those working reduced hours voluntarily.
Despite a fairly constant percentage of part-time work in the economy
as a whole, then, the significance of voluntarily reduced hours has grown
among older workers. In our empirical work below, we will pay par
ticular attention to the importance of part-time work, since this is one
logical way for individuals to ease out of the labor force. We will see
that it is, in fact, a popular route of labor force withdrawal, most often
on a new job for wage and salary workers, and most often on the career
job for the self-employed. These transitions are ignored in labor force
participation statistics and overlooked in studies that treat the retire
ment decision as dichotomous.

Table 1.4
Full-Time and Part-Time Status
Persons at Work in Nonagricultural Industries, 1989
(horizontal percentage)
Group
Age
Men
25-44
45-64
65 +
Women
25-44
45-64
65 +

Total at work
(000)

Employed
full time

Part time for
economic reasons

Voluntary
part time

32,450
15,466
1,582

95%
93%
52%

3%
3%
4%

2%
4%
44%
>—i

26,459
12,509
1,232

79%
76%
41%

5%
5%
5%

17%
19%
53%

Overtroductivoni
and

i
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings (January 1990, table 33).
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Trends in Self-Employment
Older workers are also disproportionately represented among the selfemployed. As shown in figures 1.11 and 1.12, the proportion of
nonagricultural workers who are self-employed rises monotonically with
age—from 1 percent (age 16-19) to 24 percent (65+) for men, and
from 1 to 14 percent for women. In both groups, there is a large discon
tinuous jump between the last two age categories. Men and women ag
ed 65 and over are 50 percent more likely to be self-employed than
are workers aged 55-64, and almost three times as likely as the general
population.
According to Eugene Decker (1984), the number of the nonagricultural
self-employed has increased every year since 1970, rising by 45 per
cent between 1970 and 1983. At the same time, agricultural selfemployment has been relatively constant, resulting in a steady increase
in the total number of self-employed. David Blau (1987) argued that
these official statistics underestimate the size of the self-employed
population.
Beginning in 1967, the Census Bureau reclassified incorporated selfemployed workers as wage and salary workers, since technically they
were employed by their companies, not by themselves. According to
Blau, they are much more like the self-employed than they are like other
wage and salary workers. Using data published sporadically in the
Monthly Labor Review, he pieced together an adjusted series and found
that the proportion of men self-employed has risen from a low of about
10 percent in the early 1970s to near 12 percent by 1982. Over the same
time period, the female self-employment rate increased from 5 to 7 per
cent. His empirical work suggested that this recent trend is partially
due to changes in tax laws and Social Security retirement benefits.
New data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation con
firm that the undercount is substantial. Sheldon Haber, Enrique Lamas,
and Jules Lichtenstein (1987) included the incorporated self-employed
and those who report self-employment as a secondary activity, and
estimated that the percentage of workers who owned businesses was
60 to 75 percent higher than the official self-employed statistics.
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Figure 1.11
Percent Self-Employed Men
in Nonagricultural Industries, by Age, 1989
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Figure 1.12
Percent Self-Employed
Women in Nonagricultural Industries, by Age, 1989
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The high incidence of self-employment among older workers could
represent a cohort effect—the fact that these men and women began
their employment experiences at a time when self-employment was more
common than it is today. But this would hardly explain the discrepan
cy between the last two groups, born within a decade of each other.
This difference must be due to two other explanations: self-employed
may retire later than others, or some wage and salary workers may turn
to self-employment late in life as an avenue of partial or phased retire
ment. Joseph Quinn (1980, 1981) found some evidence for both of these
hypotheses in some early cross-sectional work with the Retirement
History Study. Victor Fuchs (1982), using three waves of RHS data,
confirmed them both. With the full 10 years of data now available, we
will analyze the behavior of wage and salary and self-employed workers
separately, and show that their retirement patterns are very different
indeed.
The Importance of Career Jobs
Recent research has shown that most American men spend a con
siderable proportion of their work lives on long-term career jobs. This
is true despite the fact that the median job tenure in the United States
is quite short (3.6 years in 1978, according to Robert Hall [1982]) and
completed job tenure of jobs ending at any given time is also very modest
(3.9 and 2.8 years for whites and nonwhites in the early 1970s, accord
ing to George Akerlof and Brian Main [1981]). Because our research
focuses on exit patterns from career jobs, it is important that we establish
the importance of the career phenomenon and understand and explain
the seeming contradictions above.
Research on job tenure is complicated by two issues—the distinction
between current and eventual tenure and the difference between the
average job and the average person on a job. The first is straightfor
ward. Tenure on a current job is, by definition, incomplete and will
eventually be longer than it now is. For example, a young person who
has been in the labor market for only five years could have at most
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five years of tenure on the job, even if lifetime employment were the
rule. The fact that there are many young workers in the labor market
is largely responsible for Hall's median tenure of less than four years.
When he looked at the current tenure of older workers (aged 55 and
older), he found that one-third of them were in jobs of at least 20 years
duration.
But even this figure is misleading. Some of these workers may have
recently left jobs of longer duration. When we look at the longest (as
opposed to the current) job of our Retirement History Study sample
(aged 58-63 in 1969), we find that over half of the men and over a
quarter of the women had a job that lasted at least 20 years. As seen
in table 1.5, nearly a third of the men had held, or were then holding,
jobs of 30 or more years duration, and nearly 80 percent had at least
10 years experience on their longest job.
Even these estimates are lower bounds, since a few of these older
workers were still employed on their longest jobs, therefore adding to
tenure when they disappeared from the sample or when the surveys ended
in 1979. Hall uses statistical techniques to forecast the eventual tenure
of his sample of men employed in 1978, and estimates that about half
of those aged 40 or more were on jobs that would last at least 20 years.
With later data from the 1979 Current Population Survey, John Addison and Alberto Castro (1987) confirmed Hall's findings that many
workers enjoy long-term employment—20 or more years with the same
firm. They also found that this is more likely to be true among union
than among nonunion employees.
With some new data from a supplement to the 1987 Current Popula
tion Survey, Max Carey (1988) estimated occupational tenure for the
American workforce. This is defined as cumulative years in an occupa
tion, regardless of changes of employers or other interruptions, and
therefore is not directly comparable to the estimates above. Carey found
that current median occupational tenure for older male workers ranged
from 20 years for those aged 50-54 to 31 years for those 70 and over.
There was link between this and tenure with a specific employer. Of
those with occupational tenure of 25 years or more, nearly half had
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Table 1.5
Job Tenure on Longest Job
Number

Men

Women

8,131
-313

3,021
-353

7,818

2,668

0-4 years

12%

29%

5-9 years

10%

15%

10-19 years

23%

27%

20-29 years

24%

17%

30-39 years

18%

6%

40 or more years

13%

5%

100%

100%

Not employed

19%

39%

Employed on longest job

63%

50%

Employed on another job

18%

11%

100%

100%

RHS sample in 1969
-those without longest job data
Those with longest job data
Tenure on longest job

Labor force status in 1969

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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more than 25 years of tenure with their current employer and another
quarter had 10 to 24 years.
Akerlof and Main (1981) cleared up another source of confusion.
Although the length of the average job is very short, the average
employee is on a job of long duration. The problem is that the "average
job" statistic counts each job equally, despite the fact that some last
much longer than others. A tenure-weighted measure gives quite a dif
ferent picture. 26
Akerlof and Main estimated the eventual completed tenure of per
sons employed in 1963, 1966, 1968, and 1973, and then calculated the
mean tenure over these persons. They found that the average completed
tenure was long (about 17 or 18 years for men, and 11 or 12 years for
women) and that it changed very little over the 10-year period under
study. For those aged 56 through 59, the average duration of individuals'
longest jobs was over 20 years.
A career job of long duration is an important phenomenon in America.
The departure from this job is therefore a significant event. It is this
departure that we have studied. We will see that while many workers
do leave full-time work for full-time leisure—the traditional form of
retirement—many others embark on new and different careers late in life.
Outline of the Book
In the next two chapters, we review the research of selected authors
who have studied the determinants of the retirement decision. We begin
with the research of the Social Security Administration during the late
1930s and proceed to the present. We will see that both the research
methodologies and the conclusions have changed considerably over time.
The methodology has evolved from questionnaires that simply asked
people why they retired when they did, to complex econometric models
that draw deductions not from what people say but from what they do.
The overwhelming dominance of health factors has given way to a more
complex understanding of the financial environment in which retire
ment decisions are made. The division between chapters 2 and 3 is
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chronological and therefore somewhat arbitrary. In the latter chapter,
which begins in the early 1980s, we describe the current state-of-theart in retirement research.
In chapter 4, we utilize a life-cycle model to look at factors earlier
in a worker's career—long before retirement. If the economic incen
tives embedded in our retirement systems affect labor supply behavior
late in life, as considerable research suggests they do, then they may
do so earlier in the work career as well. We discuss current research
on the impact of pensions on labor mobility and conclude that pensions—
and to some extent Social Security—are designed to make sure that
workers do not stay on the job too long (the retirement issue), but also
that they do not leave too early (the mobility issue).
Chapters 5 and 6 document how a sample of older American workers
actually chose to withdraw from their career jobs. We find interesting
and diverse patterns. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the relatively
slim literature on partial retirement and then describes the actual exit
patterns of our sample. Chapter 6 discusses some simple correlates of
the transitions observed and compares the new jobs with the career jobs
of those who changed employment late in life.
A major theme of this book is that the public policy decisions that
society has made in constructing our Social Security and employer pen
sion systems affect work behavior throughout the life cycle—before,
during, and after retirement. The organization of the book can be viewed
in this way. After the introductory chapter, we focus on the retirement
decision—the transition from the career job. This is when the interac
tions between retirement income programs and labor supply decisions
are most obvious. This is also the topic of the bulk of the research.
We then look earlier—prior to retirement—and ask how these financial
incentives might influence younger workers. Finally we discuss the end
of the life cycle—work after retirement and second careers. In the final
chapter, we summarize what we have learned and look ahead to what
we might expect in the future.
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NOTES
1. Similar changes in the age distribution will be occurring in most other OECD nations as well
(OECD 1988, chapter 2 and tables A.I and A.2).
These forecasts use baseline mortality forecasts, in which increases in life expectancy are assumed
to be modest compared to those over the past decade. When more optimistic, low mortality assump
tions are used (an additional 10 years of life expectancy at age 60 by the year 2030), the growth
of the proportion over 64 is much more dramatic; for example it climbs to 29 percent of the U.S.
population by 2050 (ibid., table 7).
With a slight lag, the proportion aged 80 and above will increase significantly, from less than
3 percent of the population today to 6 percent by 2050 (and to 16 percent under the low mortality
assumption (ibid.)).
These long-range population projections are very sensitive to the assumptions behind them.
Guralnick, Yanagishita, and Schneider (1989) argue that the baseline Census projections are overly
pessimistic with respect to mortality. Assuming a decline in mortality of 2 percent per year, they
project that a quarter of all Americans will be aged 65 and over by the year 2040, and that the
number of those aged 85 and over will increase 10-fold.
2. The early retirement trend, especially among older men, is common throughout Western Europe
and North America. See Mirkin (1987) and OECD (1988) for details and some analysis.
3. Mirkin (1987) argues that one motivation for the many early retirement schemes that exist
in Western developed nations was to soak up the excess labor supply that developed during the
stagflation of the 1970s. These plans have now become institutionalized, and will work against
societal interests if labor markets turn around and workers are in short supply.
4. Much of the short-run problem was due to an error in the benefit calculation formula. As of
1972, both the average monthly earnings (the input into the benefit calculation formula) and the
formula itself were adjusting to inflation, which meant that the final benefits were overadjusted.
This flaw was eliminated by the 1977 amendments. For more detail, see the U.S. General Ac
counting Office report (1988). In addition to this problem, the 1970s were a decade of high
unemployment and slow economic growth, both of which caused Social Security revenues to fall
short of benefit payments.
5. In 1946, Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor under President Roosevelt and one of the ar
chitects of the Social Security system, wrote "even with enlarged benefits to persons reaching
retirement age in the next fifteen to twenty years, there would be ample funds (in the social security
system) to meet all immediate payments out of immediate income. But by any proper actuarial
estimate, there would be, in the end, an accumulated deficit. The reserves would not suffice to
pay benefits when those now twenty became sixty-five and eligible for retirement. . . . Perhaps
in 1980 it would be necessary for Congress to appropriate money to make up a deficit." (See
Perkins 1946, p. 293.) Now that is a prediction!
6. These issues are discussed by Tobin (1988). A number of proposals for radical change in the
Social Security system have emerged, and many are critiqued in a recent book of essays edited
by Meyer (1987). Starr (1988) has also written on the appropriate mix of public and private pro
vision of old-age income support, and Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (1989) have discussed some
of the implications of privatization.
7. Parnes et al. (1985) have provided a detailed description and a selection of research findings
from the NLS. An analogous volume for the RHS was edited by Irelan et al. (1976).
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8. This stage of life is growing because people are leaving their career jobs earlier and living
longer than ever before. Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky (1986) report that the life expectancy
of older Americans has been growing significantly. Between 1968 and 1980, for example, the
life expectancy of men and women aged 65 has increased by between one and two months per
year, mostly because of declines in cardiovascular mortality. Older people are living longer. What
this means for work patterns is less clear, because there is some evidence that, even as life expec
tancies increase, the health of the elderly is deteriorating. These two trends may well be related,
if the clinical successes of modern medicine have been able to prolong the survival of the chronically
ill. Yeas (1987) provides an excellent overview of these issues.
9. Ball (1988) has published an excellent and concise description of the fundamental principles
and later developments of the American Social Security system.
10. See table 5 in the Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement, 1986 (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO).
11. In 1970, after the boom decade, nearly a quarter of those aged 65 and over were living in
poverty, compared to only 11 percent of those less than 65, and 13 percent overall. Following
these large Social Security increases, the elderly poverty level declined and today is less than
the overall rate (Quinn 1987).
12. In 1987, Social Security provided 32 percent of the money income of multiperson families
with householders aged 65 and over, and 44 percent for individuals 65 and over living alone or
with nonrelatives only (Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement, 1988, table 3.E3).
13. When the health insurance (Medicare) component is added, total (1989) OASDHI expenditures
equal about 6 percent of GNP and over a quarter of total federal expenditures.
14. There are substantial differences in coverage by sex. In a study of new Social Security
beneficiaries claiming benefits for the first time in 1982, Woods (1988) reported that only 27
percent of the women were receiving a pension, compared to 53 percent of the men. When those
expecting to receive benefits in the future and those covered for potential survivor benefits were
included, the coverage rate rose to 44 percent for women—about three-quarters of the comparable
rate for men. In addition, the median monthly pension amount received by women was only about
half that received by men.
15. According to a recent study by Yeas and Grad (1987), about a quarter of the aged units (couples
and single individuals) received private pension income and 14 percent received government
employee pensions in 1984. These percentages will continue to grow as new cohorts continue
to retire. In 1982, for example, about half of all new Social Security beneficiaries (56 percent
of the married and 42 percent of the unmarried) also received pension benefits.
16. The number of active participants in plans exceeds the number of people with pension coverage,
because the former double counts those with more than one pension plan.
17. Gustman and Steinmeier (1989c) estimate that about half of the increase in primary defined
contribution coverage (between 1977 and 1985) is due to employment shifts toward the types
of firms historically unlikely to offer defined benefit plans, rather than firms actually changing
the type of plan they offer.
18. Both Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) and Moffitt (1984) have written on the nature and size
of these intergenerational transfers.
19. In a comment on the Ransom and Sutch research, Moen (1987) disputed the assertion that
the definition of labor force participation changed between 1880 and 1890. Moen's reading of
the instructions to the Census enumerators at the time suggests that a key Ransom and Sutch quotation
refers only to the occupations of children, not adults. He also claims that Ransom and Sutch
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arbitrarily excluded from the 1900 labor force those unemployed for more than six months, and
that this is crucial for establishing a constant participation rate between 1870 and 1930. In a long
response, Ransom and Sutch (1989) maintained that "[we] stand by our original (1900) estimate"
[but] "are prepared to believe that the true labor force participation of men 60 and older was
higher in 1870 and 1880 than the published census reported and higher than our benchmark estimate
for 1900." Even if this is true, Ransom and Sutch have presented strong evidence that there was
little change in the participation rates of older men between 1900 and 1937. What happened prior
to that is of little relevance to our discussion.
20. Similar patterns are observed in most other OECD countries as well (OECD 1988).
21. A recent article by Shank (1988) documents the dramatic growth in female labor supply dur
ing the postwar period. The participation rate for women aged 25 to 54 more than doubled, from
about three in 10 in 1946 to more than seven in 10 today. Department of Labor projections estimate
that this will rise to eight in 10 by the year 2000. The age pattern of participation for women
has also changed, from the historical M-shape (reflecting withdrawal during childbearing years)
to the inverted U-shape characteristic of male participation. Currently, about two-thirds of women
aged 25-54 with children under 18 are in the labor force, as are more than half of those with
children under age three.
22. The absolute drop in the labor force participation rate at age 62 increases from 12 to 14,
and then to 15 percentage points as we consider the first three of these successive cohorts—each
five years apart. At age 65, the drops are 14, 13, and 8 percent for these cohorts.
23. Of course, the absolute changes will start to decline at some age because the initial (1968)
participation rates become so small. For example, only 30 percent of men aged 70 (and 25 per
cent of those aged 72) were in the labor force in 1968. Even if none of the latter worked in 1989,
the absolute decline would still be smaller than for those aged 63.
24. During the last two decades, the labor force participation rate of women aged 25-54 increas
ed from 47 to 72 percent. For women 55-64, it was unchanged, and for those 65 and over it
declined slightly. The combination of earlier retirement by men and steady participation by older
women has significantly increased the female share of the older (55 and over) workforce, from
two in 10 in 1950 to four in 10 today (Herz 1988).
25. See Herz (1988) for more detail on part-time and part-year work by women of different ages.
26. An analogy drawn from Bane and Ellwood (1986) may clarify the issue. Imagine a hospital
with three beds, two dedicated to long-term care and one to overnight patients. Over a one-month
period, each of the long-term beds has only one occupant, while the short-term bed has 30. Of
the 32 total patients, 30 were admitted for only one day; hence, the average stay is very short.
Yet, on any particular day during the month, two-thirds of the patients were on a spell of longterm hospitalization. The average patient on any day requires long-term care. From another perspec
tive, of the 90 person-days of care during the month, 60 were long-term in nature.

-2The Individual Retirement Decision
As the previous chapter has documented, dramatic changes have oc
curred in the retirement patterns of older Americans during the past
several decades. Work after age 65, once the norm, is now the excep
tion. In 1950, the labor force participation rate of American men 65
and over was near 50 percent. By 1980, it had dropped below 20 per
cent, and currently only one of every six of these men is in the labor
force. For women aged 65 and over, the participation rate has decreas
ed slowly, from 11 to 9 percent over this same period.
Why have retirement patterns changed so much in recent years? Why
don't older Americans work beyond age 65 anymore? Why do so many
Americans claim Social Security benefits at age 62? l In this chapter
we discuss these questions from an historical perspective, beginning
in the postwar period, soon after the introduction of the Social Security
system, and continuing up through the research of the late 1970s. The
next chapter describes current econometric work in this area. We will
see that over time the answers have changed as dramatically as the retire
ment patterns being explained.
We are particularly interested in the role of Social Security and
employer pensions in the individual retirement decision. What is the
nature of the financial incentives embedded in these programs? Do they
encourage or discourage work, and at what ages? To what extent do
potential retirees respond to these incentives? How have the research
conclusions changed over the years?
In the early days of research on these issues, financial incentives were
rarely considered to be important determinants of the retirement deci
sion. People were assumed to work until they had to quit—forced by
deteriorating health, compulsory retirement, an unexpected layoff, or
a change in personal circumstances that made continued employment
41
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difficult or impossible. Once they left work, they then turned to whatever
retirement income sources were available—Social Security and, in some
cases, employer pensions. But the thought that these retirement income
sources might have induced the retirement behavior was largely dismiss
ed. Voluntary retirements by able-bodied workers were thought to be
rare.
Today, on the other hand, there is general agreement that Social
Security and employer pensions do exert a significant influence on in
dividual retirement decisions. Researchers have shown that substantial
retirement incentives (or work disincentives) do exist for many older
Americans and that workers respond as though they understand them.
Disagreement remains on the magnitude of their influence, but all agree
that they have some effect. Other factors, such as health status, job
characteristics, and involuntary terminations are still considered to be
important, but they are usually analyzed in conjunction with the finan
cial tradeoffs faced by workers nearing retirement age.
This is an important and useful analytical transition. The incentives
in the Social Security system and, to a lesser extent, employer pensions
are subject to a greater degree of government influence than are the
health status or the labor market experience (such as layoffs) of older
workers. If the answers emerging from this new research are correct,
then aggregate retirement trends are more responsive to public policy
initiatives than we once thought.
There are at least two explanations for the changing views of retire
ment scholars over the past 40 years. The first is that the actual reasons
for retirement may have changed and researchers have simply been
documenting this transition. Retirement incentives are undoubtedly more
important now than they were several decades ago. As we saw in chapter
1, our Social Security and pension systems are much larger than they
used to be. Coverage and real benefits have grown over time, and so,
it might be argued, has their influence.
On the other hand, the reasons for retirement may not have changed
so much over time. Rather, what may be different is the ability of re
searchers to ferret them out. Research methodologies have changed
significantly. In the early days, retirees were simply asked in question-
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naires why they retired when they did. When the answers were tallied,
analysts found that retirement incentives were rarely, if ever, mention
ed, and concluded that they were unimportant. Modern economic
research, on the other hand, pays much less attention to these subjec
tive responses. We do not ask what retirees say, but rather what they
do, and under what circumstances. This approach, with the extensive
data sets and sophisticated statistical techniques that make it possible,
tells a different story about the retirement decision. Those facing financial
incentives to retire are more likely to do so, regardless of what they say.
This revolution has been accompanied by new ways of modeling retire
ment income. Economists now view Social Security and pension rights
as assets or stocks of wealth rather than as annual flows. This change,
along with a life-cycle view of decisionmaking, has shed new light on
the choices that older workers face. There has been a timely marriage
of modern economic theory, outstanding data sets, and improved
statistical techniques. What has emerged is a new view of the retire
ment decision. In this chapter, we first review the early research and
see why retirement incentives received so little attention in the past.
Even in these survey questionnaires, however, we find hints that we
had missed part of the story or that the reasons for retirement were chang
ing. We then describe a simple economic model of the retirement deci
sion and turn to the beginnings of the modern literature that developed
from it. We outline the nature of the financial incentives, as we now
see them, and discuss the early econometric evidence that demonstrates
their importance as determinants of individual retirement decisions.

The Early Literature
Social Security Administration Research
Much of the early research on the determinants of retirement behavior
was done by analysts at the Social Security Administration and published
in the Social Security Bulletin. 2 The earliest article, by Edna Wentworth
(1945), was based on a survey of nearly 2,400 male old-age beneficiaries
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who received benefits in 1940 and were then interviewed during 194land
1942. These men, among the earliest Social Security recipients, were
asked, "Why did you quit working before you filed for benefits?" Well
over half (53 to 60 percent in various cities) said they had been laid
off by their employers. Of the remainder who reported a "voluntary"
retirement (that is, not initiated by the employer), about a third claim
ed they retired for reasons of' 'health.'' This category was broadly defin
ed and included responses describing general fatigue and complaints
about old age and the difficulty of work. (Of course, some of the in
voluntary retirements, at the employer's behest, may have been prompt
ed by the deteriorating health of the worker as well.) The important
point is that fewer than 5 percent of the respondents seemed to have
retired voluntarily while in good health. Wentworth concluded that "the
fact that only 3-6 percent of the beneficiaries retired voluntarily in order
to enjoy leisure is significant in evaluating the part old-age insurance
benefits have played in influencing aged workers to leave the labor
market."
A few years later, Margaret Stecker (1951) reported on the Went
worth study and on three smaller surveys from the 1940s. She found
that the overwhelming majority of Social Security beneficiaries left their
last covered employment because they had lost their jobs or had had
to quit for health reasons. Only 4 to 6 percent left because they "wanted
to retire." She concluded that "most old people work as long as they
can and retire only because they are forced to do so," and that "only
a small proportion of old people leave the labor market for good unless
they have to."
But decisions are made under constraints. Individuals who lose jobs
can search for another, although, as we will see in chapter 6, they usually
cannot find jobs that match their previous wage rates. Similarly, although
some health conditions do absolutely preclude work, many others make
it less desirable or more difficult, but not impossible. It is likely that
the financial situation facing an older person who has been dismissed
or fallen ill will influence the decision made. Stecker acknowledged
this in discussing why people were so reluctant to retire. "The prin
cipal reason that they want to continue working, however, is that without
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earnings they do not have resources enough to live at the level to which
they are accustomed, or even to meet the cost of basic needs." She
also noted that those whose retirement incomes were the lowest were
the most likely to return to work after claiming benefits. Financial in
centives may influence behavior even though the individuals attribute
the decision to other factors.
In 1951, the Social Security Administration conducted the first large
national survey of the retired beneficiary population. The results of over
15,000 interviews confirmed earlier beliefs. Nearly 85 percent of the
retired had either lost their last job or quit because they were unable
to work. Fewer than 4 percent retired voluntarily in good health—an
even lower percentage than in previous surveys. Most of those who
quit or were dismissed for nonhealth reasons returned to the labor force.
Sleeker (1955) again concluded that "voluntary quitting to enjoy a life
of leisure is rare among old-age beneficiaries. Relatively few who are
able to work choose retirement." As we will see, this is a far cry from
the situation today.
In 1963, the Social Security Administration surveyed both beneficiaries
and nonbeneficiaries and included respondents as young as 62. Women
had been eligible for reduced Social Security benefits at age 62 since
1956, and men since 1961. For the first time, a trend toward more volun
tary retirements was observed. Nearly two-thirds of the male wage and
salary workers claimed that they had decided to retire, although more
than half of these did so because of health.
Of the men who had retired in the previous five years, 19 percent
of those aged 65 or over and 11 percent of those 62-64 said they did
so because they preferred leisure (Palmore 1964). Twenty-two percent
of the retired women surveyed claimed the same (Epstein and Murray
1967). These numbers are much higher than the 4 to 6 percent observ
ed earlier. Palmore stated that "although most men retire involuntarily—
because of poor health . . . or because they have reached a compulsory
retirement age—voluntary retirements are increasing." Epstein and Mur
ray agreed that "there seem to be more and more aged men who are
well enough to work and who might get some kind of job if they were
interested, but who prefer the leisure of retirement."
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In the 1963 survey, the question on reasons for retirement listed eight
reasons plus "other (specify)." None of the eight had anything to do
with Social Security or pensions. This may have been responsible in
part for the rare mention of financial incentives. Those still working
were asked whether they expected to stop working or work less than
they currently were, and if so, why. The answer space to this question
was open-ended and no specific categories were suggested. Among the
men who did plan to stop or work less, the most common reason given
was "becoming eligible for retirement benefits." A third of the
respondents gave this reason, and another 7 percent replied "to enjoy
leisure" (Epstein and Murray 1967).
Here was an early indication that retirement income eligibility might
influence a worker's plans. There was no discussion of what aspect of
Social Security or the pension plan might be responsible. In discussing
another finding, however, Palmore (1964) suggested that "the difference
[in the retirement plans of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries] may be
due to the fact that beneficiaries under age 72 have their benefit reduc
ed by the earnings test . . . if they earn more than $1,200 per year."
Here was an early hint of an issue that has center stage today.
A 1971 article by Virginia Reno utilized a new ongoing survey of
recent Social Security recipients. Those not working were asked why
they had left their last jobs. Nearly half (45 percent) said health, another
27 percent gave job-related reasons, and 17 percent (the identical ag
gregate percentage as in the 1963 survey mentioned above) said they
wanted to retire. A mere 2 percent claimed the reason was eligibility
for Social Security benefits or pension. It looked like eligibility was
not very important.
But in another part of the survey, respondents were asked more struc
tured questions about leaving their last jobs. In response to the direct
inquiry, "did you leave your last job because you wanted to start get
ting social security or a pension?" 31 percent said "yes." Perhaps
eligibility was important, although not the primary reason. These
responses suggest at least two conclusions: first, that there is some survey
evidence that financial considerations may be significant, despite
respondents' reluctance to mention them unless asked directly; and sec-
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ond, that the responses may depend on the form and nature of the ques
tions asked, perhaps even of whether the questionnaire provides specific
categories of answers or merely an open-ended answer blank.
Reno (1971) saw the importance of benefits in the retirement deci
sion, and found that the proportion who wanted to retire increased direct
ly with the size of their retirement benefits. She concluded that
"... financial considerations often underlie the willingness with which
men retire early," and that "the level of retirement benefit income had
an important influence on the men's willingness to accept or initiate
early retirement."
More recently, Michael Packard and Virginia Reno (1989) reported
on the results of a 1982 survey of new retired-worker beneficiaries.
Those no longer working (and not self-employed on their last job) were
asked which of a list of factors was the most important reason for leav
ing their last jobs. The answers suggested that there were more volun
tary than involuntary retirements. The proportion retiring voluntarily
rose with the age of departure from the job, and was much higher for
those eligible for a pension. Overall, about one-third (40 percent of the
men and 24 percent of the women) said they just wanted to retire. This
was far more than the quarter who named health. 3 Again, almost no
one mentioned eligibility for Social Security or pension benefits as the
primary motivation.
Sally Sherman (1985) compared the results of the 1968 and 1982
surveys for nonemployed men aged 62-64, and aggregated the answers
into three categories: employer-initiated, health problems, and employeeinitiated. The proportion of retirements that were employer-initiated
(lost job or [rarely] compulsory retirement) remained the same over
these 14 years—17 percent. The proportion due to health and employee
initiation reversed. Health dropped from 54 to 29 percent, and the
number of people claiming a desire to retire or (rarely) to receive retire
ment benefits rose from 29 to 54 percent. This is consistent with a trend
toward more voluntary retirements.
Several authors have noted, however, that the importance of health
generally drops with the age of benefit receipt, at least through age 65.
In the 1982 survey, for example, nearly one-third of the men first claim-
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ing benefits at age 62 named health as the primary reason, compared
to only a quarter of those who waited until 63 or 64, and 17 percent
of those at 65. (There was an increase to 22 percent among the very
small number of men who delayed receipt beyond age 65.) The pattern
was less clear for women, although the 62-year-old beneficiaries were
again the most likely to cite health (Sherman 1985).
Using the National Longitudinal Surveys of older men, Eric Kingson
(1982) analyzed the health of "very early retirees"—those who per
manently withdrew from the labor force before age 62. He found that
the vast majority either had medically certified disabilities or reported
health conditions that prevented or limited work. Health status was pro
bably very important in their retirement decisions. Packard and Reno
(1989) found that it was, for men at least, with a sample of very early
retirees from the 1982 New Beneficiaries Survey. The proportion of
men naming health as the primary retirement reason for leaving their
last job declined from 35 percent among those who left before age 55,
to 30 percent between ages 55 and 62, to 26 percent at age 62, and
only 21 percent thereafter. It is essential to remember, however, that
older Americans are an exceedingly diverse group, and that most
generalizations, excluding this one, are potentially misleading. Our
reading of the evidence on health is not that it is unimportant as a retire
ment determinant, or that it ever was, but that it is less important than
it once was and less important than it may appear in surveys featuring
subjective retrospective reasons for retirement.
Since Sherman's and Packard and Reno's data included only those
receiving Social Security checks, they were unable to compare the cir
cumstances of those who could and those who could not claim benefits.
This would be a much more robust test of the influence of retirement
benefits, and this is the approach taken in current econometric research.
In addition, none of these researchers was able to test explicitly which
aspects of the Social Security and pension plans might have been im
portant. Was it the size of the benefit, the ratio of benefits to recent
earnings, or the earnings test? Insights into these issues had to await
a major modeling change—from viewing these benefits as flows of in
come to viewing them as assets or stocks of wealth.
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Other Early Research
Researchers outside the Social Security Administration also shed light
on the reasons for the dramatic retirement trends underway. Peter Steiner
and Robert Dorfman (1957) reported on a special 1952 Census Bureau
survey of approximately 3,600 men and women aged 65 and over.
Although the study emphasized economic status, there were several ques
tions on the circumstances and reasons for retirement. Steiner and Dorf
man found that three-quarters of the men retired voluntarily, but primari
ly for health reasons. 4 All other reasons for voluntary retirement were
of relatively minor importance. In particular, only a small proportion
had been driven out of the labor force by retirement systems. The authors
concluded that the main causes of labor force withdrawal were poor
health and obsolescence of skills—a picture consistent with that painted
by Social Security researchers at the time.
Clarence Long (1958) attempted to explain the decline in labor force
participation by older workers in five Western industrialized countries,
including the United States. He found little evidence that the trends were
due to demographic changes, rising real earnings, declining physical
productivity of the aged, increases in arbitrary discrimination (such as
mandatory retirement provisions), or changes in technology. He sug
gested that the influence of Social Security and pensions was marginal
and that
. . . Social Security and pensions were far from being the
main force (though they doubtless helped) in bringing about
the withdrawal of elderly persons from the labor market. In
deed, there is evidence that elderly persons desire to work
as late in life as their health permits, mainly because old age
benefits rarely take the place of earned income even when
they are comparatively generous.
The implication here is that retirement benefits could be influential, but
that they were too small at the time to induce labor force withdrawal.
Note that retirement rights were being viewed as annual flows, an ap
proach that can lead to conclusions quite different from those to follow.

50

The Individual Retirement Decision

To what did Long attribute the decline in participation rates? He claim
ed that the older men were being displaced by better-trained women
who would work for lower wages. The low educational attainment of
the older generation put them at a competitive disadvantage against young
and middle-aged women. Long's answer was on the demand side of
the market.
Margaret Gordon (1963) later reported on an international study of
18 developed nations. She noted that participation rates among older
men had been declining for decades in all the countries studied. The
trend accelerated during recessions and depressions and slowed or re
versed briefly during wars, but the overall declining pattern was clear.
She acknowledged that a large proportion of the retired attributed the
decision to "ill health," but noted that that phrase could encompass
a wide variety of conditions, many of which did not preclude work.
Might not the decisions of those in poor health depend on the availability
of retirement income sources? She concluded that
[I]t seems reasonable to assume that, in a substantial pro
portion of cases in which ill health is the ultimate reason for
retirement, prospective retirement income will have an im
portant influence on the timing of the decision to retire. There
is scattered evidence . . . that significant numbers of elderly
keep postponing the decision to retire, despite slow physical
deterioration, at least partly because of the prospect of serious
ly inadequate retirement income.
Gordon found a significant negative correlation between the labor
force participation rate of men over 64 and the ratio of average oldage, survivors, and disability benefits to average earnings. This is a
rough aggregate replacement rate. She also found participation rates
lower the longer the country had had an old-age benefit program and
concluded that
. . . there is considerable evidence to suggest that prospec
tive retirement income has a highly important influence on
attitudes toward retirement. . . . The findings of the present
study suggest that, as benefit levels are improved, a rising
proportion of elderly people will be attracted by the prospect
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of retirement. ... As old-age benefits increase, the propor
tion of elderly persons who choose to retire will no doubt
gradually increase.
Truer words were never spoken.
The Gordon article is important for several reasons. She expressed
skepticism in taking the "health" answers to retirement questions at
face value. At minimum, health status is likely to interact with other
factors, such as retirement income alternatives. In addition, she presented
a supply-side explanation for the retirement trends: older workers were
choosing to retire, given the alternatives they faced, rather than being
forced out and then turning to whatever retirement income sources were
available. And finally, in discussing Great Britain, Gordon included
a long description of the impact on an individual's pension benefit of
delaying retirement from age 65 to 70. She pointed out that the increase
in the annual amount was insufficient to compensate for the five years
of benefits foregone. This was an early preview of an issue that dominates
much of the retirement literature today.
A few years later, Michael Brennan, Philip Taft, and Mark Schupack
(1967) published a study titled The Economics of Age. They studied
employment patterns by detailed occupational and age groups. Their
explanation of declining elderly labor force participation rates was one
of geographical and job immobility. Older workers, they claimed, found
the demand for their services declining because of their decreasing pro
ductivity, greater supplementary employment costs (such as pension con
tributions and workers' compensation), and the substitution of female
labor. Once displaced, older workers found it difficult to become
reemployed, and eventually left the labor force. This prospect, which
was really disguised unemployment, was the best among a very poor
set of alternatives.
This is another demand-side argument. Individuals work as long as
they can, until they are forced out. The authors dismissed the impor
tance of Social Security and pensions in the decision, arguing that "retire
ment income ... is simply not large enough relative to earned income
to make voluntary retirement with sufficient income feasible."
Finally, in 1969, Richard Barfield and James Morgan published a
research volume that focused specifically on the early retirement exper-
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ience. They noted the previous increases in the coverage and benefit
levels provided by Social Security and employer pensions and the
liberalized early retirement benefits negotiated by the United Auto
Workers in 1964. They attempted to find the factors that influenced
the decision to retire voluntarily; that is, prior to mandatory retirement
age and the onset of debilitating health conditions. They gathered data
on a national representative sample and on a random sample of auto
workers around 60 years old. The major finding of their study was that
"financial factors—primarily expected retirement income—are of prin
cipal importance in the retirement decision." Subjective health status,
age, and attitudinal variables were also important, but financial incen
tives were key.
With a few exceptions, then, research through the 1960s described
a drama in which Social Security and pension benefits played relative
ly minor roles. Many retirements were employer-initiated, and therefore
involuntary. Of the voluntary departures, most seemed to be due to health
problems. At least this is how retirees described their decisions when
asked. Researchers had detected an increase in the number of truly volun
tary retirements by healthy people who simply preferred more leisure.
But these were still the minority, probably less than 20 percent. Some
analysts suspected that the availability of retirement income sources was
more important than the surveys suggested, but hard empirical evidence
was scarce.
Circumstantial evidence, however, was abundant. Although official
statistics showed labor force participation rates for older men declin
ing since at least 1890, the size of the decline was much larger after
than before the development of the Social Security system. During the
60 years between 1890 and 1950, the labor force participation rate for
men 65 and over dropped about a third, from 68 to 46 percent. Over
the next 24 years, as Social Security coverage grew from 18 to 67 per
cent of the labor force (and private pension coverage grew as well),
the participation rate dropped by half (Campbell and Campbell 1976). 5
In addition to this aggregate longitudinal evidence, cross-sectional
analyses of participation rates by age showed dramatic declines at age
65, the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits. The size of the
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age-65 effect grew over time, and another one appeared at age 62, after
the introduction of reduced Social Security benefits (Ippolito 1990). In
1970, the male participation rate dropped by 7 percentage points be
tween ages 61 and 62 and by nearly 25 points at age 65. By the
mid-1970s, nearly half of all eligible workers aged 62 to 64 claimed
early Social Security retirement benefits.
But other things were changing as well. Health status, compulsory
retirement, and unexpected layoffs remained important. Pension plan
coverage was on the rise. Large real increases in Social Security benefits
were being legislated. The economy recovered from the recessions of
the 1950s, enjoyed the economic boom of the late 1960s, and then
slumped into the stagflation of the 1970s. The research problem clear
ly required empirical techniques that could disaggregate these various
determinants and isolate their individual effects.
During this same time, two outstanding data sets were being
developed. The Department of Labor was funding the National
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), one part of which would follow nearly
5,000 men aged 45-59 for 17 years—from 1966 until 1983. At the same
time, the Social Security Administration was planning the Retirement
History Study (RHS), a 10-year longitudinal study of the retirement
process. Over 11,000 respondents aged 58-63 would be interviewed
in 1969, and then again every two years until 1979. These two sources
would provide the testing ground for new theories about the nature of
the retirement decision.
Finally, economists were beginning to take a closer look at the choices
that older Americans faced. They realized that the incentives embed
ded in retirement plans were very complicated and that simple, oneperiod models were inadequate to describe the options available.
Multiperiod life-cycle models were developed and a new view of the
retirement decision emerged.

Economic Models of the Retirement Decision
The Social Security Act is a very complicated piece of legislation.
To describe it in all its detail would be neither enjoyable nor productive.
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The goal of a model is to highlight essential details—those attributes
that have an important impact on the behavior under study—and to ig
nore others. This yields a cleaner and more understandable description
of the program, though admittedly one missing much of the rich in
stitutional detail.
The simplest economic models of Social Security treat it as a oneperiod tax and transfer program. Individuals maximize utility, which
depends on leisure (L) and on the consumption of a composite good
(X), which is purchased with income. A person enters the period with
a stock of wealth (A) and faces an exogenously determined hourly wage
rate (w). If we ignore income taxes and assume that the choice of hours
of work is entirely up to the worker, the task, as seen in figure 2.1,
is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint,
PX=A+w(T-L)
where P is the price of the composite good, T is the length of the time
period, and (T-L) is hours worked.
Figure 2.1
Labor-Leisure Choice, Without Social Security System
Income
E

Hours of Leisure (L)
Hours of Work
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Graphically, the individual chooses the point (Zj) on the linear budget
constraint (AE) that is tangent to the highest indifference curve (Uj).
A simple manipulation of the budget constraint yields a useful insight:
A+wT=PX+wL.
The term [A+wT] is "full income"—the amount someone would earn
by working the entire T hours. The sum is entirely exogenous in this
model, since it depends on three exogenous quantities: assets, the wage
rate, and the number of hours in the time period. It is not a function
of the current labor-leisure choice. This "full income" is then "spent"
on the two "goods"available: X , which costs P per unit, and L (hours
of leisure), which costs w per hour—the opportunity cost of not work
ing. A proportional income tax would rotate the budget constraint down
(the equivalent of a decrease in the wage rate); a progressive tax would
make it concave.
How does the introduction of Social Security change this model? Prior
to the age of eligibility for benefits, Social Security merely taxes wages
up to some maximum amount—$51,300 in 1990. Individuals earning
beyond that amount have their full incomes reduced by the maximum
contributions, but their marginal wage rates are unchanged. They re
spond as they would to any wealth loss—they purchase fewer of all nor
mal goods, including hours of leisure. In other words, they should work
more. But someone earning less than the maximum taxable amount faces
a second effect. The marginal after-tax wage rate is now lower because
of the Social Security contribution. Since this is the opportunity cost
(the price) of leisure, leisure is now less expensive than it was. This
"substitution effect" increases the demand for leisure. The income (or
wealth) effect says work more because you are poorer (by the amount
of the Social Security tax) than you were. But the substitution effect
says work less, since leisure is on sale. Whether the income or the
substitution effect dominates is an empirical question. From a theoretical
point of view, the net effect is ambiguous.
When the individual becomes eligible for retirement benefits (B) at
age 62, the analysis changes again. First, the zero-hours intercept of
the budget constraint rises from [A] to [A+B], as seen in figure 2.2.

56

The Individual Retirement Decision

Figure 2.2
Labor-Leisure Choice,
With Social Security System
Showing Reduced Labor Supply

Income
E

O
T

Hours of Leisure (L)
Hours of Work

T
O

In addition, the marginal wage rate declines because Social Security
reduces benefits by $1 for every $2 of earnings after an exempt amount. 6
In this one-period model, this is identical to an additional tax of 50 per
cent. If we ignore Social Security contributions and income taxes, the
budget constraint is parallel to the original as long as earnings are less
than the exempt amount and then has one-half the slope (along CD,
reflecting the one-half benefit reduction rate) until it rejoins the original
budget constraint at D. Beyond this point the individual is working too
many Hours to be able to collect any Social Security benefits.
The effect of these changes on the labor supply of the individual is
unambiguous—the person should work the same amount or less. Because
of the potential benefit (B), the individual is richer, and therefore can buy
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more of all normal goods including leisure. This is the income effect.
In addition, the price of leisure has been reduced in that range (CD)
where the 50 percent Social Security benefit reduction rate is in effect.
The reward to work (the opportunity cost of not working) is less than
it used to be. The substitution effect implies that the individual will pur
chase more of the good (leisure), whose relative price has decreased.
The income and substitution effects work together. The Social Securi
ty incentives after eligibility will reduce hours of work, unless the in
dividual was already retired (working 0 hours) or continues to work
along DE and declines Social Security benefits altogether.
Some people who used to work at Z l will find that the tangency be
tween the new budget constraint and their highest indifference curve
(U2) is now along CD; say, at Z2 in figure 2.2. The combination of
the income guarantee (B) and the dramatically reduced marginal wage
rate (the reward for work) has reduced their labor supply. For others,
the highest indifference curve may now intersect at Z3—zero hours of
work, as depicted in figure 2.3. These workers have been induced to
retire by the Social Security incentives.
This simple one-period analysis was popular in the early retirement
research by economists, which is reviewed below. 7 But it has a fatal
flaw. It ignores an essential ingredient in the Social Security system.
Although Social Security does resemble a tax and transfer system in
many ways, it also has some features of a savings program. In par
ticular, the benefits that one eventually receives depend upon the earn
ings (and therefore the contributions) made earlier. Social Security taxes
today increase benefits tomorrow. And delaying retirement after the
age of eligibility does the same. This changes the analysis in fundamental
ways that cannot be seen in a one-period framework.
A life-cycle model of work and consumption behavior differs from
a one-period model in several essential ways. Decisions made in any
one period depend on past and present circumstances and on expecta
tions about the future. People can transfer purchasing power over time—
consuming income before it is earned by borrowing, or saving it for
later consumption by lending. In the simplest models, with no uncer
tainty, individuals are assumed to foresee what lies ahead—future wage
and interest rates, future Social Security rules, and the lengths of their
lifetimes.
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Figure 2.3
Labor-Leisure Choice,
With Social Security System
Showing Complete Retirement

A+B

O
T

Hours of Leisure (L)
Hours of Work

T
O

From a life-cycle perspective, Social Security contributions are not
just taxes. They are taxes today, but they generate larger benefits in
the future. The net impact on one's lifetime wealth may be positive,
negative, or zero, depending on whether the future increments exceed
the taxes. If the rules are actuarially fair or neutral (the present dis
counted values of the benefits and taxes are equal), then the introduc
tion of the Social Security system should have no effect at all on labor
supply behavior. It is merely a mandatory savings program that one
could offset by lending and borrowing.
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Considerable research, however, suggests that for all the cohorts that
have retired thus far, the Social Security system has not been actuarially fair. Rather, benefits have vastly exceeded the amounts that prudent
investment of the contributions would have provided. 8 What looked like
an earnings tax was really an earnings subsidy, since a dollar of con
tribution withheld provided well more than a dollar (in present discounted
value terms) of future benefits. Rather than lowering the slope of the
budget constraint (the wage rate) at younger ages, the Social Security
rules had actually raised it.
The impact of the life-cycle view is even more dramatic once the age
of eligibility for Social Security benefits (age 62) is reached. In figure
2.2, we implicitly assumed that benefits foregone by those earning
beyond the exempt amount were lost forever. But this is not true for
two important reasons.
Social Security benefits are based on one's average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME), a complicated function of covered earnings over the
lifetime. 9 Another year of earnings will usually raise this average and
result in higher Social Security benefits in the future. In addition to the
benefit recalculation, there is also an actuarial adjustment that can have
dramatic effects. Between the ages of 62 and 65, benefits are reduced
by five-ninths of 1 percent for each month prior to age 65 that one claims
benefits. This implies a 6.67 percent reduction for each year of early
retirement, or a 20 percent reduction for retiring the maximum three
years early. Viewed from the other end, the 80 percent benefit at age
62, the rules provide a bonus—a delayed retirement credit—for each
additional year of work between the ages of 62 and 65. (An adjustment
is actually made for any month in which benefits are reduced or foregone,
and differs slightly depending on whether one has yet claimed benefits
at all (Clark and Gohmann 1983).) The adjustment, which applies to
all future benefits, is compensation for claiming fewer checks.
The choice of whether to work another year after age 62 is now more
complicated. With respect to Social Security, it is not simply a choice
between a benefit of Bj if one retires and 0 if one does not. Rather,
it is a choice between one stream of benefits (B p Bj, Bj . . . ) begin
ning now and another stream (0, B2, B2 . . . ) beginning in a year, with
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B2 larger than Bj. Which of these streams is worth more? Adding the
benefits is inappropriate, since they arrive at different times. What must
be compared is the present discounted value of the streams, where
1, and
PDV2 =0+B2/(l+r)+B2/(l+r)2 +B2/(l+r)3 . . .
= £ B2/(l+r)<.
The present discounted value of a stream of future payments is merely
the stock of funds today that, if invested at interest rate r, could yield
the stream in question. Although B2 exceeds Bj (annual benefits are
higher if you work another year), PDV2 may or may not exceed PDVj
because the first B2 is 0.
Note that Social Security rights, which guarantee a stream of income
in the future, are viewed here as an asset or a type of wealth, not as
a monthly benefit. A present discounted value is a stock, like a savings
account, not a flow, like a monthly salary. The value of this asset can
rise or fall as one delays retirement, depending on the extent of the benefit
recalculation and the actuarial adjustment. This modest change of
framework, from a flow to a stock, has dramatic implications for one's
view of the financial incentives embedded in the Social Security
legislation.
Suppose, for example, that the present discounted values above are
equal. This is an actuarially fair or age-neutral system, since the asset
value is not affected by the timing of retirement. In this case, the earn
ings test, which is still on the books, has in fact disappeared! The benefit
reduction rate of 50 percent is really zero. The reason is that benefits
foregone today because of additional work are not lost, as they appear
to be in a one-period model, but rather are delayed and returned to the
recipient in the form of higher Social Security checks in the future.
Suppose now that PDV2 exceeds PDVj; that is, that the future in
crements are more than sufficient, in an actuarial sense, to compensate
for the initial benefits lost. In this case, not only are there no earnings
test and no benefit reduction rate, but the system actually provides an
earnings subsidy. The true compensation for the year equals the
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paychecksp/Ms the increment to Social Security wealth that accrues from
the additional work.
On the other hand, if PDV2 is less than PDVj, future increments are
insufficient to compensate for the loss in benefits today. Additional work
does provide a paycheck, but it also reduces the value of Social Securi
ty rights by the loss in present discounted value. (The loss is less than
the full amount of benefits foregone (B t), because future benefits do
increase.) While one pocket is being filled, the other is being picked.
In this scenario, the Social Security system has imposed a pay cut—a
surreptitious one, but a pay cut nonetheless.
As we will see, one topic of debate is over which scenario most ac
curately describes the Social Security system for workers between the
ages of 62 and 65. But everyone agrees that after age 65, the last scenario
is the appropriate one. The reason is that at age 65, the delayed retire
ment credit drops from 6.67 percent to only 3 percent per year of delay.
This 3 percent annual increment is inadequate to compensate for the
benefits foregone. Therefore, those who work beyond age 65 do so at
a true wage rate that is lower than they earned the year before.
Defined-benefit pension programs are similar to Social Security. They
promise a stream of benefits in the future, the size of which is usually
a function of one's work history. Prior to eligibility and after vesting,
additional years of work add to the asset value of the pension rights.
One's true compensation exceeds the paycheck by the increment to pen
sion wealth. But after eligibility, an employee who remains on the job
forgoes pension benefits. Whether pension wealth rises or falls depends
on the benefit calculation rules of the particular pension plan.
Pensions are much more difficult to study than Social Security.
Although the Social Security system is complicated, there is only one
system, and the details are known to the researcher. In contrast, there
are hundreds of thousands of employer pension plans, each with its own
rules and regulations, and these are often not known to the analyst.
Larry Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) have studied the details of
nearly 1,200 plans from the Department of Labor's Level of Benefits
Survey and found a wide variety of incentives. They define the accrual
rate as the change in pension wealth following an additional year of
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work divided by earnings for that year. Positive accrual rates imply
a wage subsidy and negative ones, a wage tax. They find considerable
evidence that future pension increments are often inadequate to com
pensate for current benefits foregone. They conclude that:
Typical plan provisions provide a strong incentive for retire
ment after the age of plan normal retirement, and a large
portion of plans provide a strong incentive for retirement after
the age of early retirement. . . . For example, while the
average plan may provide reduced but still positive accrual
after the age of early retirement, for a large proportion of
plans the accrual rate after this age is a sizable negative
number. Thus, it would not be unusual for the reduction in
pension benefit accrual after the age of early retirement to
be equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in wage earnings.
The development of this new view of retirement income rights—as assets
whose values can rise or fall with additional work—was gradual. There
is virtually no sign of it through the mid-1970s. By now, however, it
is the dominant paradigm, and it has changed our views on how retire
ment systems work and how they influence individual retirement
decisions.
Retirement Research During the 1970s

Economists are interested in incentives. We generally believe that
individuals understand and respond to the economic incentives they face.
There is considerable circumstantial evidence that the Social Security
and pension systems have had an important influence on retirement
trends. In the United States, retirement (and early retirement) rates rose
dramatically as the Social Security and pension systems expanded.
Noticeable changes in participation rates occur at ages important in pen
sion and Social Security rules—60, 62 and 65. Workers' earnings are
found to cluster around the levels at which the earnings test goes into
effect. 10 Other factors, of course, are important—health status, manda-
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tory retirement rules, and the state of the economy. But, as Joseph
Pechman, Henry Aaron, and Michael Taussig argued in 1968:
Within these limits, ... the terms upon which people can
retire—the loss in earnings which they suffer from not
working—are very important. Since social security is the
dominant retirement system in the United States, it can in
fluence the retirement decision, both directly by altering the
income choices that workers face, and indirectly, by help
ing to influence the other factors which determine the time
of retirement.
Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig evaluated the evidence that existed in
1968 on the influence of extended Social Security coverage and benefits
on the trends in labor force activity, and concluded that "unfortunate
ly, the little evidence bearing on this point [rising benefit levels] is even
weaker than the evidence on the effects of widened eligibility for
benefits." In other words, economists were confident that Social Security
was an important determinant, but had yet to establish it empirically.
Over the next two decades, the evidence for this proposition and our
understanding of how retirement income programs work would increase
dramatically. 11

One-Period Models
Michael Boskin (1977) produced one of the earliest econometric studies
of the retirement decision with a small sample of white married men
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. He defined retirement as
movement to less than quarter-time work and included among his ex
planatory variables a measure of health status (hours ill during the year),
Social Security benefits (the maximum for which the household would
be eligible), the net earnings potential of the individual (net of earningstested benefit reductions), and income from assets. The findings were
remarkable. The Social Security effect was large and statistically signifi
cant, and many times larger than the effect of income from assets. 12
Here was evidence that those elderly eligible for larger Social Security
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benefits were much more likely to retire than others. Boskin concluded
that
the overall impact of the social security system ... is clearly
to induce earlier retirement for a substantial fraction of the
elderly population. . . . The results . . . suggest that recent
increases in social security benefits and coverage, combin
ed with the earnings test are a significant contributor to the
rapid decline of the labor force participation of the elderly
in the United States.
The magnitude of the effects that Boskin claimed was very large. He
suggested that an "increase in Social Security benefits from $3,000 to
$4,000 per year per couple raises the annual probability of retirement
from 7.5 to 16 percent," and that "a decrease in the implicit tax rate
on earnings from one-half to one-third would reduce the annual prob
ability of retirement by about fifty percent!"
These large estimates were suspect for several reasons. The sample
size—only 131—was very small. This may also explain why the health
effect estimated was insignificant and of the wrong sign. The study com
pletely ignored employer pensions. Since those with pensions are also
likely to be eligible for relatively large Social Security benefits, the Social
Security coefficients may have been picking up some pension effects.
And finally, the treatment of the Social Security system was, in
retrospect, unsophisticated. It was done in the context of a one-period
model, and therefore ignored the impact of additional work on future
retirement benefits. But this was one of the first econometric efforts
to suggest that retirement income incentives are much more important
than survey questionnaires had implied.
In that same year, Joseph Quinn (1977) published the results of some
early research based the Social Security Administration's new Retire
ment History Study. He used only the initial 1969 cross section of what
would eventually become a 10-year longitudinal survey of the retire
ment patterns of over 11,000 older Americans. In 1969, the sample
was 58 to 63 years old and a substantial portion of the group had already
stopped working.

The Individual Retirement Decision

65

Quinn defined retirement as complete labor force withdrawal and asked
what objective circumstances differentiated those who were and were
not retired in 1969. He considered both Social Security and pension
eligibility, along with an interaction term denoting eligibility for both.
Also included were variables reflecting health status, the presence of
dependents, asset income, the hourly wage rate on the current or last
job, local labor market conditions, and certain characteristics of the job. 13
Some interesting results emerged.
The coefficients on all three retirement income variables were large
and significant. Current Social Security and pension eligibility both in
creased the probability of retirement, and their effects appeared to be
more than additive. Social Security eligibility alone reduced the prob
ability of labor force participation by 11 percentage points, pension
eligibility alone by 7 points, and both together by 26 points. The presence
of a health limitation was also very important (reducing the probability
of participation by 20 percentage points), as was the presence of asset
income. The one surprising result was that the wage rate on the current
or last job was not a significant determinant of retirement behavior.
Subsequent research has explained this puzzling finding. 14
Quinn then disaggregated the sample by health status to see whether
health interacted with the other explanatory variables. Statistical tests
suggested that it did, since the explanatory power of the separate equa
tions was significantly greater than that of the combined equation.
Although the same coefficients generally remained significant in the
two equations, the coefficients were much larger among those with a
health limitation, suggesting that those in relatively poor health (though
not bedridden or housebound—those two groups were excluded from
the analysis) were more sensitive to their financial conditions.
For example, the aggregate Social Security effect on labor force par
ticipation (-11 percentage points) turned out to be an average of a very
large effect on those with a health limitation (-28 points) and a small,
but still significant, effect (-4 points) on those in relatively good health.
The analogous pension effects were really -14 and -5, rather than the
average of-7. The effects of dependents and higher asset income were
also larger for those with a health problem. This is consistent with the
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suggestion in some of the later survey research that health is often an
important contributing, but not necessarily determining, factor in the
retirement decision. Those with health problems are more likely to want
to retire. Whether they can afford to or not depends on the financial
options they face.
In 1978, Michael Boskin and Michael Kurd published an article us
ing the first two waves (1969 and 1971) of the Retirement History Study.
They analyzed the behavior of about 1,000 white males who were
employed in 1969 and who did not have a working wife. In addition
to utilizing the longitudinal nature of the RHS, this research had two
interesting innovations. It analyzed three transition states: continued work
(without receipt of Social Security benefits), semiretirement (working
and receiving Social Security benefits) and retirement (not working at
all). In addition, Boskin and Kurd considered the possibility that the
potential Social Security benefit is itself an endogenous variable, a func
tion of the individual's taste for work. The authors hypothesized that
those with higher potential benefits might retire later, not because the
higher benefits induced continued work, but because both the delayed
retirement and the potential benefits were determined by some underlying
preference for work. Those with a taste for work would have worked
hard all their lives (and, hence, be eligible for large benefits) and would
then continue to work in old age. The appropriate econometric response
to this endogeneity is a two-stage least-squares procedure in which poten
tial benefits are replaced by predicted potential benefits based on ex
ogenous instruments.
Boskin and Kurd's results were similar to those of Boskin (1977),
mentioned above. They found a strong influence of Social Security on
early retirement, and estimated that a $1,000 increment in annual Social
Security benefits would increase the probability of complete retirement
by about 8 percentage points (on a mean of only 12 percent). It is in
teresting to note that the Social Security coefficient had the wrong sign
when the variable was treated as exogenous, suggesting that the en
dogeneity issue may be an important one.
The Boskin and Hurd analysis ignored pensions, so that some of the
Social Security effect may have reflected the influence of employer plans.
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In addition, their treatment of Social Security was unsophisticated, since
changes in future benefits due to continued work were not considered.
Despite these shortcomings, Boskin, Hurd, and Quinn did provide
some early statistical evidence that Social Security and pensions were
important determinants of the labor market behavior of older American
males. Some aspect of these programs seemed to induce retirement,
but was it the size of the benefits, the ratio of benefits to earnings on
the job, the tax rate levied by the earnings test, or actuarial adjustment
rules? This early research shed little light on these issues.

Multiperiod Models: Retirement Income Rights as Wealth
In 1979 and 1980, Richard Burkhauser added an important theoretical
insight that eventually changed the way most economists view the retire
ment decision. He emphasized the multiperiod nature of Social Securi
ty and pension rights, and argued that "it is not simply the size of an
nual benefits received each year but the present value of the entire stream
of benefits that emerges as theoretically and empirically important"
(Burkhauser 1980).
An annual benefit amount, though better than a dichotomous eligibility
variable, is an inadequate description of the incentives an individual
faces. This is also true for another popular summary statistic, the replace
ment rate, which is the ratio of post- to preretirement income. Con
sider two workers currently earning $30,000 per year on identical jobs
and eligible for annual retirement benefits of $12,000 if they were to
retire. It appears that their financial tradeoffs are the same—an increase
in leisure for a substantial reduction in income. But, they may well not be.
Suppose, for example, that the first individual's benefits are indexed
for future inflation, as Social Security is, while the other's are not, as
is true for many private pensions. Retirement will look more attractive
to the former, especially during times of expected high inflation. And
suppose that the benefit calculation and actuarial adjustment provisions
differ. For the second, let us assume that the annual benefit would rise
from $12,000 to $15,000 per year following another year of work;
whereas for the first, it would remain at $12,000. Another year of work
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looks more attractive if it results in higher pension benefits in the future.
In fact, in the hypothetical case here, the year's worth of benefits
foregone ($12,000) would be recouped in four years, and the subse
quent years of benefit increments would then provide an added bonus
for that additional year's work. In the second case, however, the $12,000
in benefits foregone during the extra year of work are lost forever, and
there is no financial reward for work other than the current paycheck.
The point here is that the retirement incentives are very different for
our two workers, despite the fact that the one-period tradeoffs appear
to be the same.
A worker facing a retirement decision, then, is not just choosing be
tween a paycheck and a pension check, but rather between two different
streams of income. As we described above, these alternatives can only
be compared by evaluating their present discounted values (PDV). This
is precisely what Burkhauser proceeded to do.
Burkhauser (1979) first analyzed a sample of 761 male auto workers
aged 59 to 64, who became eligible for Supplementary Earnings Retire
ment Benefits under the 1965 United Auto Workers' contract. The deci
sion he tried to explain was whether or not the worker decided to take
an early pension, that is, prior to age 65. The key new variable he in
troduced was the difference between the (after-tax) PDV of the pen
sion stream if taken early and the PDV of the stream that would start
if retirement were delayed until age 65.
He found that the average PDV of the early retirement benefit streams
was $18,365; whereas, the average PDV of the normal retirement pen
sion streams was only $8,660. The average loss in pension wealth,
therefore, was nearly $10,000. Over the same time period, the PDV
of the wages that one of these workers could earn averaged over $22,000,
so an income maximizer would certainly continue to work. But a utili
ty maximizer who enjoyed leisure might not. The true net gain from
working those years was not the $22,000 in pay, but $22,000 minus
the loss in pension wealth. Only those willing to work for a net com
pensation of around $12,000 would remain on the job.
In his empirical work, Burkhauser found a number of interesting
significant explanatory variables. In regression, probit, and logit equa-
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tions, the difference between the present discounted values of the pen
sion streams was always a very important determinant. The larger the
pension wealth loss accompanying additional work, the more likely the
workers were to accept the pension benefits and leave the firm. In ad
dition, the present value of the earnings expected between early retire
ment age and age 65 was significant, confirming that higher earnings
encourage continued work. The probability of pension acceptance also
increased with age, with the amount of other financial assets, and with
poor health, measured by the number of weeks of work missed during
the previous year.
The main contribution of this paper was the treatment of pension rights
as an asset whose value changes with the age of retirement. Burkhauser
found that these changes in asset value were important theoretical and
empirical determinants of the pension acceptance decision. He concluded
that "the loss in the asset value of both private pension and social security
benefits together with their constraints on market work encourages
workers to take these benefits and reduce or completely stop work";
and suggested that "efforts to increase the labor market opportunities
of the aged (i.e., the recent legislation to end mandatory retirement below
age 70) may have little impact unless adjustments in the asset value of
pensions, both private and social security, are introduced" (Burkhauser
1979).
These Social Security implications were not based on the UAW study,
because it was impossible to include Social Security variables in the
analysis. In 1980, Burkhauser analyzed the impact of Social Security
with a sample of about 700 men taken from the Social Security Ad
ministration's 1973 Exact Match File, which contains microeconomic
information drawn from the March 1973 Current Population Survey
and from SSA's internal program records. These men were all eligible
for Social Security retirement benefits at age 62. The advantage of this
data source was accurate information on Social Security benefits. The
disadvantage was the lack of any data on personal health or pension
status.
The dependent variable was the decision to accept Social Security
benefits at age 62. The size of the benefit was measured by the present
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discounted value of the future benefit stream, including the possibility
of dependent and survivor benefits. Burkhauser assumed in this paper
that the Social Security system was actuarially unfair (that future benefits
increments did not adequately make up for benefits foregone during
additional years of work) and, therefore, that the potential loss in Social
Security wealth was proportional to the initial asset value. He did not
calculate the wealth loss directly. This assumption of actuarial unfairness
at age 62 is controversial, and the subject of a debate mentioned below.
Burkhauser found that the size of Social Security wealth was an im
portant determinant of the retirement decision. The larger the asset value,
and therefore, he assumed, the larger the potential wealth loss during
years of delayed retirement, the more likely the individual was to ac
cept benefits at age 62. High market earnings potential discouraged Social
Security receipt, as did being married or highly educated.
This data source included no information on individuals' pension
status. Since this is undoubtedly an important determinant in the retire
ment decision, Burkhauser included a very rough proxy for this by
calculating the probability that each individual was eligible for pension
benefits at or before age 62, or at any time. The estimates were in
dustrywide averages for the industry in which the respondent last worked.
He found that those workers with high early pension probability were
more likely to accept Social Security benefits at age 62, and that those
eligible only later were less likely to accept than those with no benefits
at all. This may be because pension plans frequently base benefits on
the earnings in the last few years of work, thereby increasing the return
to working late in one's career.
These early studies established that the incentives in our Social Security
and pension systems could affect people's behavior and induce retire
ment, and that the most appropriate way to view retirement income rights
is as an asset or a stock of wealth. The value of this asset depends on
when it is claimed. Retirement plans can encourage work by growing
in value with continued employment. But they can also discourage work
and encourage retirement by declining in value for those who remain
on the job.
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A Debate Over Social Security Incentives
In 1980, Alan Blinder, Roger Gordon, and Donald Wise published
an article that utilized the same general approach that Burkhauser had
introduced, yet reached remarkably different conclusions. They challeng
ed the increasingly common assumption that Social Security was an im
portant factor in the early retirement decision and claimed that the in
centives hidden in the Social Security law often provided strong incen
tives to work, not to retire. These incentives, they argued, frequently
cancelled and sometime outweighed the disincentive effects of the benefit
reduction rate.
The authors began by examining a simple one-period model in which
the Social Security benefits of an eligible worker are reduced by 50
percent of any earnings over the exempt amount. When this tax is add
ed to income taxes, it appears to provide a very strong disincentive to
work, since the employee keeps so little of the gross pay. But, as we
explained above, this analysis misses a key point. Unlike income taxes,
Social Security contributions result in higher future benefits. If the present
discounted value of these future benefit increments equals the benefits
"taxed" away today, then the system is actuarially fair, and the earn
ings test, though still on the books, is irrelevant. If the losses are more
than offset, then the tax becomes a subsidy, and additional work is en
couraged by the Social Security rules, not discouraged as frequently
thought.
The determination of the incentives actually faced by an individual
is complicated. It depends on a number of factors, including the dis
count rate, the age of the potential retiree, and the presence and age
of a spouse and dependent children. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise
calculated the actuarial adjustment (delayed retirement credit) and benefit
recalculation (AIME) incentives separately. They first asked whether
the actuarial adjustment compensated for the 50 percent earnings test.
Using real discount rates of 1 and 3 percent and analyzing five
hypothetical 62-year-old individuals, they concluded that the actuarial
adjustment made up about one to one-and-a-half times the amount of
the earnings test loss—the latter, obviously, turning the earnings test
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tax into a subsidy. At age 65, when the delayed retirement credit drops
from about 7 to 3 percent per year of delay, only 10 to 60 percent of
the loss was returned. The percentage of the earnings-test loss return
ed in the future is higher for the married individual, if the spouse does
not claim Social Security benefits on the basis of his or her own record,
and declines with the age of the spouse and with the presence of depen
dent children. But the important point is that, with rare exceptions, the
true earnings-test tax was not 50 percent.
In addition, according to the authors, the benefit recalculation rules
after the 1977 amendments provided additional wage subsidies as well.
For the average 65-year-old married male in their sample (drawn from
the Retirement History Study), the subsidy was between one-third and
one-half of the wage, depending on the discount rate used. For their
average 65-year-old single man, the subsidy was about a sixth of the
wage.
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise did not combine the two parts of their
analysis—the actuarial adjustment and the benefit recalculation. They
concluded that "the earnings test for social security does not present
a work disincentive for the typical worker aged 62-64 because, if he
loses benefits to the earnings test, he recoups most or even more than
all of them through an actuarial adjustment of his future benefits.'' When
the estimated wage subsidy in the benefit recalculation formula is in
cluded, they claimed that "it seems likely that the social security law—if
understood by the public—should provide work disincentives for only
a small minority of individuals. It seems that social security should in
duce the majority of older workers to work harder."
Gordon and Blinder (1980) continued this line of research with a major
empirical analysis of the retirement decisions of a large sample of white
males from the Retirement History Study. Because of their analysis
above, their subsequent model assumed that Social Security was irrele
vant to retirement decisions. They estimated a market wage rate for
each person in the sample, from a wage equation, and then derived a
reservation wage from an explicit utility function. Individuals work if
their market wage exceeds their reservation wage and retire (withdraw
from the labor force) when the reverse is true. Age, health, pension
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status, education, and demographic characteristics affect the retirement
decision through their influences on the market and reservation wages.
The Gordon and Blinder model did well predicting the retirement
behavior of respondents aged 58 to 61, almost as well for those 62 to
64, and not very well at all for those in the 65-to-67 age category. Ac
cording to their estimates, age had a dramatic impact on the decision.
In their base case, the retirement probability rose from 10 percent at
age 61 to above 60 percent at 67. Health and market wages were also
important. They found that "pension plans—with or without associated
mandatory retirement provisions—provide powerful incentives to retire
at the age of eligibility for the pension (normally 65)," and that "social
security . . . has a much weaker effect (if any) on retirement decisions."
Despite the sophistication of the economic model and the econometric
techniques, the derivation of the pension and Social Security variables
was quite simple. The Social Security effect was not estimated directly
because the authors were convinced that the incentive structure frequently
favored work, not retirement. The pension variables, which were large
and statistically significant at age 65, only denoted coverage. Gordon
and Blinder assumed that the actuarial reductions for early pension ac
ceptance were less than actuarially fair (encouraging early retirement),
and that pensions decreased in present discounted value even further
when one worked beyond the age of full eligibility (discouraging late
retirement). But their dichotomous variables did not permit a test of
this directly.
From these two important papers, the authors concluded that it "seems
unlikely that the growth of the social security system, as impressive
as it has been, has contributed much to the trend toward retirement"
(Gordon and Blinder 1980). They acknowledged the remarkable coin
cidence of the growth of Social Security and the dramatic decline in
retirement ages, as well as the small (at that time) body of econometric
evidence linking the two trends, and conjectured
that many people eligible for social security benefits may not
understand how their current earnings affect their future
benefits. It is possible, therefore, that social security is
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discouraging labor supply only because its provisions are
poorly understood (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 1980).
These articles prompted a response from Richard Burkhauser and John
Turner (1981) entitled "Can Twenty-Five Million Americans Be
Wrong?" They agreed with the basic framework of analysis, that the
impact of current earnings on future retirement benefits is the key issue.
The forward-looking life-cycle model was gaining general acceptance.
But Burkhauser and Turner faulted Blinder, Gordon, and Wise for not
looking backwards in a life-cycle mode. Suppose, they said, that Blinder
et al. were correct, that the actuarial adjustment and the benefit recalcula
tion formula more than offset the 50 percent earnings test, and therefore
that Social Security provides an earnings subsidy rather than a tax be
tween the ages of 62 and 65. If so, then the benefit recalculation for
mula provides an even larger subsidy to wages prior to age 62, when
it is in effect but the earnings test is not. In other words, current earn
ings are likely to increase the "average monthly earnings" on which
benefits are based any time late in one's work career, and it is better
to generate these earnings before age 62 rather than after. The earn
ings test decreases net compensation at age 62, and whether it is from
a large subsidy to a small subsidy or from a subsidy to a tax is not im
portant. In a full life-cycle framework, Burkhauser and Turner argued,
the Social Security system encourages the substitution of early work
for late work by tilting the relative wage profile toward the former.
As Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981) pointed out in a rejoinder, this
final conclusion is valid only if the actuarial adjustment at age 62 is
less than fair. At age 62, two changes occur—both the earnings test
and the actuarial adjustment go into effect. If they just offset each other,
and the benefit recalculation formula remains unchanged, then there
is no intertemporal wage tilt. Therefore, much of the debate comes down
to the actuarial fairness of the adjustment between ages 62 and 64.
Everyone agrees that the adjustment after age 65 is inadequate. Whether
it is prior to 65 remains a matter of dispute.
James Kahn (1988) has added a recent contribution to the debate. He
maintains that the Blinder, Gordon, and Wise results are very sensitive
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to the interest rate used to discount future income streams, and argues
that the appropriate rate is much higher than the 1 and 3 percent they
chose. The reason is that many older people are liquidity-constrained
because they cannot borrow against future Social Security benefits at
market rates. If so, then these retirement income rights are worth less
than they would be if they were more portable over time. At a higher
discount rate, the future Social Security increments from continued work
are less valuable and less likely to offset the immediate benefits foregone.
Kahn demonstrates that for a sample of men ineligible for an employer
pension, the Social Security incentives are almost neutral between ages
62 and 64, when a 3-percent rate is used, but become strong work
disincentives at 12 percent. He also shows that the retirement spike at
age 62 is primarily low-wealth people, which is consistent with his
liquidity-constraint story.
Early econometric work suggested that economic incentives can in
fluence individual retirement decisions and that the nature of the in
centives and their impact is complex. But this work had many flaws.
Boskin and Kurd's analysis ignored pensions and the effect of addi
tional work on Social Security wealth. Quinn studied the importance
of pension and Social Security eligibility, but not the size of the benefits.
Burkhauser introduced the concept of retirement income wealth to the
microeconomic literature, but was not able to analyze Social Security
and pension plans simultaneously. Gordon and Blinder's behavioral work
assumed that Social Security did not affect the retirement decision and
their data set was not amenable to easy extraction of pension benefit
amounts. Work in the 1980s, to which we now turn, would address
all of these early deficiencies.

NOTES
1. According to Packard and Reno (1989), 43 percent of American men claimed Social Security
benefits at age 62 in 1985, including about 11 percent who were disabled. By age 64, nearly
two-thirds of all men were receiving benefits. For women, including those receiving benefits as
wives and widows, the percentages are even higher—well over half at age 62 and three-quarters
by age 64.

76

The Individual Retirement Decision

2. An excellent review of this earlier literature can be found in Campbell and Campbell (1976).
They discuss the literature through 1975—just about the time that modern microeconomists began
to research the retirement decision. Boskin (1977) also includes a short overview of these issues.
3. Those who had previously been eligible for disabled-worker benefits were excluded from these
calculations. Obviously, health would have been much more important among this group.
4. This categorization shows the difficult in differentiating between voluntary and involuntary
retirements. If poor health induces someone to retire, which of the categories is it? The decision
may be voluntary; the poor health is not. Packard and Reno list health reasons under involuntary,
while Steiner and Dorfman call such retirements voluntary.
5. Research by Ransom and Sutch (1986), mentioned in chapter 1, casts some doubt on the validity
of these figures, and suggests that labor force participation rates were approximately constant
from the late nineteenth century through 1937. But this only strengthens the point being made,
that the development of the Social Security and employer pension plans may have had a signifi
cant effect on aggregate retirement patterns.
6. In 1990, workers aged 62 through 64 can earn up to $6840 per year without any loss in Social
Security benefits and they lose $1 in benefits for each $2 earned beyond that. For those 65 through
69, the exempt amount is $9360 and the benefit reduction rate is only one-third. At age 70, the
earnings test disappears altogether and full benefits are paid regardless of earnings.
7. See, for example, Boskin (1977), Quinn (1977), and Hall and Johnson (1980).
8. See Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) and Moffitt (1984) for discussions of the returns to the
Social Security "investment" by cohort.
9. All of the relevant rules and regulations, from the beginning of the program to the present,
as well as those already legislated for the future, can be found in the Annual Statistical Supple
ment to the Social Security Bulletin.
10. See Kahn (1988) and Burtless and Moffitt (1984) for dramatic illustrations of this circumstantial
evidence.
11. A very detailed summary and review of the recent literature, with an emphasis on theoretical
issues, can be found in Mitchell and Fields (1982).
12. Boskin attributed the larger Social Security effect to three factors: (1) Social Security benefits
are guaranteed until death and fully indexed against inflation; (2) they cannot be bequeathed to
heirs; and (3) income from assets includes imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, an asset
against which Boskin argues, the elderly are reluctant to borrow.
13. Respondents who were either bedridden or housebound were excluded from the sample. The
health variable was based on the answer to the question, "Does your health limit the kind or
amount of work or housework you can do?" Although this is a subjective assessment of health,
the question was not asked in conjunction with reasons for retirement.
14. It now seems clear that this result is due to the exclusion of an important variable—some
measure of the size of the retirement benefits for which the respondent is eligible. Higher benefits
should induce retirement if we hold all other factors constant. But benefit levels are positively
correlated with earnings, since Social Security and many pensions base benefits, even if loosely,
on earnings history. The wage rate variable, then, was probably picking up its own positive ef
fect on the probability of remaining at work and the negative effect of the higher pension benefits.
The two effects approximately cancelled. As we will see below, when some measure of the benefit
magnitudes is included, the wage or earnings coefficients are generally significant and of the ex
pected sign.
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Retirement Incentives
and the
Retirement Decision
The Current Literature

During the 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in economic research
on retirement issues. As we discussed in chapter 1, there are several
reasons for this. The nation is aging. The proportion of the population
aged 65 and over will continue to grow well into the next century, ris
ing from near 12 percent today to about 20 percent by the year 2030.
The ratio of those aged 18 to 64 to those over 64 will decrease from
five to three. This change in the basic age structure, combined with
the trend toward earlier retirement, has threatened the financial wellbeing of the Social Security system. The hearings, recommendations,
and subsequent legislation prompted by the National Commission on
Social Security Reform (the Greenspan Commission) put Social Security
on the front page, and concern about demographic trends and the federal
budget deficit has kept it there.
The confluence of public interest and the availability of extraordinarily
rich data sets have led to a significant increase in retirement research.
In this chapter, we will review this modern research and summarize
where we now stand. We will try to describe the general framework,
the unique contributions, and the qualitative conclusions of some of the
major figures in the field.
The research strategies fall into two general classes. Most authors
have chosen to utilize the strengths of two large microeconomic data
sets—the Social Security Administration's Retirement History Study
(RHS) and the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), developed by the
U.S. Department of Labor and the Center for Human Resource Research
77
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at The Ohio State University. These sources provide large represen
tative samples of older Americans and a wealth of demographic, social,
economic, and financial data on each respondent. A major drawback
of both, however, is the paucity of private pension details. Employer
pensions are complicated agreements, and these data sets do not begin
to capture the complexities of the individual plans.
This problem suggests an alternative research strategy—to dig much
deeper into the details of a small number of specific plans and analyze
the impact of particular plan features. Much of this work is based on
the Benefit Amounts Survey, a data set developed by the Department
of Labor from summary descriptions submitted by individual pension
plans. These data include the specific benefit calculation rules missing
from the micro data sets above. Their disadvantages are the smaller,
nonrepresentative samples of recipients and the lack of much other in
formation on the individuals involved. 1 With this research strategy, we
learn much more about pensions and much less about everything else.
In a recent paper, Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989b)
report on a data set that combines some of the advantages of both ap
proaches above. They use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, which
includes a national random sample of over 4,200 households and in
formation on pension plan details supplied by the providers. Unfortunate
ly, the demographic information is not as complete as in the RHS or
the NLS. In addition, since the data set is not specifically designed to
study the retirement process, there are fewer older workers than in the
two other sources. The survey is well-designed for studying pension
incentives, but less applicable for studying their impact on retirement
behavior.

Retirement Incentives and Mandatory Retirement
In several 1983 articles, Richard Burkhauser and Joseph Quinn
(1983a,b; Quinn and Burkhauser 1983) described the Social Security
and pension incentives facing a sample of older Americans and estimated
their impact on individual retirement behavior. The initial focus of this
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research was mandatory retirement. The 1978 amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) raised from 65 to 70 the
earliest age at which most Americans could be forced to retire solely
because of age. Subsequent legislation has virtually eliminated man
datory retirement altogether. 2 The research question was whether the
1978 change would dramatically alter the trend towards earlier retire
ment. Casual empiricism suggested that it would, but more careful
analysis indicated that it would not. Although mandatory retirement pro
visions severely constrained the options of certain individuals, the rules
were relatively unimportant in the aggregate.
The crux of the issue is that mandatory retirement, Social Security
and employer pensions are all closely intertwined. Since they all can
influence the retirement decision, it is essential to isolate their individual
effects. When this is done, much of what looks like a mandatory retire
ment effect is, in fact, due to the incentives embedded in the retirement
income programs. Financial incentives and mandatory retirement turn
out to be a carrot and a stick—alternative means to the same end.

Mandatory Retirement, Social Security and Pensions
Mandatory retirement rules were widespread prior to the 1978 ADEA
amendments. They applied to between one-third and one-half of
American workers approaching retirement age. For example, of the men
and nonmarried women in the Retirement History Study who were ag
ed 58 to 61 and employed in 1969 (the year of the initial survey), 43
percent faced a mandatory retirement age on the job they held. Using
three other data sources gathered at about the same time, Janice Halpern
(1978) estimated that between 30 and 46 percent of older workers had
jobs with compulsory retirement.
A simple comparison of the behavior of those with and without man
datory retirement suggested a large impact. Using later waves of the
RHS, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) followed a sample of men aged
62 to 64 and employed in 1973. Some faced mandatory retirement over
the next two years and others did not. Of those who did not, 57 percent
were still working in 1975—the remaining 43 percent had withdrawn
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from the labor force. But of those who did face mandatory retirement,
83 percent had left the labor force, and only 17 percent remained at
work. The contrast between 17 and 57 percent indicates a large poten
tial retirement effect.
But coincidence does not imply causation. Those with and without
mandatory retirement had very different probabilities of pension coverage
on that job. Of the RHS respondents who faced mandatory retirement
during the subsequent two years, 94 percent were also eligible to col
lect pension benefits, and most during those same two years. Of those
facing mandatory retirement after that two-year period, nearly 90 per
cent enjoyed pension eligibility. In contrast, fewer than half of those
without mandatory retirement would ever collect employer pension
benefits from their current jobs. Pensions and mandatory retirement
went hand-in-hand. Although there were many individuals with a pen
sion and without mandatory retirement, the converse was very rare.
The relationship between mandatory retirement and Social Security
was also very close. Sixty-five was the most popular age for compulsory
retirement, and that is precisely the age at which workers became eligible
for full Social Security benefits. Sixty-five is also the age at which the
delayed retirement credit drops dramatically, from about 7 percent per
year of delay between ages 62 and 64 to only 3 percent (and this was
only 1 percent prior to 1982).
To disaggregate the effects of Social Security, pensions, and man
datory retirement, as well as all the other determinants of the individual
retirement decision, one must first describe and quantify the retirement
incentives and then estimate their effects in a behavioral model. The
first part of this is difficult for several reasons. Retirement income plans
are usually complex. They differ in coverage criteria, ages of eligibili
ty, benefit calculation rules, delayed retirement credits, and inflation
protection after retirement. Even if we knew all these details, which
we usually do not, we would have to decide how to utilize them in em
pirical research—which are important and should be included in a sum
mary measure of retirement incentives and which should be ignored.
Fortunately, the RHS has appended to its own data the entire Social
Security Administration earnings record (through 1975) for each of the
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respondents. (This creates the odd situation in which the researcher prob
ably knows more about the individual's Social Security incentives than
the individual making the decision does!) With respect to employer pen
sions, however, we are much less fortunate. The RHS does include ques
tions about the extent and age of eligibility and the size of the annual
benefit, but other key details are unknown. In addition, answers to the
pension questions are sometimes incomplete, and, in the case of ex
pected pension amounts, frequently so.
Problems with the RHS pension data have discouraged many research
ers from utilizing these benefits estimates. A major contribution of the
Burkhauser and Quinn research was an attempt to squeeze pension benefit
information from every possible source in the longitudinal questionnaires.

Social Security and Pension Incentives
We argued in chapter 2 that the best measure of the value of retire
ment income rights is the present discounted value of the stream of future
benefits — the asset or wealth equivalent. Unlike the annual benefit or
the replacement rate, the present value incorporates into one number
the age of eligibility, the size of the annual flow, life expectancy and,
via the discount rate, the amount of inflation protection after retirement. 3
The value is positive prior to the age of eligibility, which is consistent
with a life-cycle view of decisionmaking.
In their empirical work, Burkhauser and Quinn calculated, for Social
Security and employer pensions separately, two measures of retirement
income incentives— WEALTH and DELTA. WEALTH was merely the
present discounted value mentioned above; i.e.,
T

WEALTH(s)= E (p^s)) / (1+r)1,
i=s
where p{ is the probability of living through period i , r is the discount
rate, T is the age (assumed to be 100) at which the probability of sur
vival drops to zero, and Bj(s) is the annual benefit associated with a
pension accepted in period s. 4 The (s) in the expression WEALTH(s)
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is a reminder that the value of the pension depends on when it is first
claimed. This leads directly to the other retirement income incentive,
DELTA.
DELTA is the change in retirement income wealth that accompanies
an additional year of work. When an individual works another year,
there is bad news and good news with respect to pensions. The bad
news is that a year's worth of pension benefits is foregone. The good
news is that future annual benefits may be higher. Whether the asset
value of the stream rises or falls depends on whether the increments
tomorrow are sufficient to offset the losses today.
DELTA is the change in wealth from one period (s) to the next (s+1)
following an additional year of work; i.e.,
DELTA(s)=WEALTH(s + l) - WEALTH(s) - C(s)
where C(s) is the worker's contribution to the plan during the year of
work (and equals zero in noncontributing plans). A positive DELTA
denotes an increase in Social Security or pension wealth, and, in essence,
a wage subsidy. A negative DELTA is a wealth loss—the equivalent
of a wage decrease.
For Social Security, WEALTH and DELTA estimates were relatively
easy to obtain because the RHS includes actual Social Security records
and the exact benefit calculation rules are known. 5 In the derivation
of WEALTH(s+1), workers were assumed to earn the same real wages
in year (s +1) as in year (s). These were added to the earnings records,
and the streams of benefits and their present discounted values were
then recalculated.
Pension derivations were much more difficult. The first problem was
to find the annual amount for which a respondent was or would be eligi
ble. 6 Even with these figures, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983a) still did
not know the details of the individuals' pension plans. In order to estimate
how annual benefits would change if the respondent worked another
year, they assumed
(a) the pension plans did not include a joint-and-survivor provision,
(b) the benefit amount was based on years of service, so that it in
creased by [1/n], where n is years of tenure with the current
firm, and

Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision

83

(c) for those eligible for reduced but not full benefits, the benefit
amount also increased by an actuarial adjustment.
In the absence of plan-specific information, one-digit industry averages
for these adjustments were used, from data in the Bureau of Labor
Statistic's Level of Benefits Study. For those respondents who stated
that they were already eligible for full benefits, no additional actuarial
adjustment was assumed.
With these assumptions, the authors calculated the asset values of
Social Security and employer pension claims (and changes in these values
with continued work) for the Retirement History Study sample. These
assets, though ignored in traditional definitions of wealth, turn out to
dominate the portfolios of older Americans. For three-quarters of a sam
ple of RHS men aged 62 to 67 in 1973 (just after several large increases
in real Social Security benefits), Quinn (1985) found that retirement
income wealth exceeded all other forms of wealth, including equity in
the home. 7 Wolff (1987) has confirmed these qualitative results. With
slightly earlier data, he estimated that Social Security and pension wealth
constituted about 30 percent of total wealth for those aged 65 and over
in 1969.
For the mandatory retirement study, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b)
drew a sample of full-time, private-sector men (not self-employed) ag
ed 63 to 65 in 1974. About two-thirds of them had employer pension
wealth from a current or previous job. The median value for those with
positive pension wealth (using a 5 percent discount rate) was about
$21,000 (all figures in 1974 dollars)—slightly more than twice the me
dian annual wage earnings at the time.
For workers aged 63, the pension DELTAs were almost equally split
between positive (gains) and negative (losses) values; the median value,
therefore, was close to zero. But by age 64, the losers outnumbered
the gainers, and the median pension wealth loss accompanying another
year of work was over $1,100. At age 65, there were almost no gainers,
and the median loss had risen to over $2,000. Six percent of those aged
65 would have lost over $5,000 in pension wealth from an additional
year of work and another 8 percent, between $3,000 and $5,000.
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The WEALTH and DELTA figures for Social Security were much
more dramatic. Coverage was nearly universal, and the value of most
people's Social Security rights far exceeded their pension wealth. At
a 5 percent discount rate, 70 percent of the sample had Social Security
wealth over $50,000.
The change in this wealth following an incremental year of work
depends crucially on an individual's age, because the Social Security
delayed retirement credit drops at age 65. For respondents aged 63 and
64, the Social Security rules generally provided a net subsidy to work.
Those who remained employed received a paycheck and an increase
in retirement wealth. The median annual gains were about $1,850 at
age 63 and $850 at 64. But at age 65, nearly everyone lost because
of the inadequate actuarial adjustment—only 1 percent prior to 1982.
The median loss was over $3,000.
Are these wealth changes large or small? Since they are part of
compensation—a pay raise or a pay cut—they should be compared to
annual earnings. For those eligible for Social Security alone, the results
mirrored the story above—on average, modest gains occurred at ages
63 and 64, and dramatic losses at 65. The estimates suggested a me
dian loss at age 65 of about a third of gross earnings. When the pen
sion DELTAs are added for those eligible for both, the median loss
at age 65 rose to almost half of gross pay—a hefty pay cut indeed.
These are only rough estimates, because they ignore taxes and im
plicitly assume that full-time workers lose all of their Social Security
benefits. (In fact, some low-wage workers may be able to work full
time and still collect all or part of their Social Security benefits.)
Nonetheless, they indicate that the financial incentives embedded in
retirement income programs can be large. Older workers can suffer
severe wage cuts, not because the paycheck is reduced but because Social
Security and pension wealth decrease with continued work. Economic
theory suggests that workers should respond to this abrupt change in
compensation and that some who found work worthwhile at the previous
rate of pay will not after the decrease. These workers will leave the
job and retire.
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But do they? Do older Americans understand and respond to these
incentives? Although the concepts are not difficult, the actual calcula
tions are. Is there evidence that those facing large wealth losses
(DELTAs) are more likely to retire than those who are not?
Retirement Behavior
Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) found that there is evidence for this
effect. They attempted to explain job transitions over time—who did
and who did not leave the labor force over a two-year period (1973
to 1975). Their explanatory variables included the retirement incen
tives discussed above, as well as changes in health status, earnings poten
tial on the job, and marital status. The empirical results indicated that
health deterioration during the two-year period increased the prob
ability of retirement, but that marital status and mandatory retirement
in the future (after 1975) were relatively unimportant. The financial
variables all had the correct signs, and all but one were statistically
significant. Higher earnings, ceteris paribus, discouraged retirement.
Pension wealth and both Social Security and pension DELTAs encourag
ed it. 8 The higher the wealth loss associated with continued work (the
higher the implicit pay cut), the higher the probability that the individual
left the labor force and retired.
Mandatory Retirement
As was mentioned above, those with and without mandatory retire
ment during the two-year period under study behaved very differently.
Those with this constraint were much more likely to leave the labor
force. But they were also more likely to have employer pensions and
therefore to face pension wealth losses if they continued to work. In
addition, nearly all faced negative work incentives from the decrease
in the Social Security delayed retirement credit at age 65. To what ex
tent were the differences in behavior due to the existence of the man
datory retirement provision and to what extent were they due to the
coincident financial incentives?
To tackle this question, Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b) used a jobexit equation, estimated on those who were not subject to mandatory
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retirement over the two-year period, to predict the retirement behavior
of those who were. They intentionally ignored that fact that the latter
did in fact face mandatory retirement and asked what proportion would
have retired anyway, because of their health and the financial incen
tives they faced. The estimate was that 63 percent would have retired.
In fact, 83 percent did, compared to only 43 percent of those without
mandatory retirement. In other words, about half of the total difference
in behavior (43 to 83 percent) could be explained by factors other than
mandatory retirement. 9 The remaining half was due to mandatory retire
ment and to other factors that they were not able to include. 10
As a final point, the authors estimated the total number of persons
aged 63-65 whose retirement behavior would have changed if man
datory retirement at age 65 had been outlawed in 1973, as it was five
years later. The estimate was small—about 50,000 men. 11 This would
have created a modest increase in the labor force participation rate of
that cohort, and an almost imperceptible increase in the labor supply
as a whole. Mandatory retirement was much less important than it ap
peared. 12
Conclusion
This research suggests that the concepts of retirement income wealth
and changes in this wealth are very useful. An individual with high pen
sion benefits may feel induced to retire or to continue working, depend
ing on how the future benefit stream varies with the decision. Neither
the current annual benefit nor the replacement rate can capture these
important incentives. Only by describing these retirement rights as
assets—present discounted values—can one describe and quantify these
factors and estimate the magnitude of their effects.
Social Security and many employer pension plans eventually create
large financial incentives for a worker to leave a job. Empirical evidence
on the actual behavior of a large sample of older American men in
dicates that they behave as though they understand and respond to these
factors. By no means do these factors (or any of the factors that research
ers have been able to measure) explain all of the behavior. But they
do explain some of it.
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This is important for several reasons. First, it appears that one variable
that looked very significant—mandatory retirement—is really not so. 13
The elimination of these rules will be important to certain individuals
who would have been forced to leave their jobs at some arbitrary age,
but should have little impact in the aggregate. 14 Second, we now see
that there are alternative means to the same end. Employers can in
fluence retirement patterns with the carrot (financial incentives) as well
as with the stick (a compulsory retirement age). 15 A major advantage
of the carrot is that those who really want to continue to work are able
to. And finally, these findings suggest that retirement trends are not
exogenous. They depend on the incentives built into our Social Securi
ty and pension systems—incentives that discourage work at age 65, if
not sooner. It is no wonder that so few Americans work beyond age
65. Those who do pay dearly for their choice.
Optimal Retirement Age

In a series of recent articles, Gary Burtless (1986, 1987), Robert Moffitt (1984, 1987), and Burtless and Moffitt (1984, 1985, 1986) have
made significant advances in the theoretical and econometric analysis
of the retirement decision. The major focus of their work is the deter
mination of the optimal age of retirement and the optimal labor supply
afterwards. They adopt a life-cycle model of work and consumption
and emphasize the nonlinear nature of the budget constraints faced by
older Americans.

Retirement Age and Hours of Work
Workers contemplating retirement face budget constraint kinks
(nonlinearities) along two dimensions. These dimensions correspond
to the major decision variables that Burtless and Moffitt studyretirement age and post-retirement hours of work. As all modern analysts
of these issues agree, the choice of the optimal retirement age is com
plicated by Social Security and private pension incentives. If leisure
is a good, then the loss of leisure during an additional year of work lowers
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an individual's utility. But the increased income earned makes addi
tional consumption possible, which increases utility. In their words,
an individual stops working "when the marginal disutility of another
year of work is just equal to the marginal utility arising from the con
sumption that can be financed by the added work'' (Burtless and Mof
fitt 1985).
Their work emphasizes the impact of Social Security on the retire
ment decision and they delve in great detail into benefit calculation rules.
When considering the budget constraint over potential retirement ages,
they find nonlinearities at ages 62, 65, and 72 (now 70, when the earn
ings test disappears), all created by the impact of additional work on
the asset value of future Social Security benefits. Because of these kinks,
they expect a clustering of retirements at age 65, and depending on the
actuarial fairness of the adjustment between 62 and 65, perhaps at age
62 as well.
Burtless and Moffitt have defined retirement as a sudden and discon
tinuous drop in hours worked, not as complete labor force withdrawal. 16
Under this definition, retired workers can continue to work, and this
decision is part of their analysis. 17 When one considers the budget con
straint over the number of hours in a given year, another nonlinearity
appears. Social Security rules allow a certain exempt amount of
earnings—in 1990, $6,840 for those 62 to 64 years old; $9,360 for those
65 to 69—before benefits are reduced by the earnings test. After that
amount, benefits are reduced by 50 percent (for those 62 to 64) or 33
percent (for those 65 to 69) of all incremental earnings until they are
reduced to zero. 18 In essence, the net hourly wage drops after the ex
empt amount is earned, and a kink appears (see point C in figure 2.2).
(The point at which this happens is different for each individual since
it depends on the wage rate.) If potential retirees do not fully unders
tand the impact of benefit recalculation on their Social Security wealth
and view the earnings test as a real tax, then Burtless and Moffitt would
expect to find earnings of the retired clustered around the exempt amount.
Using a sample of men from the Retirement History Study, the authors
found clear evidence of both types of clustering. As seen in figure 3.1,
men were most likely to retire at ages 65 and 62. Over a quarter retired
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Figure 3.1
Frequency Distribution of Retirement Ages
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at 65, the age at which the delayed retirement credit drops and a signifi
cant kink occurs. This is "consistent with the pronounced incentive to
retire at that age in the Social Security benefit formula'' (Burtless and
Moffitt 1985). The clustering at 62 is more difficult to explain, since
the convexity in the budget constraint is much less severe, if it exists
at all. This clustering could be due to ignorance of the benefit recalcula
tion rules or to liquidity constraints—the inability to borrow against future
income in order to consume (or retire) today. 19
Figure 3.2 provides evidence of clustering around the exempt earn
ings amount. Of the retirees still working, over a quarter were found
to be earning between 90 and 110 percent of the exempt amount, and
many more were just below the 90 than are just above the 110. 20 Burtless
and Moffitt found these results to be strong confirmation of their model's
predictions. They then proceeded to estimate the parameters of their
comprehensive life-cycle model.
Determinants of Retirement Behavior
The Burtless and Moffitt model contains two other distinctive features.
Their specification allows the influence of Social Security benefits to
differ from that of other unearned income. There are two reasons for
this. Social Security wealth is less liquid than other assets, especially
before retirement. For example, one cannot pledge future Social Security
receipts as loan collateral. This may make Social Security less valuable
than an equivalent amount of other wealth. On the other hand, Social
Security benefits are fully indexed for inflation, by law since 1972 and
by custom before then. Unlike other assets, they are not subject to the
uncertainties of inflation, housing, bond or equity markets, or the state
of the economy in general. For this reason, Social Security wealth may
have a larger impact on behavior. Burtless and Moffitt permitted the
effects to differ and the relative importance to vary over the age of the
respondent. In addition, the authors allowed the propensity to retire to
vary directly with age, independent of age's effect on the budget con
straint. They expected retirement probabilities to increase with age, other
factors held constant.
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Figure 3.2
Distribution of Retirement Earnings Among Working Retirees
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SOURCE: Burdess and Moffitt (1984), p. 156.
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The parameters of the retirement age and retirement hours equations
were generally consistent with economic theory. Respondents in poor
health tended to retire earlier, as did nonwhites and those with poor
educational backgrounds. 21 As expected, retirement probabilities did
increase with age.
The financial results were reasonable. Workers with higher preretire
ment wages were found to retire slightly earlier, suggesting an income
effect stronger than the substitution effect. Postretirement wages were
positively associated with postretirement hours of work, but the elasticity
was very small. Workers vested in a pension plan were found to delay
retirement. This somewhat puzzling result may reflect pension benefit
rules that encourage delayed retirement. Workers were found to retire
earlier the higher the level of potential retirement income.
The results on the relative Social Security impact were very interesting.
The relative effect of Social Security wealth compared to that of other
assets went from zero prior to age 57 (perhaps due to high personal
discount rates or the low liquidity of this asset) to 1.0 by age 59, 3.8
at 62, and 5.0 by age 65 (Burtless and Moffitt 1984). These final ratios
seem unbelievably high, but the evidence does suggest that the impact
does change, with Social Security becoming more and more important
over time.
Conclusions
This research, as all research, has its shortcomings. The Burtless and
Moffitt treatment of pensions is inadequate. They were unable to model
how pension benefits changed with delayed retirement—an issue that
is central to the life-cycle framework. In addition, the sophisticated
econometric techniques have both advantages and disadvantages. The
parameter estimates have desirable statistical properties, but are dif
ficult to interpret.
Nonetheless, these papers represent a very important contribution to
the field. Burtless and Moffitt have integrated the analysis of both the
retirement age and the retirement hours decisions. Their model is con
sistent with the observed clustering of retirement ages at 62 and 65,
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as well as the clustering of postretiremen! earnings near the Social Securi
ty exempt amount. And they find evidence of statistically significant,
though small, Social Security effects on both retirement age and subse
quent labor supply. 22
The Incentives of Specific Pension Plans
In a book and a series of related articles, Gary Fields and Olivia Mit
chell (1984a, 1984b, 1984c), and Mitchell and Fields (1984,1985) have
made major contributions to understanding the retirement decision. Their
work differs from most of the literature in two important ways. They
are among a small number of researchers who have chosen to delve
deeply into the details of a number of specific pension plans. By doing
so, they have been able to document the wide variety of retirement in
centives that American workers actually face. The precision of their
estimates far surpasses what anyone using the limited pension infor
mation available in the Retirement History Study or the National
Longitudinal Survey could hope to achieve. In addition, they have at
tempted to calculate the retirement incentives facing a worker in each
and every possible retirement year in a planning horizon, rather than
in just a specific year or two.
Mitchell and Fields are interested in explaining the age of retirement,
and they have generally ignored the issue of labor supply afterwards.
Their model "assumes that the optimal pattern is to work full time and
then retire" (Fields and Mitchell 1984c). When using the Retirement
History Study sample, they defined retirement as departure from a
primary job, and assumed that the job held in 1969 (the first year of
the RHS) was the primary job. When using the specific pension plan
data described below, they defined the age of retirement as the age of
pension receipt.
The authors' theoretical model is very much in the life-cycle tradi
tion. The worker looks ahead over a planning horizon and chooses when
to retire. The individual's goal is to maximize personal utility, which
depends on the consumption of goods and leisure. There is a tradeoff
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between goods and leisure, because continued work increases lifetime
income (and therefore goods), but decreases lifetime leisure.
Earnings, Social Security, and Pensions
The choice of retirement age is affected by three key variables in the
Fields and Mitchell model: future earnings, future Social Security
receipts, and future pension benefits. Lifetime earnings obviously rise
with delayed retirement. Social Security and pensions are more com
plicated, since each year of continued work means a loss of retirement
benefits during that year, but (usually) higher annual benefits in the
future.
Mitchell and Fields' strategy is to calculate the present discounted
value of the earnings (net of Social Security and income taxes), Social
Security and pension streams that would accrue with each possible retire
ment date over a nine-year planning horizon—from age 60 to 68. They
then sum these three values to obtain the present discounted value of
the total income stream (PDVY) for each potential retirement age. A
major contribution is the method by which the pension data were
obtained.
Rather than rely on the limited pension benefit data in the RHS or
the NLS, Fields and Mitchell drew a sample of workers from 14 actual
defined benefit plans from the Labor Department's 1978 Benefit
Amounts Survey (BAS). 23 In addition to having some basic demographic
data and the entire Social Security earnings records of the workers in
the sample, they had the exact formulas used to calculate pension
benefits. They ended up with a sample of nearly 9,000 workers who
retired between the ages of 60 and 68 and who had complete data on
retirement age, tenure with the firm, and Social Security covered
earnings.
The authors' research strategy required them to forecast what workers
aged 60 around 1970 thought their earnings, Social Security, and pen
sion benefits would have been had they decided to retire at each age
from then to age 68. 24 Future real earnings were estimated on the basis
of individual-specific earnings equations. Future Social Security benefits
were based on the 1972 Social Security rules, which had already
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been legislated in 1970. The authors assumed that workers would have
expected continued annual real increases of the magnitude that had oc
curred during the 1960s—about 3 percent per year.
Initial pension amounts were based on the individual plans' benefit
calculation rules in effect in 1970, and were then assumed to increase
in real terms, prior to retirement, at whatever annual real rate of in
crease the plan had experienced during the 1960s. In five of the plans,
benefits were held constant in nominal terms after retirement. In the
others, postretirement increases had occurred in the past and were assum
ed to continue in the future. The earnings, Social Security, and pen
sion streams were then multiplied by the appropriate survival prob
abilities and discounted at a 2 percent real rate of interest.
The present values of the pension streams for an identical illustrative
worker in each of the 14 plans appear in table 3.1. In all cases, the
PDV of the pension stream began to decrease at some age. But there
was considerable variety in the asset profiles over time. 25
Mitchell and Fields differentiated between pattern and conventional
pension plans. In pattern plans, common in union agreements, the an
nual benefit is almost exclusively a function of the years of service with
the firm. Conventional plans use both years of service and final salary
(often over the last few years on the job) in determining initial benefits.
As seen in table 3.1, the pattern plans were generally structured to
encourage early retirement. Four of the six plans peaked in the initial
year of eligibility (age 60), one peaked at age 62, and one peaked at
65. After the maximum, an individual lost pension wealth with every
single year of delayed retirement. In one case (Plan E), the losses were
extreme; the value of the pension at age 68 was only 42 percent of its
value at age 60. Conventional plans, with their emphasis on final earn
ings, were more likely to encourage work after age 60. Only one plan
peaked at age 60. Far more common was growth through age 65 and
decline thereafter.
Olivia Mitchell and Rebecca Luzadis (1988) traced changes in the
retirement incentives in these 14 defined benefit plans between 1960
and 1980. They found that the incentives in the four United Auto Worker
plans had changed dramatically. In 1960, the present discounted value

Table 3.1
Present Values of Net Private Pension Benefits for Alternative Retirement Ages: Plan-Level Data

UAW plans
Plan A
Plan B
PlanC
PlanD
Non-UAW plans
PlanE
PlanF
PlanG
PlanH
Plan I
Plan J
PlanK
PlanL
PlanM
PlanN

If retirement age occurs at age
65
64
63
A. Pattern Plans

66

67

68

$22,195
34,987
22,195
22,195

$21,706
34,081

$21,140

$20,500

21,706

21,140

20,500

14,512
6,986

13,001
7,079

11,608
6,620

10,328
6,156

9,153
5,692

B. Conventional Plans
10,087
10,027
18,173
19,364
17,028
16,977
18,359
19,335
16,318
15,504
25,295
23,468
18,810
18,291
13,742
14,230

10,497
16,869
16,893
17,246
17,174
26,981
19,084
13,198

9,461

8,891

7,951

16,190
16,563

15,081
15,866

13,841
15,109

12,605

11,592

10,950

60

61

62

$28,181
36,030
28,176
28,176

$27,586
36,146
27,571
27,571

$27,189
36,599
27,189
27,189

$25,455
36,341
25,455
25,455

$23,787
35,730
23,787
23,787

21,858
6,351

19,814
6,464

17,912
6,641

16,147
6,850

0
13,527
16,410
20,012
14,851
17,671
16,526
19,491

0
14,176
16,709
20,256
15,079
19,669
17,042
17,254

9,300
20,471
16,841
20,270
15,290
21,594
17,668
15,193

SOURCE: Mitchell and Fields (1985), p. 283.
NOTE: This table is based on pension algorithms as applied to illustrative worker; see source text. Underlined numbers are row maxima. Dashes indicate
retirement is mandatory in that plan at that age.
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of the benefit stream increased with delayed retirement up through age
65, thereby discouraging early retirement. In both 1970 and 1980,
however, pension wealth peaked at age 60, and declined with each year
of additional work after that.
In four other union plans, the peak in pension wealth occurred at age
65 in 1960 and 1970, but had moved to 62 by 1980. In six nonunion
plans, the peak was at age 65 in all three years. In this small sample
of union plans, then, the incentives changed significantly, from
discouraging early retirement in 1960 to actively encouraging it two
decades later. In later work with 83 defined benefit plans, Luzadis and
Mitchell (1989) presented preliminary evidence that employer pensions
did indeed respond to changes in the retirement environment—in par
ticular, to changes in mandatory retirement legislation, Employee Retire
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) regulation, and Social Security
benefit calculation rules. The carrot replaced the stick.
Richard Ippolito (1990) demonstrates the same trends. He documents
the dramatic increase over the last several decades in the number of
pension plans that offered reduced (and usually actuarially subsidized)
benefits at age 55 or full benefits prior to age 65. Using data from several
sources, he estimates that the percentage of male workers eligible for
full benefits prior to age 65 increased from almost none in 1965 to 15
percent in 1985.
Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989a) have shown that,
because of the service requirements in many defined benefit plans, the
age at which pension wealth peaks depends on when the worker joined
the firm. The later one has joined, the later the wealth peaks. In other
words, plans often provide less incentive for long-term employees to
keep working than they do for more recent hires of the same age. Their
work confirms the view that there is an extremely wide variety of work
incentives embedded in pension plans and suggests that, because of ser
vice requirements, knowing just the worker's age and the dates of ear
ly and normal retirement may not be enough to calculate true compen
sation accurately.
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Work Incentives
These pension values are only one-third of the financial story. Workers
must also consider earnings on the job and the asset value of their Social
Security benefits. Social Security may be close to actuarially fair be
tween 62 and 65, but is definitely less than fair after that. The Social
Security wealth losses after age 65 compound the pension losses
documented above and offset some of the earnings from continued work.
Fields and Mitchell (1984a) have analyzed the incentive structure,
by year of retirement, facing 390 men in one of their plans (Plan A). 26
As seen in the averages in table 3.2, the present value of earnings rose
with each year of delayed retirement. The asset value of the pension
rights declined monotonically and lost about one-quarter of their value
by age 68. Social Security rights rose in value through age 65, and then
declined. The net result of all three of these factors is seen in row 7.
Several conclusions are apparent. The present discounted value of
lifetime income always rises with delayed retirement because earnings
exceed the losses in retirement wealth. An income or wealth maximizer
would never retire for financial reasons. But a utility maximizer might.
The true net annual compensation (the change in lifetime income) declin
ed steadily, from about $7,500 (1970 dollars) at age 60 to less than
$3,000 at age 68. This was not due to declines in the paycheck, but
rather to losses of Social Security and pension wealth. 27
In another paper (1984b), the authors did an analogous experiment,
using the 1982 Social Security laws and a sample drawn from the RHS.
Their pension figures were much less reliable here. In fact, they were
not based on the pension data available in the RHS, but rather on in
dustrywide averages of benefit amounts. The same qualitative conclu
sions appeared. Lifetime income rose with continued work, but by
smaller and smaller amounts. The true earnings of an illustrative worker
at age 61 were over $17,500 (1982 dollars). This decreased to less than
$10,000 at age 65 (when Social Security wealth declines begin), and
dropped further to nearly $6,000 at age 67. The worker's true com
pensation declined with each additional year of work, with a particularly
severe cut at age 65.

Table 3.2
Expected Future Income Opportunities as Viewed From Age 60
(in 1970 dollars)
If retirement occurred at age
60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

7,549
3,487
2,172

7,450
3,451
2,480

7,430
2,449
2,807

7,399
2,608
2,991

8,471
2,775
3,181

7,295
2,953
3,376

Annual amounts
(1) Net earnings
(2) First year's net private pension
(3) First year's Social Security benefit3

0
3 ,140
1 ,904

7,302
3,157
1,901

7,503
3,513
1,894

1

Present values
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

PDV net earnings
PDV net private pension
PDV Social Security
PDV net lifetime income
(=(4»+(5)+(6))

a.
3

0
28 ,879
28 ,589

7,022
28,425
29,529

13,950
28,008
30,412

20,625
26,290
31,930

26,920
24,699
33,305

32,905
23,355
34,332

38,571
22,811
33,203

43,900
22,181
31,947

57 ,468

64,977

72,370

78,846

84,923

90,592

94,586

98,028 100,968

48,904
21,503
30,561

SOURCE: Fields and Mitchell (1984a), p. 255.
a. Social Security benefits are computed as of the year of first eligibility. Thus, an individual retiring at age 60 would not begin receiving benefits
until attaining age 62.
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Retirement Behavior
Mitchell and Fields proceeded to test whether work or retirement in
centives actually did influence the behavior of the men in their Benefit
Amounts Survey sample. This involved reducing the eight years of in
centives facing each worker (corresponding to retirement at ages 60
through 68) to simpler summary parameters. The authors chose two:
the present discounted value of future earnings, pensions, and Social
Security associated with retirement at age 60 (YBASE), and the change
in this figure between ages 60 and 65 (YSLOPE). 28
Economic theory suggests that, ceterisparibus, retirement age should
be an inverse function of YBASE. This is basically a wealth effect—
those with more wealth will buy more of all normal goods, including
leisure. One way to buy more leisure is to retire earlier. The effect of
YSLOPE is theoretically ambiguous because of offsetting income and
substitution effects. The authors expect, however, that the substitution
effect dominates, and those with the more to gain from continued work
will tend to retire later.
Simple regression estimates with retirement age as the dependent
variable supported their hypotheses. With a sample of workers from
10 of the BAS pension plans, the YBASE coefficient was significantly
negative and the YSLOPE coefficient significantly positive (Fields and
Mitchell 1984c). Each additional $1,000 of Social Security and pen
sion wealth at age 60 was associated with retirement about one-half to
one month earlier. Each $1,000 in potential wealth gain between ages
60 and 65 delayed the average retirement age by one-third to two-thirds
of a month. 29
Silvana Pozzebon and Olivia Mitchell (1989) analyzed the retirement
behavior of a small sample of working wives in the RHS. In contrast
to the men, the wives' economic opportunities did not seem to be signifi
cant determinants of their retirement behavior. Neither the base level
of Social Security and pension wealth nor changes in lifetime wealth,
if retirement were delayed from age 60 to 65, was statistically signifi
cant. The wives' decisions were affected by their husbands' health, their
husbands' incomes and the age differences between their husbands and
themselves, but not by the financial incentives they themselves faced.
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Since there is little literature on the retirement behavior of wives, and
since this research was done with a very small sample, it is impossible
to draw strong conclusions. But the suggestion is that working husbands
and wives may respond differently to their economic circumstances.
Finally, Laurence Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) estimated the im
pact of the pension plan of a specific Fortune 500 company on the
behavior of its workers. As did Fields and Mitchell, they knew all the
details of the benefit calculation rules. In this plan, there was a very
large reward for remaining on the job until age 55. Pension accruals
after that were either small or negative, depending on the worker's age
and service. At age 65, Social Security accruals also turned negative,
compounding the pension effect, and resulting in wealth losses equal
to about one-third of annual pay.
Kotlikoff and Wise compared the pension accrual patterns with observ
ed retirement behavior. They found large increases in retirement rates
at ages 55, 60, and 62 (the age of first Social Security eligibility) for
those vested in the pension plan (10 years of service), but no such jumps
for those not yet vested. At age 65, there was a large increase in the
probability of retirement for those few still working. This pattern is
consistent with response to the financial incentives embedded in the pen
sion and Social Security plans. The authors concluded that
It is clear . . . that the inducements in the plan provisions
to retire early have had a very substantial effect on depar
ture rates from the firm . . . The jumps in departure rates
at specific ages coincide precisely with the discontinuities
and kink points in the worker compensation profiles that result
from the pension plan provisions together with wage earn
ings profiles and social security accrual.

Conclusions
A major contribution of this line of research is the detail provided
about specific retirement plans—detail that is simply nonexistent in the
large microeconomic data sets. The price paid is considerably less in
formation about most other aspects of the individuals under study.
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Another contribution is the specific detail on how retirement incentives
change, year-by-year, as workers age beyond 60. The authors found
that retirement income programs are seldom actuarially fair. 30 The pres
ent discounted value of the income streams depends critically on when
the benefits are first claimed.
For workers in the Labor Department's Benefit Amounts Survey,
Social Security wealth generally increased with work up to age 65 and
declined thereafter. Defined benefit pension plans displayed greater varie
ty. Pattern plans tended to encourage early retirement (prior to 65),
while conventional plans (which include earnings in the benefit calcula
tion rules) generally discouraged it. Delaying retirement always increases
lifetime income, but by smaller and smaller amounts as one ages. The
true compensation for work at age 68 can be less than half of what it
was at age 60.
Work incentives change dramatically over time. Mitchell and Fields'
and Kotlikoff and Wise's research on the retirement behavior in specific
firms suggests strongly that workers do respond to these incentives,
and therefore that individual retirement behavior and aggregate retire
ment trends can be influenced by changes in public policy.
Uncertainty
Most retirement models have assumed a world of certainty in which
people make decisions on the basis of their current situations and their
best estimates of the future. In fact, however, the future is very uncer
tain. There are probability distributions around these best estimates and
many predictions turn out to be wrong. Health and living arrangements
change and unexpected layoffs occur. Labor market conditions improve
or deteriorate. And retirement benefits can turn out to be very different
from earlier expectations, either because individuals did not understand
the benefit calculation rules completely or because the rules changed
after their initial expectations were formed.
The latter is particularly likely for Social Security. Prior to the 1972
amendments, which indexed benefits to the cost of living, Congress
periodically increased nominal and, sometimes, real benefits. Between
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1968 and 1975, for example, real benefits increased dramatically—on
the order of 45 percent (Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn 1986). This
occurred after a 15-year period in which real benefits were essentially
constant. In 1983, amendments were passed that altered benefits by
delaying a cost-of-living adjustment for six months, taxing half the
benefits of high-income recipients, and legislating an increase in the
age of eligibility for full benefits to age 67 (by the year 2027). Pension
benefits are also subject to change, particularly for workers still on the
job. Steven Alien, Robert Clark, and Daniel Sumner (1986) have argued
that postretirement inflation adjustments are made much more frequently
than commonly believed, even when employers have no contractual
obligation to do so.
A few researchers have studied the effect of unanticipated changes
on retirement plans, and a major effort in that direction is currently
underway. Much of this research has focused on the extent to which
the large—and presumably unanticipated—increases in real Social Securi
ty benefits during the early 1970s were responsible for the dramatic
declines in the labor supply of older men that followed. 31 We will see
below that there is wide disagreement on the answer. Others have ask
ed whether changes in retirement plans are correlated with observed
changes in the respondent's circumstances.

Social Security Increases and the Decline in Participation Rates
Jerry Hausman and David Wise (1985) analyzed the labor force
behavior of the wage and salary men in all six waves of the Retirement
History Study. They used a subjective definition of retirement—a respon
dent is retired when he says he is; that is, when he calls himself fully
or partially retired. This definition corresponds more closely to exit
from a career job than it does to withdrawal from the labor force. The
authors estimated the effects of a number of explanatory variables in
a hazard model of retirement. The observations were retirement tran
sitions over two-year RHS interview periods.
The model included standard variables such as health status, annual
earnings, assets, age, dependents, and pension eligibility, but the focus
was on Social Security. 32 Its influence was measured by both flows (an-
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nual benefits) and stocks (the present discounted value of future benefits),
and by both the current value of these two measures and the changes
in these values following an incremental year of work. It is interesting
to note that the asset or wealth specification fit the data better than the
annual benefits version. As expected, high Social Security wealth in
creased the probability of retirement (and more so at age 65 than earlier)
and wealth losses associated with additional work decreased it.
With their empirical results, Hausman and Wise were able to simulate
retirement patterns with and without the increases in Social Security
primary insurance benefits that occurred between 1969 and 1975. They
compared the differences in their estimates with the actual declines in
labor force participation rates, and concluded that "the increases in social
security benefits over this period may account for possibly one-third
of the decrease." Although their comparison of subjective self-defined
retirement status to objective participation rates makes the precise
numerical estimates suspect, the qualitative finding that the impact of
these Social Security benefit changes was large is interesting.
In contrast, Gary Burtless (1986) attributed "only a small role in the
decline in the average male retirement age" to the benefit increases.
He defined retirement as a discontinuous drop in annual labor supply
and his dependent variable was retirement age. Lifetime Social Securi
ty benefits were calculated under three different sets of benefit rules:
those in effect prior to 1970, those that applied during the period from
1970 to 1972, and those applicable after 1972. These benefits were in
cluded in a lifetime budget constraint and the effects of the parameters
of this constraint on the retirement age were estimated.
Burtless found statistically significant, but modest, effects of Social
Security increases on retirement behavior. In particular, he estimated
that the increases legislated in 1970 and 1972 reduced the average retire
ment age by only one month. The long-run effect, had the changes oc
curred much earlier so that respondents could have had longer to ad
just to the change, would have been about two months. Although these
changes are not inconsequential in the aggregate, they represented, ac
cording to Burtless, only a small portion of the participation decline
that actually took place. He viewed rising personal wealth levels, in-

Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision

105

creases in unemployment after 1969, and changing attitudes toward
retirement as alternative explanations.
Robert Moffitt (1987) and Alan Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke
(1989) are skeptical of even this small role for Social Security. Mof
fitt's approach to the problem was very different and relied on aggregate
time series data on labor supply and Social Security wealth. He pointed
out that the Social Security wealth of a cohort can rise for at least two
reasons: increases in benefits for individuals already in the system, as
is studied above, but also extensions of coverage to include those
previously excluded.
With various assumptions about how people form expectations about
the future, Moffitt presented evidence that the unanticipated increases
in aggregate Social Security wealth were actually larger in the 1950s,
when coverage was expanding rapidly, than they were in the early 1970s.
But the decreases in labor force participation in the early 1950s were
much more modest. In addition, Moffitt argued that there were large
negative unanticipated wealth shocks in the mid- and late-1970s, when
actual Social Security increases failed to keep pace with what recipients
may have expected based on the early 1970s experience. Despite these
negative shocks, participation rates continued to decline.
Krueger and Pischke (1989) analyzed the behavior of the so-called
"notch babies"—workers born between 1917 and 1921—who, due to
a 1977 Social Security Act amendment, suffered an abrupt and unex
pected decrease in their future Social Security benefits. They found lit
tle evidence that this affected the labor supply behavior of these in
dividuals and conclude that there is probably little hope for reversing
the trend toward early retirement by reducing Social Security benefits. 33
Microeconomic cross-section findings are difficult to compare with
aggregate time series results. Each approach has its own advantages
and disadvantages and these are nicely summarized in the Moffitt arti
cle. But he and Krueger and Pischke have pointed out a potential in
consistency between the long-run trends in aggregate Social Security
wealth and participation rates and prompted at least a temporary pause
among those deducing causation from recent patterns of Social Securi
ty growth and elderly labor force decline.
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Changes in Circumstances and Changes in Plans
With a sample from the National Longitudinal Surveys, Gilbert Nestel
(1985) compared the retirement plans of respondents at age 59 with
their subsequent behavior. He noted a significant shift in expectations
over time. Between the middle 1960s and the middle 1970s, the pro
portion of respondents planning to retire prior to age 65 increased from
about 30 to about 40 percent.
The predictions turned out to be relatively inaccurate. By 1981, only
31 percent of the whites interviewed, and 26 percent of the blacks,
had actually retired in the age interval in which they had said they
would. 34 The predictions were more accurate the nearer the planned
retirement age was to age 59. Those who did not predict accurately
were much more likely to retire earlier than planned than later. These
findings suggest that something happened between the date of predic
tion and the date of planned retirement, but give no insight into what
might have occurred.
Kathryn Anderson, Richard Burkhauser, and Joseph Quinn (1986)
compared the planned and actual retirement dates of a sample of nearly
1,600 men from the Retirement History Study and found that about 60
percent left work within a year of their predicted dates. 35 More retired
before than after they had planned, and the proportion of "on-time"
retirements increased with the age at the time of the prediction.
More important, the authors found that changes in plans were cor
related with what they assumed were unanticipated changes in the en
vironment. They studied three such changes: the dramatic increases in
Social Security benefits mentioned above, changes in individual health
status, and changes in local labor market conditions.
The Social Security variable was measured as the unexpected increase
in Social Security wealth caused by the changes in the benefit rules.
The authors calculated the asset value of the benefit stream in the year
of predicted retirement (R*) using two sets of rules—those in effect in
1969, the year when the prediction was made, and those eventually in
effect in year R*. The difference between the two asset values was the
unexpected increase in wealth, and it was expected to induce earlier
retirement. The authors also included dummy variables, indicating health
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status improvement or deterioration and differences in the local
unemployment rate between 1969 and the earlier of R* and the actual
retirement date.
The empirical results were reasonable. As expected, increases in Social
Security wealth increased the probability of retiring earlier than plan
ned and decreased the likelihood of retiring later. Self-defined health
deterioration had the same effects. A loosening of the local labor market
did just the opposite. The greater the increase in local unemployment
rates, the less likely the workers were to retire early and the more likely
they were to stay in the labor force longer than planned. This preliminary
evidence contradicts the view that older workers, often protected by
seniority, are likely to be forced out of employment during economic
downturns (although some individuals certainly are), and suggests that
they may want to and may be able to remain employed longer when
economic conditions decline.
This research demonstrates that plans do change and, therefore, that
models based on assumptions of certainty will miss an important part
of the story. But it is reassuring to find that the changes in plans are
not entirely random. In fact, they turn out to be correlated with obser
vable and often unforeseeable changes in circumstances. When expec
tations prove inaccurate, so do the plans based on them.
Dynamic Programming Models
Much of the most current and sophisticated retirement research focuses
specifically on issues of uncertainty. John Rust (1987), James Berkovec
and Steven Stern (forthcoming), and James Stock and David Wise (1990)
have used dynamic programming models to describe individuals who
recalculate their optimal behavior each time period, using new infor
mation about the present and their best predictions about the future. The
computational requirements are so burdensome that these models are
usually streamlined along other dimensions and are quite limited in the
options they allow. The results thus far are generally consistent with
the previous literature—retirement decisions are influenced by Social
Security and pension provisions, age and health status.
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What makes these models particularly interesting is that they do not
assume that workers know their future wage rates and retirement in
come flows with certainty. Stock and Wise, for example, argue that
workers decide whether to retire today by making best guesses about
future wages and Social Security and pension rules. If any time in the
future looks better, the individual continues to work. After another year,
the worker has more information about the future, based on actual earn
ings during that year and any other relevant knowledge acquired, and
must then make another retirement decision, again comparing immediate
retirement with retirement in all subsequent years.
The key is that forecasts of future conditions will be different from
what they were a year ago. What becomes critical in these models are
assumptions about how expectations are formed and how sensitive they
are to new information. This is obviously difficult to model. And some
of what is gained in the theoretical sophistication is lost when one is
forced to operationalize the concepts for empirical estimation.
Social Security Reform
Gary Fields and Olivia Mitchell (1984b,c), Gary Burtless and Robert
Moffitt (1984), Stephan Gohmann and Robert Clark (1989) and Alan
Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1985b, 1989d), whose work we will
discuss more fully in chapter 5, have all utilized retirement models to
estimate the effects of Social Security reforms similar to those enacted
in 1983. 36 They all conclude that these policy changes would indeed
alter aggregate retirement patterns but suggest that the magnitude of
the change would be small.
Mitchell and Fields studied the impact of four changes in Social Securi
ty regulations on the retirement ages and retirement incomes of a sam
ple of older Americans drawn from the Retirement History Study. They
defined retirement as the departure from the job held in 1969, the year
of the initial RHS survey. They calculated the impact of specific reforms
on the budget sets of the respondents and estimated the effect of these
changes on labor supply behavior. The four reforms were
(1) an increase in the age of full Social Security benefits from 65 to 68,
with benefits reduced by 6.67 percent for each year of receipt
before age 68, 37
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(2) a one-time six-month delay in the Social Security cost-of-living
adjustment,
(3) an increase in the delayed retirement credit after age 65 from 3
percent per year of delay to 6.67 percent—the factor currently
applied between ages 62 and 65 38 and
(4) an increase in the early retirement penalty from 6.67 to 15 percent
for each year of Social Security receipt prior to age 65.
Three of the four proposals would lower benefits. The third leaves
benefits prior to age 65 unchanged and increases them for those who
retire thereafter.
The last proposal, a severe penalty for early retirement or, alternative
ly, a large reward for continued work, had the largest predicted effect
on behavior. Fields and Mitchell (1984b) predicted that average retire
ment would be delayed about three months. The first proposal, which
combines a decrease in Social Security benefits with a larger delayed
retirement credit for work after 65, had about half that effect—an average
delay of 1.6 months. The other two reforms—the one-time delay in the
cost-of-living adjustment and the increased delayed retirement credit—
had almost no effect, the former because the impact on lifetime wealth
is so small and the latter because it only changes incentives after age
65, when most people have already retired. These results predict that
workers will respond to Social Security cuts with very modest increases
in their work lives. They will choose to take the cut in income, not
in leisure.
Burtless and Moffitt (1984) used their empirical results to simulate
the impacts on retirement ages and Social Security outlays of three possi
ble Social Security amendments: 39
(1) a delay in the normal retirement age from 65 to 68 (the same as the
Fields and Mitchell proposal [1] above),
(2) a 20 percent reduction in Social Security benefits at every age, and
(3) an actuarially-fair delayed retirement credit at all ages. 40
The first two proposals would lower benefits and the last would increase
them after age 65, when the current delayed retirement credit drops
from near 7 percent to 3 percent. These amendments were imposed on
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the budget constraints of three hypothetical recipients—married males
with and without a working spouse, and an unmarried male.
All three proposals were predicted to delay retirement, but the changes
in behavior are modest. The increase in the normal retirement age to
68 delays the retirement of the married men by about 4.5 months and
that of the unmarried man by 2.5 months. These estimates are qualitative
ly similar to those of Fields and Mitchell. The third proposal (an
actuarially fair adjustment at all ages) has similar effects and the acrossthe-board 20 percent benefit reduction has about half that impact. Since
the behavior responses are small, these reforms would substantially alter
Social Security outlays, decreasing them under the first two proposals
and increasing them in the third.
It is difficult to compare the Gustman and Steinmeier findings to those
above because they calculated changes in the percentage working full
time and part time rather than changes in the average age at retirement.
They simulated the effects of four actual Social Security changes:
(1) A delay in the age of normal retirement to 67, with the penalty for
receipt at age 62 at 30 percent,
(2) An increase in the delayed retirement credit after age 65 to 8
percent per year,
(3) A reduction in the benefit reduction rate applied to earnings over
the exempt amount (for those aged 65 to 69 only)
from 50 to 33 percent, and
(4) A one-time six-month delay in the cost-of-living adjustment.
The first two proposals have been legislated for the future; the others
have already taken place.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) estimated that the entire reform
package will have little long-term effect on the retirement probabilities
of those younger than 65—the percentage fully retired (not working)
falls by less than 1 percentage point. But between ages 65 and 68, the
proportion retired falls by about four points. This is the net result of
a six-point increase in the percentage working full time and a 2 percent
drop in those employed part time. The retirement bulge at age 65 disap
pears. The component responsible for most of the change is the increase
in the delayed retirement credit. There is some effect of the decrease
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in the benefit reduction rate and almost none from the delayed cost-ofliving adjustment. The authors pointed out that with actuarially fair ad
justments, the designation of the "normal retirement age" is irrelevant,
since the incentives for delayed retirement are the same before and after
this arbitrary age.
Gohmann and Clark (1989) have developed a model in which the deci
sion to claim Social Security benefits and the decision to retire (leave
the labor force) are treated separately and therefore allowed to move
in separate directions in response to a policy change. They used a sam
ple of married, wage and salary men from the Retirement History Study
to estimate behavioral equations for both decisions, and found that they
are simultaneously determined. When they altered the parameters of
the model to reflect the eventual outcome of the 1983 Social Security
amendments, their simulations suggested only slight changes in the agespecific probabilities of enefit acceptance and retirement.
These researchers all predict that changes in Social Security incen
tives like those legislated in 1983 will alter retirement patterns, but on
ly modestly. 41 But all of these estimates are only partial equilibrium
predictions, since they assume that the other parameters in the decisionmaking process, in particular, the structure of employer pension
benefits, will remain the same. 42 If these are also endogenous to the
system, as we expect they are, then the final results could differ substan
tially from the simulations above.

Involuntary Retirement
Although economists have focused primarily on retirement as a volun
tary choice (the rational response to the set of options available), there
has been a resurgence of interest in factors that limit or eliminate this
choice. This is very much in the older tradition—the view that retirements
are often involuntary, the result of circumstances beyond the worker's
control. The two most important such factors are health and labor market
obstacles late in life.

Health
Interest in the interaction between health and retirement has grown
in recent years because of the 1983 amendments to the Social Security
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Act, which will increase the age of normal retirement to age 67 by the
year 2027 and raise the penalty for claiming Social Security at age 62
from 20 to 30 percent of the full benefit amount. Part of the justifica
tion for this change is the recent increase in the life expectancy of the
elderly. This puts financial strains on the resources of the Social Security
system, but also suggests that workers may well be able to work longer
than they do now.
Recent reviews by Steven Chapman, Mitchell LaPlante, and Gail
Wilenski (1986) and by Martynas Yeas (1987), however, have cast some
doubt on the popular presumption that life expectancy and health go
hand-in-hand. The trends on longevity are clear—older Americans are
living longer now than they did two decades ago. The increases in life
expectancy at ages 60 or 65 are well-documented and are significant
for males and females, for whites and nonwhites. What is surprising
is that they do not seem to be accompanied by increases in health status.
Chapman et al., reporting on a variety of studies and data sources, con
cluded that morbidity and the prevalence of disability have actually in
creased. Yeas used a number of measures of health status and found
that they produced very similar patterns over time, suggesting increas
ing health problems at least through the late 1970s. 43
One explanation for the declining health of the elderly is the "failure
of success"—that medical advances keep people alive today who would
have died in the past (Berkowitz 1988). The additional years may be
ones of chronic illness, not good health. Regardless of the explanation,
an implication is that the impact of health on the retirement decision
is likely to remain at least as important in the future as it is now.
Many economists are skeptical about the usefulness of subjective health
evaluations, especially when given as a reason for retirement or as part
of an application for health-related benefits. One concern is that
respondents may view health as a socially legitimate reason for stop
ping work and therefore mention it even when it is not the primary reason
for retirement. Joseph Quinn (1977) found that among retired RHS
respondents who claimed that they had no health limitations and had
health better than that of their peers, 10 percent still claimed health as
the primary motivation for retirement, as did 13 percent of those with
no health limitation and health the same as their peers.
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On the other hand, Frank Sammartino (1987) and Gary Burtless (1987)
have argued that self-evaluations of health may be a better measure than
objective standards because they implicitly include information about
the quality of health required on the individual's actual job. Sammar
tino has pointed out that several studies report a high correlation be
tween medically determined health status and subjective descriptions.
Despite this, there is a great deal of interest in alternative measures
of health and in estimating how sensitive empirical results are to the
definition used.
In a very thorough recent review of the health and retirement literature,
Sammartino described three causational links. Poor health can make
work more arduous and therefore increase preferences for leisure; it
can lower an individual's market wage rate; and it can decrease life
expectancy. All three can induce earlier retirement.
In empirical work, poor health is almost always associated with earlier
retirement (see Sammartino [1987] for a list of recent references). The
effects are large and significant. Exact comparisons are impossible
because of the variety of definitions of both health and retirement. Sam
martino reported on several studies that conclude that poor health raises
the probability of retirement for workers aged 60 to 67 by 14 to 18
percentage points and lowers the expected age of retirement by one to
three years.
Some recent studies have focused on health measures other than selfdefined status at the time of retirement. Donald Parsons (1982), Eric
Kingson (1982), and Kathryn Anderson and Richard Burkhauser (1985)
utilized subsequent mortality. Gloria Bazzoli (1985) and Herbert Parnes
and Lawrence Less (1985a) used self-reported health, but from a survey
wave prior to retirement. The hope here is that prior health is more
likely to be an accurate representation, and less likely to be used as
a social justification for retirement.
Thomas Chirikos and Gilbert Nestel (1981) and Gloria Bazzoli (1985)
created an index from a series of impairments. J. S. Butler, Richard
Burkhauser, Jean Mitchell, and Theodore Pincus (1987) compared selfreports on a specific condition—arthritis—with a clinical measure. Gary
Burtless (1987) compared three commonly used subjective measures
with subsequent mortality and found them to be highly correlated.
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These and other studies continue to confirm that health, however
measured, is an important determinant of the individual retirement deci
sion. But they suggest that the use of self-defined health status at retire
ment exaggerates its importance and may reduce the measured effects
of other factors. For example, Parsons (1982), using a sample from
the NLS, found that older men were more likely to declare themselves
in poor health the larger the Social Security benefits for which they were
eligible. This suggests that retirement status and declared health status
may be jointly determined. If so, then the coefficient of subjective health
status in a retirement equation might reflect both the legitimate impact
of health and the financial incentives in retirement income programs.
Parsons found a stronger and cleaner Social Security effect when an
objective measure of health—subsequent mortality—was used.
Anderson and Burkhauser (1985) reached similar conclusions with
respect to the wage rate. They used both a subjective measure based
on the (RHS) respondent's self-assessment and an objective one based
on subsequent mortality. Although they found significant wage effects
in their retirement equations in both cases, the elasticities were about
five times larger when the mortality measure was used. Finally, Burtless
(1987) compared a subjective measure of impairment with an index based
on predetermined conditions. He found that both variables were signifi
cant determinants in retirement equations, but that the measured effects
of economic variables (Social Security benefits, pension entitlement,
and potential earnings) were much larger when the more objective in
dex was used.
These authors have suggested that self-declared health status may really
be an endogenous variable, jointly determined with retirement status.
If so, it is not a legitimate explanatory variable in a single-equation labor
supply equation. Steven Stern (1989) has tested this hypothesis explicitly,
although not with a sample of older workers. He considered reported
disability and labor force participation as a system of simultaneous equa
tions, and used symptoms and diseases as the underlying index of true
health status. In contrast with the suggestions in much of the literature,
Stern found very little evidence of endogeneity when using standard
subjective health questions and very little bias on other coefficients in
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the equations. Although he admits that his evidence is not conclusive,
he finds that the traditional disability measures are useful and reasonably
exogenous predictors of labor force participation. The last word has
certainly not been spoken on this issue.
Several authors (Sickles and Taubman [1986] and Butler, Anderson,
and Burkhauser [1989]) have gone a step further and presented models
in which actual (not just reported) health is endogenous, since medical
care over the lifetime is a matter of choice. If medical care depends
on income, then financial resources have two effects on the retirement de
cision: a direct one as in all the modern models, and also an indirect one
via their impact on health status. If this story is correct, then use of
health status, even if perfectly measured, in a single equation model
will yield biased coefficients for the explanatory variables.
This current literature on health and retirement yields several con
clusions. The most obvious is additional confirmation that health is a
key determinant of labor force status, even in sophisticated models that
focus on choice and the role of financial incentives. But there is con
siderable debate on the magnitude and exact nature of its influence. The
size of the estimated effects of health and economic factors depends
on the nature of the model (whether health is viewed as exogenous or
endogenous) and on the precise measure of health status used.

Labor Market Obstacles
Even in an era when an increasing number of retirements appear to
be voluntary, there is widespread interest in the special labor market
problems of middle-aged and older workers. This interest was accen
tuated by the job losses caused by two recessions in the early 1980s
and by recent and current corporate restructuring, often in conjunction
with mergers and acquisitions. The special problems of the elderly in
clude the difficulty of finding new full-time work late in life, the short
age of well-paying part-time job opportunities, and age discrimination.
The official unemployment rates of older workers are lower than those
of the labor force as a whole. 44 These official statistics, however, con
ceal part of the story. Older Americans are more likely than others to
be discouraged workers—out of work but no longer looking, and
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therefore not counted among the unemployed. Diane Herz and Philip
Rones (1989) showed that the inclusion of discouraged workers adds
over a third to the unemployment rate of men aged 55 and over and
adds over 70 percent for analogous women, but has only a very small
effect on the unemployment rate overall. 45 Although workers aged 55
and over were about as likely to be laid off in the mid-1980s as those
who were younger, the older workers who were laid off were much
more likely to leave the labor force—one-third of those aged 55 to 64
did, as did three-quarters of those 65 and over, compared to less than
10 percent of those aged 20 through 54 (Herz and Rones 1989).
David Shapiro and Steven Sandell (1987) have specifically studied
older displaced workers in the NLS surveys—those men who were per
manently laid offer fired between 1966 and 1978. They found that older
job-losers faced special difficulties. They were more likely to suffer
long spells of unemployment and greater earnings reductions when they
did find work. Layoffs were also highly correlated with retirement.
Almost 30 percent of male job-losers aged 60 retired, compared to on
ly 10 percent of those still employed.
Robert Hutchens (1986,1988) has argued that job opportunities decline
with age because older workers have fewer years to offer a prospective
employer. Therefore, firms have less time to recoup the fixed costs of
employment (such as the costs of firm-specific on-the-job training) and
are less able to utilize compensation schemes that delay part of the pay
until the end of the contract. In addition, the physical requirements of
some jobs may put older workers at a disadvantage. Using data from
the 1983 Current Population Survey, Hutchens (1988) showed that
recently hired older workers were found in a narrower band of industries
and occupations than were either recently hired young workers or all
old workers. Although this could occur because older job-changers
voluntarily choose this limited range of jobs, it is also consistent with
the hypothesis that the breadth of opportunity declines.
According to Jim Jondrow, Frank Brechling, and Alan Marcus (1987),
many workers would like to retire gradually. In one survey, 80 percent
of respondents over age 55 preferred part-time work to complete retire
ment. In another, 60 percent of a sample of managers preferred phased
retirement. Two-thirds of another group said they would consider a tran-

Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision

117

sitional step of part-time employment. Many of these individuals would
have liked part-time work with their full-time employer. Despite these
preferences, as we will see in chapter 5, the modal pattern of retire
ment still involves an abrupt transition from full-time work to complete
labor force withdrawal. Most wage and salary workers who are able
to reduce the number of hours they work must switch jobs to do so.
Why do the desires and opportunities for part-time work not match?
A primary reason is that part-time pay is lower than full-time com
pensation. According to Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1985a),
older workers in the RHS who reported themselves partially retired suf
fered an hourly wage loss of 10 percent if they remained with their
previous full-time employer, and 30 percent if they did not. In chapter
6 below, with the RHS sample, we report similar findings—significant
wage losses associated with movement to part-time work, especially
if accompanied by a change in employer.
Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987) suggest that these wage
declines are due to the lower productivity and higher fixed administrative
and training costs of part-time work. They hypothesize that employers
have to pay less to make part-time employment profitable. This is
especially true when a worker has changed employers, lost specific
human capital, and has to be retrained on the new job.
Why then do workers not reduce hours on their career jobs, and
thereby maintain their specific human capital and wage rates? Accord
ing to Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, 1985a), they do not because they
cannot. Only 15 percent of firms responding to a 1979 survey permit
ted some employees to reduce hours as they approached retirement.
Only 7 percent offered this option to all employees. A survey of in
dividuals suggested that two-thirds to three-quarters of older wage and
salary workers were unable to work fewer hours. Shirley Rhine (1984)
reported that only 3 percent of a sample of over 350 large firms per
mitted phased retirement. The self-employed, on the other hand, who
have more control over their hours, are much more likely to utilize a
transitional period of partial retirement.
What many workers want, but cannot find, is part-time employment
at their old wage rates. What some find, but do not want, are jobs at
lower pay. 46 Many older workers, therefore, face unattractive alter-
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natives as they age. Continued full-time employment on a career job
eventually results in significant losses of retirement income wealth—in
essence, a pay cut. Part-time work on this job is rarely available for
the wage and salary population. A new job usually means a substan
tially lower wage rate.
Faced with these unattractive alternatives, many older Americans stop
working. Is this decision voluntary? In one sense it is, because individuals
choose to do it under the circumstances. But in another sense it is not,
because the circumstances change dramatically as they age. Older
workers face special problems in the labor market, and the interaction
between supply and demand, choice and coercion, is a complex one.
The National Longitudinal Surveys
Herbert Parnes and his colleagues at the Center for Human Resource
Research at the Ohio State University are responsible for the develop
ment, collection, and much of the analysis of the data collected in the
National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLS). Four
demographic groups were surveyed, including a sample of approximately
5,000 men aged 45 to 59, in 1966. Although the study was initially
scheduled to last only five years, concentrating on the preretirement
experience, it was later extended to 10, and then to 17 years. Respondents
were interviewed a total of 10 times, by telephone, mail, and in per
son. Since this group was 62 to 76 years of age by the time the surveys
ceased in 1983, most of them were followed through their retirement
and well into their postretirement years. 47
The NLS data on older workers have generated a remarkable amount
of research—six volumes of papers by members of the Center for Human
Resource Research (all referenced in Parnes et al. [1985])—and hun
dreds of papers by these and other researchers throughout the country.
Their last monograph includes research by economists, psychologists,
sociologists and statisticians. We include only a cursory review of this
literature here, and highlight some of the findings that bear most directly
on our research below.
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Definitions of Retirement
Using 15 years of longitudinal data, Herbert Parnes and Lawrence
Less (1985a) analyzed the volume and patterns of retirement over this
period and documented the importance of the definition chosen. They
experimented with three. The first is subjective—individuals are label
ed retired whenever they state that they have stopped working at a regular
job. The other two are objective. One is based on the receipt of pen
sion or disability income (from Social Security or an employer pension),
and the other on annual labor supply. In the latter, the authors defined
as retired anyone working fewer than 1,000 hours per year—
approximately half-time or less.
There are several other choices that the researchers must also make
in calculating how many people retired during a given time period. One
is whether to treat retirement as a one-time event (once retired, always
retired) or as a function of current labor force status and, therefore,
reversible. Another issue is which samples to use—those available at
the beginning of the period or the smaller group left at the end.
Parnes and Less demonstrated that these definitional issues are very
important. If one requires only that the individual meet one of the three
criteria at some point during the 15 years, then 86 percent of the men
in the sample (aged 60 to 74) were retired in 1981. At the other ex
treme, if all three criteria have to be met and the definition is based
on current status, only 59 percent of this same sample were retired. 48
In proportional terms, the differences were even greater earlier in the
surveys, when the absolute number of retired was much smaller. Parnes
and Less concluded that there is no best definition of retirement, but
that the appropriate definition varies with the purpose of the research.
In their volume (Parnes et al. 1985), the authors all used the subjective
criterion (stopped working at a regular job) and treated retirement as
irreversible. With this definition, they found a considerable amount of
work after retirement.

Reasons for Retirement
Parnes and Less attempted to determine why those who had retired
had done so. They did not rely on retrospective answers to direct ques-

120

Retirement Incentives and the Retirement Decision

tions about motivations, but rather relied on the longitudinal record prior
to the retirement decision.49 They categorized the reasons into four
groups: (1) involuntary retirement under mandatory retirement plans,
(2) retirement dictated by poor health, (3) retirement because of labor
market adversities, and (4) voluntary retirement. Individuals were in
cluded in the first category only if they retired at the mandatory retire
ment age and had reported in earlier interviews that they preferred to
work longer. 50
When all the retirements during the 15 years were analyzed, the first
and third categories turned out to be relatively unimportant. Only 3 per
cent of the men retired because of mandatory retirement, and only 5
percent because of adverse labor market conditions. 51 About a third
seemed to be "forced" into retirement because of poor health, and the
majority—nearly 60 percent—appeared to have retired voluntarily.
There were some interesting differences among subgroups. Blacks
were significantly more likely to have retired for health reasons (47
versus 34 percent) and, therefore, less likely to have made an un
constrained voluntary decision. Those who stopped working at their
regular jobs before age 62 were much more likely to have had a prior
health problem. This finding is consistent with the research of Eric
Kingson (1982), mentioned in chapter 2, who studied the NLS men who
permanently withdrew from the labor force before age 62. Kingson found
that among these "very early retirees," 85 percent of the white men
and 91 percent of the black men had health problems—they either
reported that health limited their work or they had medically certified
disabilities that enabled them to receive Social Security disability benefits.
These NLS results—at least those for respondents retiring at age 62
or later—are consistent with most of the modern research and at variance
with the early Social Security questionnaires discussed in chapter 2.
There is considerable evidence that today many of the labor market tran
sitions in the later years are voluntary, made by individuals choosing
among alternative lifestyles and income streams. Many of these transi
tions take place before the age of 65. Of course, health and labor market
obstacles remain important constraints for certain individuals, especially
for very early retirees. They preclude continued work for some and
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change the terms of the tradeoff for others. But they are by no means
the dominant factors that they once appeared to be.

Postretirement Work Experience
When the definition of retirement is based on something other than
current labor force status, it is possible for individuals to work while
retired. In another paper, Parnes and Less (1985b) studied the labor
market activities of the men who had retired between 1967 and 1979.
At the time of the 1981 survey, nearly 20 percent of them were either
employed or looking for work.
This percentage differed dramatically by other characteristics. Retired
whites were more likely to be in the labor force than were blacks (18
percent versus 13 percent), and the white labor force participants were
much less likely to be unemployed. More than a quarter of the individuals
from professional and managerial occupations remained in the labor
force, compared to only 15 percent of the others. Those who retired
voluntarily were only slightly less likely to keep working than those
driven out by mandatory retirement or labor market adversities (23 per
cent versus 27 and 24 percent), but people in all of these categories
were much more likely to be at or looking for work than those driven
out by poor health. Only 11 percent of the latter group remained in
the labor force.
Parnes and Less also found that the likelihood of being in the labor
force was highest right after retirement, and declined thereafter. It was
higher for younger retirees, for the self-employed, for those with working
wives, and for those with high levels of wealth. This last result sug
gests that postretirement employment may be for reasons other than
financial.
Of the retirees who worked during 1981, half of them had full-year
jobs, but 60 percent worked part time during the weeks they worked.
Altogether, 20 percent of those employed worked more than 2,000 hours
per year, and 30 percent worked less than 500. Three-quarters of the
working retired were in new occupations (defined by Census 1-digit
categories), two-thirds in new industries, and most were in jobs lower
on the economic scale than the ones they had left. In real terms, me-
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dian average hourly earnings were less than half what they had been
on the preretirement job.

Conclusions
Parnes and Less found a wide variety of labor market experiences
among the older workers in their NLS sample. By various definitions,
they found between 60 and 85 percent were retired by 1981, when the
age range was 60 to 74 years. The term "retired" covered individuals
in very different states of labor market activity—from those continuing
to work full time to those who had completely withdrawn from the labor
force.
Our focus differs from that of Parnes et al We are interested in depar
tures from what we define as a career job—full-time work on a job held
for at least 10 years. Nonetheless, the Parnes results are very similar
to those which we find with the Retirement History Study data, and
discuss in chapters 5 and 6 below. After exit from full-time work on
a career job, many people continue to work, sometimes part time on
the same job, but more often with a new employer at substantially lower
wages. Whether these individuals define themselves as retired or not
is of secondary concern to us. We are more interested in what they do
than in what they call it.
Summary

The retirement literature has come a long way since the mid-1940s.
Research methodologies and conclusions have changed. The early work
relied primarily on cross-sectional questionnaires in which retirees were
simply asked why they retired when they did. Much of the modem work
is based on large longitudinal data sets with detailed demographic,
economic, and social data on thousands of individuals. This permits
researchers to study the objective circumstances that existed prior to
the behavior under study and, thereby, to supplement the explanations
given by the respondents themselves.
Over these past four decades, our understanding of the retirement
decision has grown significantly. Early evidence suggested that the over-
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whelming reasons for retirement were health and labor market con
straints, and that very few people retired voluntarily. Modern research
suggests the opposite—that many older Americans do leave their career
jobs voluntarily. Although some are still forced out by bad health and
layoffs, many others are induced out by the financial incentives embedded
in our retirement income systems.
Most of the recent work by economists in this field has concentrated
on the details of these financial incentives. A major breakthrough was
the treatment of retirement rights as stocks of wealth rather than as an
nual flows. It soon became clear that the asset value of these rights could
either rise or fall with continued work, depending on the details of the
benefit calculation formulas, and that these changes in wealth are real
ly a component of compensation. Therefore, an individual's true earn
ings could rise or fall over time without any change in the size of the
pay check.
Modern retirement research has taken two tacks. One approach, nar
row and deep, is to look very carefully at the mechanics of actual pen
sion plans and deduce whether the rules subsidize or penalize work at
various ages. The problem here is that the data sets with considerable
pension detail provide little other information about the individuals enroll
ed in the plans. The other approach, wide and shallow, is to utilize one
of the superb longitudinal data sets mentioned above, with excellent
information about the individuals in the sample, but relatively little detail
about their pension plans. Fortunately, both avenues suggest that retire
ment incentives do exist and that many people behave as though they
understand and respond to them.
While the work on the theory and the explanatory variables has got
ten more and more sophisticated, economists have paid considerably
less attention to the actual behavior being explained. With the excep
tion of a few analysts who have studied hours of work and a few more
who have analyzed partial retirement, most have treated retirement as
dichotomous. In fact, as we demonstrate in chapter 5, the labor market
behavior of older Americans is anything but dichotomous. A wide variety
of withdrawal patterns is observed. Although it is always possible to
squeeze them all into two categories, we suspect that insight is lost rather
than gained in the process.
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Before looking ahead to work after retirement, however, we first look
back, to a body of research on the influence of retirement income plans
on behavior much earlier in the life cycle—in the prime working years,
long before thoughts of retirement.

NOTES
1. The Benefit Amounts Survey includes the birth date and date of retirement for each pension
recipient, as well as earnings histories and some very basic demographic information from the
Social Security Administration's records. (See Fields and Mitchell 1984c.)
2. Martin Levine (1988) has recently published a book on mandatory retirement. He reviews the
literature on mandatory retirement and aging, and concludes that mandatory retirement is an un
justifiable form of age discrimination. Karen Holden and Lee Hansen (1989) have edited a volume
on the impact of changing mandatory retirement rules on higher education.
3. The discount rate has two components: the real rate of interest (assumed to be 2 percent), and
the expected rate of inflation. In cases where future retirement benefits are fully indexed for in
flation (such as Social Security and federal employee pension benefits), the inflation component
disappears. When future benefits are only partly indexed) as with many state and local govern
ment plans), only the uncovered portion of inflation is included. Future benefits that are fixed
in nominal terms at initial receipt (like many private sector pensions) are discounted at the full
nominal discount rate.
4. A more detailed description of the derivation of the WEALTH and DELTA terms can be found
in Burkhauser and Quinn (1983a).
5. Although the WEALTH formula in the text does not reflect it, the calculations for couples
include the expected benefits going to a surviving spouse, at two-thirds the amount that a couple
received.
6. Information was available in three parts of the RHS questionnaire: a section on pension plans,
a section on retirement income expected in the future, and a section on actual income received.
In the first four waves of data, then, there were 12 potential sources of information. Not everyone
was asked every question and not every question asked was answered. A decision tree was developed
to search all the sources in a specific order, to maximize the probability of obtaining useful infor
mation. Whenever possible, the pension data were based on actual pension receipt. If these data
were not available, the authors turned next to the details of the pension plan on the current or
last job. Finally, if still not successful, they looked at answers about expected retirement income.
In the end, they obtained benefit estimates for about 85 percent of the sample.
7. This was most true in the intermediate wealth categories. The poorest were the least likely
to have pension and Social Security coverage. The wealthiest tended to have other assets that
dominated retirement rights.
8. The Social Security wealth coefficient was insignificant. This is surprising, from a theoretical
point of view, but, in fact, weak wealth effects are frequently found in the retirement and other
labor supply literature. One hypothesis is that wealth is correlated with an unobserved measure
of proclivity for work. Those with a taste for work have accumulated wealth (retirement income
wealth, in this case), and are likely to continue to work as they approach retirement age—not
because one causes the other, but because both are caused by this unmeasured underlying per
sonality characteristic. The correlation between wealth and attitude toward work masks the true
relationship between wealth and the probability of retirement.
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9. Malcolm Morrison (1988) found similar results with a small sample of women. About a third
of the actual differences in behavior between those with and without mandatory retirement could
be explained by other factors.
10. Mandatory retirement is probably even less important than it appears here. If workers select
jobs in part because of their compulsory retirement provisions, then those who plan to retire at
the mandatory age anyway are more likely to end up in jobs with that constraint, because it is
not a drawback to them. They will then retire at mandatory retirement age, but not because they
had to, but because they wanted to. Those who prefer to stay on the job beyond then will tend
to avoid firms with such rules and then work beyond mandatory retirement age. Since these
preferences are not measured and are correlated with mandatory retirement status, mandatory
retirement will look more important than it really is.
11. Morrison (1988) estimates this number at 200,000, which is still very small in comparison
to the national labor supply.
12. Using a very different methodological approach, James Schulz (1974) and Janice Halpern
(1978) reached the same conclusion. Schulz found that only 10 percent of a cohort of retired men
was subject to mandatory retirement, worked up to that age, and claimed that they were willing
and able to work longer. Using several data sets that asked similar questions, Halpern reported
that only 4 to 8 percent of the older population was really constrained by these rules.
Data from the first 15 years of the National Longitudinal Survey of older men tell a similar
tale. Parnes et al. (1985) report that "of the nearly 8.5 million men aged 60-74 in 1981 who
had retired over the preceding 15 years, fewer than 5 percent had been unwillingly removed from
jobs by mandatoiy retirement rules."
13. Steven Sandell (1988) has questioned this conclusion, and pointed out that it is based on research
undertaken in an institutional environment different from that today. In particular, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 requires continued pension credits and accruals for work after
age 65. This was not the case previously. It is certainly possible that this increased incentive to
work may encourage some workers to remain on the job and therefore make the elimination of
mandatory retirement at age 65 more important, but the magnitude of this effect is unknown.
14. There has been a particular concern in the university community about the elimination of
mandatory retirement in an environment with tenured employment and no heavy lifting. Recent
research by Holden and Hansen (1989) and Montgomery (1989) suggests that the increase in the
mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70 might delay average faculty retirement ages by one to
two years, but also that faculty would probably be responsive to early retirement incentives designed
to induce them out.
15. Olivia Mitchell and Rebecca Luzadis (1988) presented additional evidence that this is the case.
They quantified the retirement incentives in 14 defined benefit pension plans from 1960 to 1980—a
period during which mandatory retirement at age 65 was outlawed (in 1978), and the elimination
of mandatory retirement altogether was discussed. (It was outlawed for most workers in 1986.)
They found that the pension incentives in union agreements changed from discouraging early retire
ment (in 1960) to encouraging it (in 1980). This paper is discussed below.
16. For those with a decline in hours over time, but without a clear and discontinuous drop, retire
ment status was based on a combination of self-defined retirement status, labor force status, and
Social Security receipt status.
17. About one-fifth of the retirees in the sample continued to work. Their average workweek
was about 16 hours (Burtless and Moffitt 1984). In subsequent work, Burtless (1986) considered
this partial retirement insignificant enough to ignore it and treated partial retirement as in
distinguishable from full retirement.
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18. The Burtless and Moffitt analysis ignored the increments to future benefits that occur because
of the earnings beyond the exempt amount. Because of these future increments, the true earningstest tax was less than the SO percent legislated prior to 1990. (If the increments are actuarially
fair, the earnings test disappears, since the benefits foregone are returned in the future. If the
adjustments are more than actuarially fair, the earnings-test tax actually becomes a subsidy.) Burtless
and Moffitt (1984) ignored this complication because they believe that retirees are generally unaware
of its existence.
19. The impact of borrowing constraints and the clustering of retirements at age 62 are discussed
in more detail in Burtless and Moffitt (1986). In addition, Kahn (1988) has presented evidence
for the liquidity constraint hypothesis. He found that the retirement cluster at age 62 is primarily
among low wealth people, who can neither dissave, since they have little wealth, nor borrow
against future benefits. Therefore, they have to work until actually eligible for benefits.
20. The authors acknowledged the possibility that these results represent reporting bias, rather
than the actual earnings distribution. In other words, respondents may underreport earnings to
avoid the reduction in Social Security benefits. But since these figures were reported to Census
workers (who actually collected the RHS data), not to the Social Security Administration, this
may not be a serious problem.
21. In more recent work, Burtless (1987) has written in detail on the impact of health on retire
ment. He found that industrial and occupational attachments affect work-related health status,
and that both health and industrial and occupational attachments have independent impacts on
the employment patterns of older workers.
22. Burtless (1986) used a similar model, estimated with the same data set, to simulate the impact
on retirement trends of the large increases in real Social Security benefits between 1969 and 1972.
He concluded that "social security is found to have a precisely measured but small overall effect
on retirement. If these estimates are approximately accurate, rising social security benefits in the
1970s played only a small role in the decline in the average male retirement age in recent years.
The labour force participation rate of older men has declined for various reasons in addition to
the increases in social security payments: rising personal wealth levels, sharply higher unemployment
levels in the period after 1970, and changing attitudes toward work and retirement."
23. Eight of the plans were union agreements—four in durable manufacturing, negotiated by the
United Auto Workers, and four others in transportation, trade, and construction. The other six
nonunion plans were in the service and finance industries. (See Mitchell and Luzadis 1988.)
Four of the pension plans had insufficient data on the retirees to use in the behavioral equa
tions. Therefore, all 14 could be used in describing the retirement incentives, but workers in only
10 of them were included in the behavioral equations.
24. See Fields and Mitchell (1984c, chapter 3) for more details on their forecasting techniques.
25. Their qualitative results were similar to those of Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) who studied the
accrual patterns of nearly 1,200 plans and also found a wide variety of incentives.
26. The present discounted values of the pension plan in table 3.2 are different from those for
plan A in table 3.1, because table 3.1 described the incentives for a single illustrative individual,
while table 3.2 averages the values over the 390 men in the plan A sample.
27. In their book, Fields and Mitchell (1984c) calculated the average incentives across 10 of the
pension plans (the 10 plans that they used in the behavioral work), but only up through age 65.
The average (across people and plans) true compensation peaked at $8,711 (in 1970 dollars) be
tween ages 61 and 62, and then declined to $7,306 between ages 64 and 65. Presumably, the
declines continued after age 65, when the Social Security wealth gains became losses.
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28. The earnings component in YBASE is zero, because retirement at age 60 implies no future
earnings in the Fields and Mitchell model.
29. Similar results were found in an analysis of the 390 workers in pension plan A (Fields and
Mitchell [1984a]) and in a regression on workers in the RHS. In the latter case, however, the
magnitude of the YSLOPE effect was much smaller and barely significant.
30. An exception to this is the defined-contribution employer pension plan, which is really just
a tax-deferred savings plan.
31. Bernheim (1988) presents evidence that respondents in the RHS form generally unbiased
estimates of future Social Security benefits, and that this was true even when the predictions were
made prior to the large increases legislated in the early 1970s. This suggests that these increases
may not have been entirely unanticipated, despite the fact that they followed a decade-and-a-half
of roughly constant real benefits.
The literature below, in contrast, assumes that these real increases were not foreseen. See Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) for arguments on why this is a more reasonable assumption.
32. With the exception of the pension eligibility variable, which was statistically insignificant,
the other coefficients were of the expected sign, and significant.
33. Krueger and Pischke (1989) admit that there are alternative explanations for their nonfinding. Integrated employer pension plans would have offset part of the wealth loss, and even where
they did not, the impact of the loss on lifetime wealth may have just been too small to create
a discernible retirement effect. If so, it would be incorrect to conclude that a more substantial
and widespread change in Social Security benefits would have little effect.
34. The age intervals were 58-61, 62-64, 65, 66-70, and 71 and older. Since most of these in
tervals are several years wide, it is all the more surprising that the predictions were so inaccurate.
35. There are several differences in the two studies that might explain the conflicting results on
the accuracy of plans. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn's predictions were all made in the year
1969, when the respondents were 58-63 years old. They defined a prediction as accurate whenever
retirement occurred within a year on either side of the date. Nestel's predictions were all made
by 59-year-olds, who were probably further away, on average, from their predicted retirement
age. Nestel also required retirement within the predicted interval (see footnote 34), rather than
within a year of the predicted age.
36. See Svahn and Ross (1983) for a detailed description of the 1983 Social Security amendments.
37. This would imply a 20 percent reduction for retirement at age 65 and a 40 percent reduction
for those claiming benefits at age 62. The legislation actually passed in 1983 will raise the age
of full benefits to 66 by the year 2009, and eventually to 67 in 2027, and will set the maximum
reduction for retirement at age 62 at 30 percent.
38. In fact, the 1983 legislation will slowly raise the delayed retirement credit from 3 to 8 percent
per year of delay after age 65.
39. Burtless and Moffitt define retirement as a discontinuous drop in labor supply.
40. The actuarial fairness is based on the actuarial life tables for single men. This implies, accord
ing to Burtless and Moffitt (1984), very slight reductions in benefits between ages 62 and 64 (since
they estimate that the current rules are slightly more than actuarially fair) and dramatic increases
after 65. Their delayed retirement credits are not constant per year; for example, their adjustment
factors are 1.10 (rather than the current 1.03) at age 66, 1.33 (up from 1.09) at 68, and 2.05 at 72.
41. In a recent paper focusing on disability issues, Haveman, Wolfe, and Warlick (1988) analyz
ed the impact of a 20 percent decrease in Social Security early retirement benefits. Their simula
tions suggested that the number of early retirees would decrease by only a small percent and that
only about a quarter of those who would leave the early retirement rolls would be able to join
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the Social Security disability rolls. In contrast, a SO percent earnings supplement (up to a max
imum of $1,500 per year) for workers aged 62 to 64 was estimated to have a much larger effect
on reducing the number of early retirees.
42. Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) simulated what might happen if the age of normal retire
ment in an employer pension plan were changed from 65 to 67, to match the Social Security change.
They predicted that the percentage working full time would increase by another 3 to 4 percentage
points.
43. Yeas (1987) reported some preliminary evidence that this trend may have leveled off or perhaps
even reversed during the 1980s.
44. Rones (1983) points out that this was not the case prior to the late 1960s, when the official
unemployment rates for men aged 55 to 64 and 65 and over were slightly higher than those for
prime aged men.
45. Part of the reason for this difference is that there is a huge pool of older Americans out of
the labor force, and, therefore, potentially discouraged workers, and only a relatively small such
pool among the younger. Older workers are more likely than the young to have alternative in
come sources (Social Security and pensions) that permit them to stop searching and leave the
labor force.
46. Confusion arises in the literature because the survey instruments usually do not clarify the
conditions of the hypothetical part-time job when people are asked, "Would you like to work
part time?" This is not a very useful question unless accompanied by details on wages, benefits,
and other terms of employment. See Rones (1983) for more elaboration on this point.
47. By 1981, 43 percent of the original sample had been lost due to attrition—26 percent had
died and another 17 percent had disappeared for other reasons, usually refusal to participate. See
Parnes et al. (1985) for an overview of the data set.
48. If all three criteria must be met, but met at any time during the 15 years—in other words,
if retirement is a once-and-for-all event—then 68 percent of the sample had retired.
49. A comparison of the results based on information given prior to retirement with those based
on retrospective reasons given after retirement "reinforced our a priori view that retrospectively
reported reasons for retirement are suspect" (Parnes and Less 1985a).
50. This may understate the importance of mandatory retirement if some individuals retire prior
to the mandatory retirement age but were nonetheless influenced by the fact that they could not
have worked beyond it. These people would not end up in Parnes and Less' first category.
51. Even when only those who retired at age 65 or later are considered, only 9 percent seemed
to have retired because of a mandatory retirement provision on their regular jobs.
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The Importance
of Employer Pensions and Social Security
at Younger Ages
In the previous two chapters, we reviewed the literature on the im
portance of Social Security and employer pensions on the labor supply
decisions of older workers. The characterization of retirement income
rights as special forms of wealth, whose value affects and is affected
by labor force behavior, is at the core of the modern economic analysis
of retirement. Less well understood is the role that Social Security and
pensions play at younger ages. Although the actual receipt of retire
ment benefits occurs near or at the end of the work life, their values
are determined by decisions made much earlier.
In this chapter, we consider the effects of pensions on the patterns
of wage compensation and on work behavior earlier in an individual's
career. Although it is still controversial, there is emerging a life-cycle,
implicit-contract view of the relationship between workers and the firms
that employ them. Employer pensions play an integral role in this rela
tionship. Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the most obvious aspect of this
contract: nonactuarially fair pension plans can penalize workers who
stay on career jobs too long. Here, we suggest that pensions can also
affect mobility much earlier. In summary, they penalize workers who
leave too early as well as those who leave too late.
In the "spot" market view of competitive markets, workers are paid
the value of their marginal products in every time period. At the heart
of the implicit contract view, and the controversy surrounding it, is the
notion that workers are paid their marginal product over their careers
with a firm rather than at every moment during that career. They can
be overpaid or underpaid at any moment, as long as it averages out
129
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in the end. This view of labor market equilibrium turns out to be more
than an esoteric point of theory. It is an important distinction that fun
damentally alters one's view of who pays for pensions, who loses when
a worker leaves a career job "too early," and how the size of a firm's
pension liability varies over the career of its workers.
We also discuss the role of the Social Security system earlier in a
worker's career. Since a link exists between Social Security taxes and
future benefits, one can estimate the net effect of Social Security on
the wage of a worker of any age. We argue that changes in Social Securi
ty policy could influence work across the entire life cycle.

Pensions
In the last chapter, we discussed how a worker's pension wealth
changes if benefit acceptance is delayed. Here the value of pension wealth
is shown to change throughout an employee's work career with the firm.
Pension accrual (the change in the present discounted value of a pen
sion following an additional year of work) starts not when one is first
able to claim benefits, but as soon as one is vested with a firm. If changes
in pension wealth affect net compensation and labor supply of older
workers, they may do the same at younger ages as well.

Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Pension plans are generally of two types. Defined contribution plans
establish a contribution rule; for example, the employer and employee
may each pay 5 percent of current salary into a pension fund. Con
tributions are invested and the eventual benefit is based on the value
of the funds at the time. If workers who leave the firm before retire
ment have a right to the full current value of the contributions, then
the plan should have little effect on mobility. Because defined contribu
tion plans are usually actuarially fair across possible retirement ages,
they should play a relatively minor role in the timing of retirement.
Defined contribution plans are really just mandatory saving plans with
tax advantages. Their effect on work behavior is not significantly dif-
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ferent from that of other forms of wealth. While this is the dominant
form of pension for university professors, fewer than 30 percent of
covered workers have a defined contribution as their primary plan (table
1.3). But as we saw in chapter 1, these types of pensions have been
growing rapidly in recent years. If this continues, it will diminish the
importance of the employment penalties late in life that we emphasized
in chapter 3, as well as the earlier incentives discussed below.
Defined benefit plans are a more complex form of savings and play
a much more important role in work decisions. These plans promise
workers a benefit at retirement based on an agreed-upon formula.
Employees usually make no explicit contribution to the plan. A typical
defined pension plan offers benefits beginning at some stated age to
workers of specified tenure, and is usually based on years of service
and/or some average of highest nominal earnings. In practice, the lat
ter generally means the earnings in the last few years of employment
with the firm.
One method of calculating pension accrual is to estimate, year by
year, what the present discounted value of the pension would be if the
worker were to leave the firm after that year. This is the "quit value"
of the pension—what it would be worth were the worker to quit. Positive
accrual (growing pension wealth with continued employment) means
that true compensation exceeds the paycheck; negative accrual means
the opposite. Tracing the actual quit value for a worker in a given pen
sion plan requires information on the worker's annual earnings, the ap
propriate interest rate, the life expectancy of the worker, and the often
very complex pension plan rules.
Larry Kotlikoff and David Wise (1989) have studied the sensitivity
of lifetime accrual patterns to changes in each of these parameters. They
used a pension plan with cliff vesting, in which workers lose all benefits
unless they stay with the firm for 10 years. Prior to 1987, this was the
maximum number of years a firm could require before vesting. The
1986 Tax Reform Act reduced the normal maximum to five years.
Kotlikoff and Wise also assumed that, in addition to a normal retire
ment age, the plan had an early retirement option subject to an actuarial
reduction in annual benefits. This is typical of most defined benefit plans.

Employer Pensions and Social Security

132

For simplicity, benefits were assumed to be some fraction of final year's
earnings and service, with no offset for Social Security. Finally, they
assumed that the worker would live to early retirement age and had
a normal life expectancy thereafter.
The authors calculated the ratio of pension accrual to salary in each
year for workers with constant growth in real wages. Under these
assumptions, the accrual paths shown in figure 4.1 have two major
spikes. This contrasts the accrual path for the defined contribution plan,
which would be a constant proportion of the wage.
Figure 4.1
Pension Increments as a Percentage of Salary, by Age,
for a Wage Stream with 6% Inflation Discounted at
Real Interest Rates of 3%, 6%, and 9%
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SOURCE: Kotlikcffand Wise (1989), p. 21.

For ease of explication, Kotlikoff and Wise assumed that work begins
at age 30, early retirement is available at age 55, and normal retire
ment occurs at 65. Therefore, the first spike appears at age 40, after
10 years of service with the firm, when the worker becomes vested.
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A worker who leaves before then loses all pension benefits, so the quit
value of the pension is zero up to this point.
Once the worker is vested, pension accrual is found to be a smoothly
increasing percentage of salary up to the point of earliest benefit eligibili
ty. This pattern is caused both by the aging of the worker, which moves
him closer to the promised benefit stream, and by the increase in years
of service with the firm. The second peak in pension accrual occurs
at the early retirement age. It is the period after early retirement eligibility
that was the focus of much of our discussion in the previous two chapters.
Since pension plans usually did not provide full service credit after
normal retirement age, accrual was likely to be negative after that age
and pension wealth fell for the majority of workers. l (This is not shown
on figure 4.1 which stops at age 65.) The accrual rate between the ear
ly and normal retirement ages is more varied. The Employee Retire
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) regulations forbid early benefit
reductions larger than necessary to offset the additional years of ex
pected benefit receipt. In other words, the reduced benefits must be
at least actuarially fair.
In figure 4.1 all three assumptions about real wage growth and nominal
interest rates yield peaks at the earliest retirement age, but only the lowest
line shows negative pension accrual immediately thereafter. The top
two lines simply show smaller positive accrual. Actual accrual will de
pend on the size of the actuarial reduction factor and other details of
the benefit calculation formula. All that is required for the pension to
peak at early retirement is that the early retirement penalty be less than
an actuarially fair reduction. If this adjustment factor is tilted strongly
enough toward early acceptance, it can even offset the increase in benefits
caused by wage growth and another year of tenure. In such a case, the
worker is "over-rewarded" for retiring early, "under-rewarded" for
staying on, and accrual can be negative after the early retirement age.
Sara Hatch (1981) found that the majority of retirement programs
with early retirement options have reduction factors that are smaller
than actually fair. They do not sufficiently "punish" early retirement
and, therefore, they actually encourage it. For simplicity, Kotlikoff and
Wise (1989) assumed that benefits are based on a single year of earnings,
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real wages grow at a constant rate, and hours worked are constant over
all years. Most pension plans use more years in their calculations, and
real earnings growth may decline at older ages. These two factors would
make negative pension accrual more likely after early retirement age.
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) also looked at a national sample of pen
sion plans and estimated accrual paths for a typical worker who joined
the plans at age 30. Average accruals closely followed the trends in
figure 4.1. They peak just before early retirement age, fall during the
early retirement window, and then turn negative after normal retire
ment age. The recent change in pension legislation that required all plans
to continue pension credits past age 65 (with the caveat noted in foot
note 1) will reduce these negative accruals to some extent and therefore
diminish the work disincentives facing older workers.

The Spot vs. Implicit Contract View of Pensions
Despite the fact that most workers make no explicit contributions to
their defined benefit pension funds, it is unlikely that pensions are a
free gift from a firm to its workers. Rather, both sides recognize that
pension promises are costly to the firm. This cost must be offset by
the willingness of employees to receive lower current earnings. There
is profound disagreement, however, over the nature of this pension pro
mise and the amount of reduced wages workers are willing to accept
for it. Two contending theories of competitive labor markets offer
significantly different views of how workers value the pension promises
of their firms and how the resulting liabilities of these firms should be
determined.
We discussed above the quit value of a pension. Annual pension ac
crual was measured as the difference between the pension's value were
the worker to quit at one point in time versus its value following a quit
one year later. While this calculation is straightforward, its implica
tions for work behavior and pension liability are not. Neoclassical
economic theory posits that in a competitive market, workers are paid
the value of their marginal product to the firm. Total compensation in
cludes both wage earnings and the pension accrual associated with
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that extra work. But how does a worker actually value this accrual?
More specifically, what will workers be willing to forego in reduced
wages for the promise of future benefits?
Jeremy Bulow (1982) has argued that workers are unlikely to give
up anything more than the change in the quit value of the pension. In
this "spot" market view of labor contracts, workers do not view their
relationship with the firm as a multiperiod one. They demand that total
compensation (wages plus pension accrual) equal the value of their pro
ductivity in each period. If they leave, they will have been paid in full. 2
But as Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) point out, estimated accrual pat
terns and the assumption of spot labor markets imply a very unlikely
productivity pattern during a worker's tenure with the firm. As figure
4.1 shows, workers assumed to have constantly increasing real wages
will have total compensation spikes at the year of vesting and once again
at the first year of early retirement. This seems incompatible with any
reasonable assumption about productivity and suggests that a strict spot
market model does not adequately explain the reality of pensions. A
more complex model of labor market behavior is required to under
stand the role of pensions at younger ages.
Richard Ippolito (1986,1987,1989) has offered an alternative explana
tion for the pension contract—that it is the enforcing mechanism in an
implicit long-term contract between the workers and the firm. 3 The firm
promises not to terminate the worker (except for cause) or the pension
plan (barring unforeseen exigencies), and the worker promises not to
quit. The advantages to the firm are a stable workforce and lower turn
over and training costs. The advantages to the workers are stability of
employment and the opportunity to reap the returns from long tenure
with the firm.
To hold workers to their end of the bargain, they are asked to forego
wages in excess o/the quit value of their pensions, despite the fact that
firms are only required to turn over this quit value to a worker upon
termination. This model relaxes the requirement that marginal product
equal compensation each year, and instead requires only that lifetime
compensation equal lifetime productivity. 4 But this equality will occur
only if workers stay with the firm until the end of the implicit
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agreement—sometime around retirement age. As we saw in the last
chapter, workers who stay beyond this are penalized by a loss in pen
sion wealth. According to Ippolito, the same thing occurs to those who
leave too early.
The mechanism for this mobility penalty is found in the mechanics
of many defined benefit plans. Benefits are generally based on years
of service and on some measure of average earnings, usually over the
last few years of employment with the firm. If a vested worker leaves
in mid-career, these nominal earnings are frozen and become the basis
for nominal benefits many years later, at the age of receipt eligibility.
Pension benefits are tied to a much lower nominal wage base than if
the worker had stayed with the firm. Wages that would have been earned
in future years with the firm would have been higher because of pro
ductivity increases and inflation. It is the employer's promise to pay
a pension based on these higher wage years that is forfeited when a
worker quits "too soon."
Because of the implicit contract that encourages workers not to quit,
Ippolito argues that the current "stay" value of the pension is a better
measure of the firms' current obligation to its workers. The stay value
is based not on the current nominal wage (as the quit value is), but rather
on the nominal wage the worker expects to receive on the eve of retire
ment. Since this is a higher nominal wage than the current one, the stay
value of the pension exceeds the quit value. They become equal only
at retirement age. Although the current legal obligation of the firm is
only the lower quit value, its actual obligation is higher, Ippolito argues,
because the quit value is not likely to be exercised. It is the final stay
value that firms expect to pay. Their current liability, therefore, is the
present discounted value of that, and it is changes in the stay value that
are the appropriate accruals for the workers who remain on the job.
In Ippolito's model, pensions are seen as mechanisms to ensure that
workers leave their jobs at the right time. Negative accruals at older
ages assure that they do not stay too long. Substantial losses in pension
wealth at younger ages assure that they do not leave too soon. The penalty
to workers who do leave is the difference between the foregone wages
(high enough to finance a stay pension) and the smaller quit pensions
they actually receive.
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The loss is not likely to be trivial. With some simplifying assump
tions and an interest rate of 10 percent, Ippolito shows that a worker
who quits a job 10 years from retirement can lose nearly two-thirds
of the stay value of the potential pension.
Steve Alien, Robert Clark, and Ann McDermed (1986) used Ippolito
methodology to simulate the losses in pension wealth associated with
quitting a job, using pension data from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey
of Medium and Large Firms and samples of individuals from several
micro data sets. They simulated representative pension plans and
estimated the percentage of salary necessary to finance a quit pension
and a stay pension each year.
Their findings, summarized in table 4.1, are similar to those of
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). After vesting, quit pension accrual as a share
of salary rises each year until the onset of early retirement. In contrast,
the stay pension provides a smoother accrual path. There is no spike
in its accrual path at vesting since the stay pension assumes the worker
will, in fact, stay until retirement age. The spike at early retirement
is also less pronounced—15 rather than 27 percent of annual salary.
The pattern of pension wealth loss they found, were the worker to leave
under the implicit contract scenario, mirrors the accrual patterns. The
pension loss associated with a quit builds until middle age, since the
stay accrual taken from salary is greater than the legal accrual guaranteed
to a quitter. Hence, the potential wealth loss generally peaks (at about
one year's salary, according to Alien, Clark, and McDermed) in late
middle age. After that, the pension loss associated with a quit rapidly
falls and approaches zero as the worker approaches early retirement age.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed did not take into account the recent
reduction (from 10 to 5) in the maximum years of tenure required before
vesting occurs. But it is not likely that this would dramatically change
their results. Reducing the maximum number of years until complete
vesting will shift the spike in the quit pension value by five years and
provide positive accrual to workers between their fifth and tenth years.
It will have no effect on the stay pension value. It will reduce the penalty
that worker who do leave the job with between 5 and 10 years of tenure
pay, but it will not substantially alter the losses associated with quit-
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Table 4.1
Simulation of Pension Contract Lifetime Compensation Patterns
for the Typical Manufacturing Firm with 1,000 or More Employees
for Its Professional and Administrative Staff
Accrual as a percent of salary
Age

Tenure

Quit pension

Stay pension

25

0

1.4

14.3

35

10

10.9

14.4

40

15

13.9

14.5

45

20

17.5

14.7

50

25

22.0

15.0

55

30

27.5

15.5

60

35

64

39

10.1
-1.7

5.3
-4.2

65

40

-3.3

-6.0

70

45

-15.3

-20.0

SOURCE: Compilation from Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1986).

ting, since both the quit and stay value of pensions at early ages are
relatively small.

Pension Plans and Turnover
In a spot market framework, pensions are neutral with respect to job
tenure with a firm. Since workers forego only the change in the quit
value of a pension each year, they suffer no loss if they leave a firm.
They collect all their past wage decrements on the way out. While it
is true that they forego the ever-increasing accrual value of future years
of tenure with the firm, it is assumed that their total compensation
package in the future will be equal to their future productivity and,
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therefore, that they will receive similar benefits in alternative employ
ment. In the less pristine real world, the operation of markets is not
quite so smooth, but the presence or absence of pensions adds no com
plications to the spot market view of labor market turnover.
The implicit contract view, however, puts pension plans at the center
of a theory of turnover. Workers who join a firm with a defined benefit
pension plan agree to a wage package that defers some of the compen
sation until the end. The value of a worker's services to the firm equals
the worker's total compensation only for those who stay until retire
ment age to collect a pension. Quits before the optimal retirement age
result in a penalty, often a large one, to the worker.
While substantial evidence exists that workers in firms with pensions
tend to stay longer and do have lower turnover rates, the studies do
not adequately disentangle the incentives of the potential pension wealth
loss from the fact that such firms may simply have higher overall com
pensation packages. 5 Empirical testing of the effects of pensions on turn
over has been difficult for two reasons. First, few data sets provide
both the detailed information on pension rules necessary to estimate
accruals and quit penalties and the longitudinal data on the individuals
necessary to test behavioral models. Second, to the extent workers
recognize these penalties, those more likely to stay until retirement age
will tend to choose firms with such plans. While this is exactly the match
ing that firms and workers desire, such matching at the start of career
jobs may obscure the true importance of losses in pension wealth
associated with an early quit on a sample of workers caught in
mid-career.
Both Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1986, 1988a) and Alan Gustman
and Thomas Steinmeier (1987, 1989a) have attempted to disentangle
the ways in which pensions influence tenure with a firm. Alien, Clark,
and McDermed (1986) used data from the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) to
estimate a model of turnover that included pension coverage and the
capital loss associated with a quit. Because workers who plan to stay
with the firm are more likely to join firms that penalize moving, they
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first estimated a pension coverage equation to adjust for this sample
selection bias.
Because neither the PSID nor the NLS contains detailed information
on pension characteristics, Alien, Clark, and McDermed linked pen
sion data from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey for Medium and Large
Firms (EBS) to these data sets. They assigned the modal pension for
mula for each industry-occupation cell in the EBS to workers in the
PSID and NLS according to their industry and occupation. They
estimated the likelihood that an employee with a given firm in 1975
would leave that firm by 1982 and found a strong negative relationship
between pension coverage and a quit. This is consistent with the mobility
literature. They found some evidence that the potential loss of pension
wealth discouraged quitting, and concluded that the "loss in pension
wealth associated with quitting substantially reduces the rate of mobili
ty among workers covered by pension," and that "pension loss helps
explain why older workers may be reluctant to leave a job even though
market conditions may imply that future wage increases in his/her pre
sent job will be quite low."
In a later study with the same data sets, Alien, Clark, and McDer
med (1988a) found that potential pension wealth losses had a larger ef
fect on turnover than either vesting or overall compensation levels. The
losses were mainly associated with lower layoff rates rather than quit
rates, and they concluded that
this evidence indicates either that deferred compensation
schemes increase productivity (and thus reduce layoffs) or
that employers are sufficiently concerned about layoff reputa
tion and the ability to offer deferred compensation schemes
in the future to prevent them from laying off workers and
collecting a capital gain on their pensions.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) used data from the Survey of Con
sumer Finances (SCF) to test the importance of pensions on turnover.
The SCF has excellent data on the pension characteristics of the in
dividuals in the sample, so the authors did not have to assign modal
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formulas from another data source. In addition, they used a method
of estimating pension losses very different from that proposed by Ippolito and by Alien, Clark, and McDermed. They estimated an ageearning profile for each person in their sample and then processed it
through the rules of the individual's actual pension plan to calculate
the path of "quit" pension accruals. With earnings data, this yielded
age-compensation paths for all workers on their current jobs. They then
estimated an alternative age-compensation path for each based on those
who actually did change jobs over the period of the analysis. Finally,
with these simulations from actual stayers and quitters, they estimated
current and alternative job paths for all individuals in the sample.
Gustman and Steinmeier found that workers who switched jobs suf
fered for two reasons. First, their total pension wealth declined. 6 But,
in addition, they tended to earn less on the alternative job. Hence, the
appropriate comparison is the total compensation on the two jobs from
the transition date until normal retirement age. They found that "lost"
pension wealth (pension backloading) did matter. The higher the loss,
the less likely the job switch. But they also argued that it was far less
important than the lower wage workers could expect on a new job. They
concluded that' 'compensation premia constitute a much more impor
tant fraction of the loss from job termination than does backloading of
pension benefits [and] simulations . . . confirm that it is not backloading,
but wage premia that accounts for the large difference in mobility be
tween pension covered and noncovered jobs."
The papers by Ippolito and by Alien, Clark, and McDermed on the
one hand, and those by Gustman and Steinmeier on the other, used dif
ferent approaches to estimate the importance of pensions on turnover.
They began with different views of how pension rules affect compen
sation across a worker's tenure with a firm, and they reached different
conclusions about the importance of lost pension wealth on the deci
sion of workers to quit a job. Both sets of authors did find some cor
relation between pension wealth loss and turnover, but Gustman and
Steinmeier found that wealth loss was dominated by wage change ef
fects. The difference in their conclusions reflects the currently unsettl-
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ed debate on the precise nature of the effects of defined benefit pension
plans on employee turnover.
Pension Liability
Since a firm can legally terminate a pension plan at any time, its pen
sion liability is often estimated to reflect the current quit value of the
obligations. Were the plan terminated, workers would only be eligible
to receive pension benefits paid at the stipulated future retirement age,
based on current nominal wages.
But if, in fact, workers have entered into an implicit contract to receive
stay pensions based on nominal wages at the time of retirement, then
this method dramatically underestimates the actual current pension liabili
ty of the firm. The amount of the underestimate depends on the age
distribution of the firm's workforce, since the difference between quit
and stay values rises and then falls as workers approach retirement age.
Once again, empirical evidence is scarce on the relative merits of
these two alternative views of pension liability. Ippolito (1986) argued
that stock traders are better judges of a firm's pension liability than are
actuaries, and that one can examine stock prices for clues about which
accounting method most accurately reflects true liability. Martin Feldstein and S. Seligman (1981) and Feldstein and Randall Morck (1983)
found that when the traditional method of estimating liability (quit values)
was incorporated into their stock market equations, the companies' stock
appeared undervalued. When Ippolito used the larger stay value of pen
sion liabilities, there was no evidence of either over- or undervaluation
of stock. This suggests that the stock market views the higher liabilities
implied by the implicit contract view of pensions as the relevant finan
cial concept.

Social Security
Another Look at Accrual Rates
Much of the discussion concerning pensions in the previous section
can be applied to the retirement component of Social Security. One can
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estimate the annual accruals of Social Security wealth. In fact, as we
have seen in chapters 2 and 3, this is precisely what researchers have
done to estimate the impact of Social Security on retirement. Social
Security wealth and changes in that wealth are important theoretical
and empirical components of modern economic models of retirement.
In the previous section, pension accruals were introduced as a means
of differentiating between single-period and multiperiod models of labor
contracts. The emphasis was on how pensions influence tenure with
a single firm and on how alternative views of pension promises affect
pension liabilities. There is little or no discussion on the impact of pen
sions on lifetime labor supply. In contrast, this is precisely the focus
of the small amount of literature on Social Security and younger workers.
Social Security is similar to a defined-benefit pension plan, since the
government promises workers a benefit at retirement based on a known
formula. Normal benefits begin at age 65, with an early retirement op
tion at 62. Cliff vesting exists since workers (aged 62 by 1991) must
have worked in Social Security-covered employment for 10 years to
be eligible for benefits. This requirement is not likely to be important
for many workers since, unlike most employer pension plans, Social
Security earnings are portable from one covered job to the next.
For workers aged 62 by 1990, retirement benefits are based on the
highest 35 years of Social Security-covered earnings. A major change
in the formula has occurred for those who were less than 63 years old
in 1978. The highest years' earnings used in the benefit calculation for
mula are now indexed to economy wide changes in nominal wage rates.
In effect, they are blown up to current dollars before being averaged.
If this change were applied to defined-benefit pension plans, it would
dramatically reduce the current penalty to those who leave a job before
retirement and remove the major penalty associated with quitting. It
would allow those who left a job to receive the real value of their last
year of work with the firm, adjusted not merely for inflation but also
for growth in real wages, even if they left the job many years before
retirement.
If one assumes that workers receive constantly increasing real wages
and work the same number of hours per year, and if one ignores taxes
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and merely looks at the present discounted value of future benefits, then
the accrual pattern for Social Security would look much like that for
a private pension found by Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). From a quitvalue perspective, accruals would be zero until vesting, and then show
a large peak at 10 years. Accruals would then rise slowly for another
25 years, as additional years of work replace zeros in the calculation
formula. After 35 years, current earnings would be replacing past (lower)
earnings rather than zeros, and the accrual increases would taper off.
As was seen in the last chapter, what happens at age 62 is a matter of
considerable dispute. Some authors, such as Blinder, Gordon, and Wise
(1980), argue that accruals remain positive (at least they did during the
1960s and 1970s) and therefore continue to subsidize work. Others have
estimated small negative accruals and discussed work disincentives that
would imply. All agree that Social Security accruals turn sharply negative
after age 65.
What distinguishes a small, recent literature on this topic is a shift
away from the assumption of constant hours over the work career and
an emphasis on intertemporal labor supply shifts. Richard Burkhauser
and John Turner (1981, 1982, 1985) have argued that, from a lifetime
labor supply perspective in which workers can choose annual hours,
it is irrelevant whether accrual rates are positive or negative after age
62. What is critical is whether these rates are higher or lower than they
were in earlier years. Once annual hours are endogenous, it is in the
worker's interest to shift away from hours that are less well rewarded
and toward those that are better rewarded. If Social Security accrual
rates peak at early retirement, as many private pensions do, this will
encourage workers to work more when younger and less when old.
In a recent paper, Stephan Gohmann and Robert Clark (1989) present
a sophisticated retirement model that makes the same point.
As discussed in the last chapter, there is considerable evidence that
the Social Security system reduces work effort at older ages. Empirical
research on its importance earlier in the career is sparse. Burkhauser
and Turner (1978) used time-series data to argue that Social Security
is partly responsible for the leveling off of the decline in hours worked
per week that took place after the first four decades of the twentieth
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century. They suggest that the market work of younger men would have
fallen two to three hours more since 1936 without the presence of Social
Security. Adrienne McElwain and James Swofford (1986) also used
time-series data to show that younger men increase their hours worked
in years when it is easier to earn an income above the Social Security
taxable maximum. Both of these studies recognize the life-cycle effect
of the tax and benefit components of Social Security in their labor supply
estimates. This perspective is more fully developed in the next section.
An Alternative Measure of Social Security's Marginal Value
Those who recognize the relationship between Social Security con
tributions and future benefits know that the official Social Security tax
does not represent their true tax rate. Future benefits offset current taxes
to some degree. This reduces the true tax paid on work in the period.
If Social Security benefits and taxes were perfectly actuarially link
ed, the increase in the present discounted value of future benefits would
exactly offset the taxes paid. Edgar Browning (1975) has shown that
the Social Security tax should then have no effect on work behavior.
Social Security would merely act as a neutral deferred compensation
plan whose impact on current disposable income could be offset by lend
ing and borrowing.
But no such exact actuarial relationship between taxes and benefits
exists. Nevertheless, some relationship does exist, and it is only by
understanding this that the effect of Social Security on workers
throughout their work life can be understood. Burkhauser and Turner
(1985) exploit this life-cycle view to analyze how the dramatic changes
mandated for the twenty-first century by the 1983 amendments to the
Social Security Act affect younger workers today.
Table 4.2 shows the legislated payroll tax (t) across the life of workers
who retired and took Social Security benefits at age 65 in 1982. The
legislated payroll tax increased from 4 percent in 1955 to 8.55 percent
in 1978 (column 3). Column 4 shows the marginal benefits associated
with an additional dollar of taxable income, and column 5 is the true
payroll tax rate—the difference between columns 3 and 4.
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During the 23 years of earnings used in the calculation of Social Securi
ty benefits for a worker who reached age 62 in 1978, the expected
marginal gain in Social Security benefits far exceeded the marginal taxes
paid. For these years, the Social Security tax was actually a substantial
wage subsidy. The subsidies were even larger for workers with depen
dent spouses, since, at no additional charge, Social Security pays an
additional 50 percent benefit to the eligible spouse of a Social Security
recipient. Note, however, that during the years not used in the calcula
tions (in this case, those prior to 1956), the payroll tax was, in fact,
a tax at the legislated rate. And after age 61, the 50 percent earnings
test applied, reducing the marginal impact of a dollar earned below what
it was a year before. Even if Social Security continued to provide a
subsidy between ages 62 and 64, there would be an incentive to shift
hours from years with low subsidy to years of high subsidy, as long
as the actuarial adjustment was less than fair. This view assumes that
workers know which years will and will not eventually be used in the
calculation formula, an interesting assumption theoretically, but one
whose accuracy is subject to question.
In the previous chapter, we argued that Social Security encourages
older workers to retire after some age (certainly by 65) because of reduc
tions in Social Security wealth. From a life-cycle view, the Social Securi
ty benefit formula is shown to twist net wage compensation toward mid
dle years, encouraging workers to increase their work then and decrease
it at both ends.
The divergence of legislated rates from benefit-adjusted rates for the
new generation of workers entering the system in the 1980s is much
less than that of the generation now retiring. The increase in the number
of years used in the formula (which is 35 in 1990) is one explanation,
as is the indexing of past wages in the averaging calculation.
In addition, the increased labor force participation of women will mean
fewer men will have dependent spouses.
This long-run trend toward convergence of legislated and actual tax
rates was accelerated by recent amendments to the Social Security Act.
Table 4.3 shows the legislated payroll tax rates for a male aged 22 in
1983 before and after the 1983 Social Security Amendments. The true
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tax rates are shown for men in the lowest and highest Social Security
benefit calculation brackets. The numbers (0.32 and 0.15) refer to the
increase in monthly benefits associated with a $1 increase in average
monthly earnings. Even before the amendments, the true payroll taxes
were larger, and the difference between legislated and true rates smaller
than for the currently retiring generation of workers. For a worker
without a dependent spouse, the tax was really a tax for most years.
For those in the 0.15 bracket, the pre-1983 net tax was between 50 and
70 percent of the legislated rate (column 7).
The effect of the 1983 changes in benefits and legislated tax rates
on true marginal tax rates is estimated in table 4.3. Column 4 shows
the new legislated payroll tax rates over the work life of those workers.
They represent an increase of about 1 percentage point (about 10 per
cent) over the pre-amendment rates. But by reconsidering the link be
tween future benefits and current taxes, we see that the change in the
true tax rates was substantially larger in both absolute and relative terms.
Concentration on changes in legislated payroll rates masks the changes
in true tax rates implied by the alterations in the future benefit schedule.
The 1983 act cut benefits by increasing the age of full benefits from
age 65 to age 67 (for those reaching age 62 in 2022) and by taxing onehalf of all Social Security benefits for high-income recipients. 7 Although
this tax is now paid by only a small number of current Social Security
recipients, it will be relevant for more workers in the future unless the
tax thresholds are raised to offset inflation.
The exact changes in the true payroll tax are controversial. They de
pend critically on assumptions about discount rates and about the man
ner in which individuals perceive the future and act on those percep
tions. Edgar Browning (1985), for instance, has argued that the 1 percent
real discount rate used in Burkhauser and Turner (1985) and in a parallel
study by Roger Gordon (1983) was unrealistically low, and that a much
higher rate is appropriate. A more fundamental criticism by Browning
is that workers do not know for certain which years will be included
in the average earnings measure. Hence, it is not appropriate to divide
work life into years that are used in the accounting period and years
that are not. To do so results in low true marginal tax rates in the years

Table 4.3
Life-Cycle Marginal Social Security Payroll Tax Rates For White Males
Age 22 in 1983 Before and After 1983 Amendments

Legislated payroll tax rates

True tax rates
(0.32 bracket)
(0.15 bracket)
Preamendment Postamendment Preamendment Postamendment

Year

Age Preamendment
(%)

1983
1991
2001
2011
2022

22
30
40
50
61

9.15
10.20
10.20
10.20
10.20

9.55
11.20
10.98
10.98
10.98

9.55
6.27
3.80
4.37
2.78

9.15
7.27
5.92
6.27
5.32

9.55
9.15
7.99
8.23
7.56

1983
1991
2001
2011
2022

22
30
40
50
61

9.15
10.20
10.20
10.20
10.20

Worker with dependent spouse
9.55
9.15
9.55
11.20
-2.14
1.48
10.98
-7.60
-3.04
10.98
-6.02
-1.79
10.98
-9.16
-4.27

9.15
4.42
1.86
2.60
1.12

9.55
7.15
5.14
5.66
4.63

SOURCE: Burkhauser and Turner (1985).

Amendment

Worker
9.15
3.94
1.08
1.81
-0.20

m

•o
$
a

I
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used, since the earnings generate higher future benefits, and in true tax
rates equal to the legislated rate in all other years. Browning suggested
that if workers are not certain which years will be used in the averag
ing process, then the true rate should be some average of the two.
Taking these factors into account in his simulations, Browning argued
that while "historically" the divergence between legislated and true
payroll tax rates may have been great, the difference is much less for
today's generation of workers. His simulation results suggest that true
rates are in the range of 80 to 90 percent of actual rates. This is ap
proximately the range of difference found for single workers in the 0.15
bracket of table 4.3. In any case, both papers provide a plausible reason
for the reduced support for Social Security among younger workers.
The well-known increases in taxes together with the less-publicized
decreases in future benefits combine to reduce the value of Social Security
to today's contributors. Only a life-cycle view of the process can com
bine the taxes and benefits and reveal the true redistributional impact
of the program.
Summary
The life-cycle view of human behavior is intuitively and theoretical
ly appealing. The basic idea is that labor supply, consumption, and sav
ings decisions are based not only on one's current situation, but also
on the past and on expectations of the future. In the very short run,
this view is obviously accurate; people do not reduce consumption on
the weekends because they are not earning income for two days. In the
medium run, it also makes sense; consumption habits take time to alter,
and people should be able to anticipate and incorporate likely changes
in circumstances ahead. In the very long run, over a lifetime, the theory
strains credulity, but still provides a useful construct with which to ap
proach multiperiod issues.
Public and private retirement income programs are certainly
multiperiod in nature. Work decisions today affect retirement benefits
in the future. It is widely agreed that the incentives built into these
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schemes affect labor supply behavior late in life. It is reasonable to ex
pect that there are implications earlier in the career as well, but the
literature is much thinner and the empirical evidence less robust.
Richard Ippolito is a leading proponent of the view that employer
pensions are part of an implicit contract that firms and employees ex
pect to be long term in nature. The contract binds them together and
is structured to penalize a job separation that is too early or too late.
Reputational considerations discourage the firm from reneging on its
part of the agreement, even though it might be profitable to do so in
the short run. Pension promises and liabilities should be evaluated, then,
on the assumption that the workers will be around to collect all the
delayed compensation foregone during their work careers.
There is considerable evidence that financial penalties for early depar
ture do exist and some evidence that workers respond to them when
they are large enough to be important. Mobility is lower among workers
with pensions, but it is not clear whether this is due to pension wealth
losses, to wage decreases associated with moving, or to the fact that
workers who intend to remain with one firm tend to choose firms with
pensions. Research also suggests that the stock market views unfunded
pension liabilities as larger than the quit value of current obligations,
which is consistent with the implicit contract view. But this implicit
contract literature is relatively new and the evidence to date is far from
overwhelming.
Both Gustman and Steinmeier (1989b) and Ippolito (1987) have pointed
out a number of puzzles and inconsistencies in the implicit contract story.
A primary reason for pensions in this scenario is to reduce worker turn
over and thereby reduce hiring and training costs. If so, then why are
the implicit pension penalties so low during the early years of associa
tion with the firm, precisely when turnover is most likely? The penalties
may deter mobility among mid-career workers, but they seem too incon
sequential to do much at either end. Another hypothesized goal is to
prevent shirking by the workers. If a substantial portion of deferred
compensation will be forfeited if an individual is dismissed, then there
are strong incentives not to give cause. But if this is important, why
do these incentives generally disappear as soon as the worker reaches
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early retirement age, when pension wealth often declines with delayed
receipt?8
Other objections are even more basic. The size of the penalty for early
departure depends critically on the rate of inflation, a factor which is
highly variable and totally out of the control of the contracting agents—
the firm and the workers. Why would they rely so heavily on a penalty
that they cannot control? In addition, the magnitude of these financial
incentives varies dramatically from plan to plan. They are nonexistent
in defined contribution plans and show great variety among defined
benefit programs. For the implicit contract theory to make sense, these
differences should reflect underlying differences in the firms, industries
and occupations in which they are found. Very little research into these
implications has been conducted. And finally, the entire story assumes
that workers understand the details of their pension plans and the nature
of these pension wealth incentives. Olivia Mitchell (1988) and others
have cast some doubt on this.
When the pros and cons are weighed, some researchers, such as Ippolito, remain committed to the concepts behind the implicit contract
theory and the new pension economics, even while acknowledging that
many unanswered questions remain. Others, such as Gustman and
Steinmeier, express considerably more skepticism and look to other
motivations, like the redistribution of income among workers, to ex
plain the structure of pension plans.
The Social Security system also creates an interesting set of incen
tives across the life cycle. The most dramatic and best understood oc
cur near the end, and it is reasonable to argue that their effects—to in
duce older workers out of the labor force—are intentional. Whether there
is any method to the variations in implicit tax rates over the rest of the
work life is much less clear, as is the proposition that workers under
stand and respond to them during their younger and middle years.
That individuals respond rationally to incentives is appealing to
economists. Most of our models assume it, and many of our empirical
results confirm it. The research discussed in this chapter is new, in
novative, and controversial, and the jury is still out on its accuracy and
importance.
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NOTES
1. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 requires continued pension credits and ac
cruals for work after age 65, unless the worker has reached the maximum number of years of
tenure that are counted in the benefit calculation formula (Herz and Rones 1989). The discussion
here reflects the situation that existed when this research was done, and does not reflect the im
pact of this law on typical accrual patterns.
2. Current pension legislation requires firms to back up their explicit defined pension promises
by holding reserves equal to the quit value of the pensions. This is consistent with this singleperiod view of labor contracts.
3. Decker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979) were earlier proponents of the importance of pen
sions in implicit lifetime contracts.
4. Gustman and Steinmeier (1989b) have experimented with a model in which lifetime produc
tivity and lifetime compensation have to be equal for all employees as a whole, but not for in
dividual ones. They then simulate how pension features might be used to reallocate pay among
different age cohorts of employees.
5. See, for example, Schiller and Weiss (1979), Viscusi (1979), Freeman (1980), Mitchell (1982),
McCormick and Hughes (with British data [1984]), and Rebitzer (1986).
6. Clark and McDermed (1988) compared the total pension wealth of a worker with one 40-year
job to that of a worker with an identical wage profile, but with four different employers, all with
the same pension plan. In their baseline example, total real pension wealth at age 65 for the mobile
workers was only 57 percent of that of the 40-year employee. The exact percentage depended
on whether or not the worker could cash out his pension wealth upon termination, and if so, the
interest rate at which these funds could be invested. But in all cases examined, final pension wealth
was always lower for the worker who switched jobs, illustrating one cost of job mobility.
7. Single-tax filers with taxable income above $25,000 and joint filers above $32,000 pay taxes
on half of their Social Security benefits as well.
8. There is a related story at the aggregate level. With delayed compensation to be repaid only
at retirement, workers are actually creditors, like bondholders, to the firm. If the firm goes out
of business, the employees stand to lose some of their accounts receivable. This should discourage
the workers, as a whole, from making demands deleterious to the health of the firm.

- 5 Transitions from Career Jobs
As we discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there is voluminous literature
on the economic determinants of the retirement decision, much of it
very current. Over the past decade, economists have focused on the
financial incentives embedded in the Social Security and private pen
sion systems and on how these incentives affect individual behavior.
The consensus is that strong incentives to retire do exist, that many in
dividuals behave as though they understand and respond to these in
centives and, therefore, that the incentives have some impact on ag
gregate retirement patterns.
Most economic models of retirement have focused either on retire
ment status or on hours of labor supply. The first concept is discrete;
the latter, continuous. Analyses of retirement status have usually treated
the concept as dichotomous—one is either retired or not—but have dif
fered on how it should best be defined. For example, Boskin (1977)
defined retirement as movement to quarter-time (or less) work.
Burkhauser (1979, 1980) used the acceptance of pension or Social Securi
ty benefits. Quinn (1977), Gordon and Blinder (1980), and Burkhauser
and Quinn (1983b) required complete labor force withdrawal. Fields
and Mitchell (1984c) defined retirement as departure from a primary
job, and Burtless and Moffitt (1985) looked for a sudden and discon
tinuous drop in hours worked. Quinn (1980, 1981) and Hausman and
Wise (1985) used self-defined retirement status. But all of the above
used their rules to define a dichotomous state. We show below that this
oversimplification overlooks some very rich and interesting labor force
withdrawal patterns and therefore misses much of the story.
Some researchers have also studied hours of work after retirement.
These models generally posit a continuous budget constraint along which
a worker chooses the optimal combination of income and leisure. As we
155
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have explained above, the actual budget constraint is kinked because
of the vagaries of tax, Social Security, and pension rules, and true com
pensation can differ dramatically from the wage rate. Economists usually
assume either that workers can choose to work any number of hours
(e.g., Gordon and Blinder 1980), or that the number of hours is fixed
(e.g., Fields and Mitchell 1984c, and Burtless and Moffitt 1984).
Although there is some truth in each of these assumptions, neither cap
tures the realities of actual behavior.
Relatively few economists have dealt seriously with the fact that retire
ment, in fact, includes a whole gamut of labor market activities. To
label them all with a single term obscures the rich variety of behavior
that actually exists.
In this chapter, we discuss the economics literature that explicitly
models the diverse patterns of labor market withdrawal. Most of this
treats the decision as trichotomous—one either retires completely, retires
partly, or does not retire at all. We then describe the actual patterns
of departure from full-time work on career jobs that we have observed
in our Retirement History Study sample. Although traditional retire
ment (sudden and complete labor force withdrawal) remains the most
common pattern, a substantial minority of Americans leave their career
jobs via more complex routes. A few choose a period of partial retire
ment (reduced hours) on the career job. Others take a new part-time
position. Some older workers move from one full-time job to another,
and others retire completely, but then later return to the labor force
in a full-time or part-time capacity.
We will establish several facts below. First, alternative routes to retire
ment, other than the traditional transition from full-time work to fulltime leisure, are common among the American workforce. Second, most
of the intermediate stages occur soon after departure from the career
job. And finally, these transitional jobs last long enough to be interesting.
In chapter 6, we will discuss some of the correlates and implications
of the different exit patterns.
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Partial Retirement

Self-Employed vs. Wage and Salary Workers
Using the initial 1969 cross section of the Retirement History Study,
Joseph Quinn (1980, 1981) compared the retirement patterns of a sam
ple of white married men aged 58 through 63. The focus of this research
was twofold: to determine the extent of partial retirement among older
Americans, and to compare the patterns of self-employed and wage and
salary workers. The hypothesis was that partial employment would be
more common among the self-employed, since they have more control
over their work environment. They are less likely to be covered by com
pulsory retirement provisions or pension plans, and are generally un
constrained by institutional rules on the length of the workweek.
Retirement status was determined by the respondents, who describ
ed themselves as either completely retired, partly retired, or not retired
at all. These subjective responses correlated well with more objective
labor force status (in or out) and annual hours measures. 1
Several interesting conclusions emerged. Among men approaching
normal retirement age (58 to 63 in the 1969 cross section), partial retire
ment was a common phenomenon, particularly among the selfemployed. 2 Five percent of the wage and salary workers and over 12
percent of the self-employed described themselves so (Quinn 1981).
In fact, among the self-employed in this age range, partial retirement
was more common than complete retirement.
Data on annual hours of work confirmed that the self-employed en
joy more hours flexibility. Among those not retired, the annual hours
distribution of the wage and salary workers was completely dominated
by the mode around 2,000 hours, reflecting full-year status at the stan
dard workweek. Over 80 percent worked between 1,500 and 2,500 hours
per year. In contrast, the self-employed "not retired" were more evenly
distributed over the spectrum. Over half worked more than 2,500 hours
per year, and another 8 percent worked less than 1,500 hours.
Retirement status was highly correlated with the age and health of
the individual. The probability of partial retirement rose monotonically
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with age, and was always much more common among those with a health
condition limiting the type or amount of work they could do. This sug
gests that the phenomenon may grow in importance as the nation ages.
For every age and health combination, partial retirement was more likely
among the self-employed than among wage and salary workers. Addi
tional analyses suggested that retirement status was also influenced by
pension and Social Security eligibility and by the amount of asset income.
Quinn (1980) also found that some of the self-employed (about one
in eight) had become so only in the previous 10 years. This suggests
that some people may utilize self-employment as a transitional step be
tween a career job and retirement.
This early research was relatively unsophisticated. It did not utilize
the longitudinal nature of the RHS, and the treatment of retirement in
come sources was very rudimentary. But it previewed some findings
of later, more detailed research—that partial retirement is an important
phenomenon among the American workforce, that its importance grows
with the age of the individuals, that the behavioral patterns of wage
and salary workers and the self-employed are different, and that some
wage and salary workers turn to self-employment late in life. There
was also some circumstantial evidence that one reason for the difference
in retirement patterns is a lack of choice of hours in the wage and salary
sector, a topic that Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier later addressed
in a much more sophisticated manner.
Victor Fuchs (1982) also analyzed the phenomenon of labor force
withdrawal among the self-employed, using the first three waves of the
RHS. He intentionally avoided the term "retirement," because the con
cept is so poorly defined. He began by observing, as seen in table 5.1,
that the proportion of the workforce that is self-employed increases with
age, and that this can be seen in both cross-sectional and longitudinal
data. This relationship with age occurs partly because self-employment
has declined in importance in the United States over the long run, so
we tend to observe fewer self-employed among the young than among
the old. But the trend is also found within cohorts as they age. This
is either because the self-employed retire later than wage and salary
workers, so their relative number among the employed grows as a cohort
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ages, or because some wage and salary workers become self-employed
late in life.
Using a sample of white urban men in the RHS, Fuchs found that
both reasons were important. At every age between 58 and 65, those
already self-employed were less likely to stop working and this difference
generally grew with age. In addition, 4 to 5 percent of the wage and
salary workers switched over to self-employment in each of the twoyear transition periods studied.
In order to understand why some workers switched to self-employment
late in life, Fuchs estimated transition equations for those who were
initially wage and salary workers. He found that workers were more
likely to switch if they had had some periods of self-employment earlier
in their careers, or if their career jobs had characteristics similar to selfemployment. In particular, managers, professionals, and sales workers,
many of whom have considerable discretion on the job, and those already
working particularly short (less than 35 hours) or long (more than 50
hours) weeks were significantly more likely to become self-employed.
The probabilities were considerably lower for those eligible for pen
sions or subject to mandatory retirement provisions, both of which are
uncommon among the self-employed. In other words, those wage and
salary workers whose work habits already resembled those of the selfemployed were more likely to become so around retirement age.
Fuchs then combined all of those initially working (wage and salary
and self-employed) and asked why some continued to work while others
did not. Not surprisingly, he found that the probability declined with
age, with evidence of poor health, and with pension or mandatory retire
ment coverage. But he also found that the probability of continuing work
was significantly higher if the respondent was self-employed. In fact,
holding all the other economic and demographic variables constant, the
probability of continuing work over a two-year period was nearly 8
percentage points higher for the self-employed. Interaction terms be
tween class of worker and age suggested that this difference was im
portant only at ages 61 and above.
In a final set of regressions, Fuchs showed that among men initially
working more than 35 hours per week, the self-employed were more
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likely to reduce their weekly labor supply below 35 hours two years
later than were wage and salary workers. This suggests that the addi
tional hours of flexibility enjoyed by the self-employed may be part
of the reason why they are more likely to continue working late in life.
In summary, Fuchs has emphasized an important transition route for
workers leaving career jobs, namely, a switch to self-employment. This
change often involves a reduction in hours worked. He suggested that
many of those who do switch have been self-employed in the past or
are leaving wage and salary jobs that resemble self-employment in im
portant ways, although he does not explicitly compare the old and new
jobs. We will pursue this line of inquiry below.

Minimum-Hours Constraints
In a long series of articles beginning in 1983, Alan Gustman and
Thomas Steinmeier have added considerable insight to our understand
ing of the labor supply choices facing older workers, and have developed
sophisticated theoretical models and econometric techniques to deal with
the complexity they found. Their major contribution has been to em
phasize the importance of partial retirement—a transitional period of
reduced hours between full-time employment and complete labor force
withdrawal. They show that this transitional stage often occurs on a
job other than the career job and usually at a significantly lower wage
rate. They maintain that this occurs because most jobs have a minimumhours constraint, so that many people have to leave their career jobs
in order to work part time. They argue that models that ignore this
phenomenon of gradual retirement can be very misleading.
With a sample of wage and salary white men, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1984b) demonstrated again the importance of partial retirement in the
labor force withdrawal process, utilizing the same subjective defini
tion used by Quinn (1980, 1981). 3 Although they found that being "not
retired" dominated up through age 63 and full retirement dominated
thereafter, the intermediate status was an important phenomenon
nonetheless. Fewer than 10 percent of those below age 62 described
themselves as partially retired, but the proportion rose to between 15
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and 20 percent among those aged 65 to 69. In fact, for those over 65,
partial retirement was much more frequent than nonretirement. When
the authors combined the first four waves of the RHS data, they found
that about a third of the respondents were partially retired at some time
during that six-year period.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a) also studied job change among older
workers and found that the vast majority of the partially retired were
no longer on their main jobs (defined as the full-time job held at age
55). Partial retirement usually involves a job change. In contrast, most
of those not retired were still on the same job they held at 55. This
difference would not be surprising if those partially retired had all fac
ed mandatory retirement on their previous jobs, but this was not the
case. Even those partly retired who had not and would not have faced
mandatory retirement were much more likely to be on a new job. This
was true even for the subset with no health problems and with neither
a pension nor mandatory retirement on their main jobs.
A final piece of the puzzle was that those who did switch to a new
job usually did so at a wage rate lower than what they had previously
earned. 4 Why then do older workers change jobs? Why do they not
simply reduce hours on their career jobs? Gustman and Steinmeier con
clude that they do not because they cannot. Most jobs, they claim, have
a minimum-hours constraint. Although the RHS did not inquire about
this, some other data sets have. For example, over half (56 percent)
of those who answered the appropriate question on the Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics claimed that they could not have worked
less if they had wanted to. 5 In a survey of employers, only 15 percent
(and only 10 percent in manufacturing) had a program in which workers
could reduce hours as they approached retirement (Gustman and
Steinmeier 1983). The authors concluded from these various sources
that between 60 and 90 percent of workers face minimum-hours con
straints on their jobs and, therefore, are unable to reduce hours as they
age.
Gustman and Steinmeier also showed that ignoring these constraints
can lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, the discontinuous labor
supply shifts (in hours and employers) observed for most workers who
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choose partial retirement may be attributed to dramatic changes in
preferences in a model that does not include the minimum-hours con
straint. Similarly, the "choice" to move to a job with a lower wage
rate will be puzzling unless one realizes that a reduction in hours on
the original high-wage job was not possible. The authors demonstrated
that ignoring the partial retirement option can significantly change the
coefficients in a retirement model, because those partially retired have
to be combined either with those retired or those not retired in a
dichotomous world. Those who define retirement as complete labor force
status would call them "not retired" and not differentiate between par
tial retirement and continued full-time work on the original job. Those
with a definition based on hours or work or pension receipt would label
many of them as retired, and equate partial retirement and complete
labor force withdrawal. Since there is a sizable number of people in
this intermediate category, particularly among those 65 and over, the
empirical results are affected by how they are defined. 6

A Structural Retirement Model
Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) have developed a structural model
of retirement that incorporates changes in individual preferences and
budget constraints over time. In contrast to most of the retirement
literature, their model permits individuals to reduce their hours to less
than full time, but only at a reduced wage rate. This corresponds to
the actual options described above.
Graphically, the worker faces the budget constraint shown in figure
5.1, which is drawn for a particular moment in time. Point A corresponds
to full-time work at the full-time wage rate. No other hours options
are permitted at this wage rate. To work less, the worker must take
a lower wage rate, either on the main job or, more likely, on a dif
ferent job. If this choice is made, the worker faces the budget constraint
BCDE, kinked because of the mechanics of the Social Security system.
Point E represents full retirement. Y(t) is current earnings, and,
therefore, is zero at E.
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Figure 5.1
Choice of Income and Leisure at Tune t,
With Different Part-Time and Full-Time Wages
Y(t)

Yf(t)

en

O)
CO
LLJ

Leisure
SOURCE: Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a), p. 561.
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The complete budget constraint includes point A and line segments
BCDE. The labor supply choice depends on this budget constraint and
on the shape of the individual's indifference curves. A person with a
very flat set of indifference curves (for whom a small increase in in
come would compensate for a large loss in leisure) will remain at point
A and continue full time on the career job. People with steep indifference
curves (a strong preference for leisure) will prefer point E and withdraw
from the labor force. Workers with very curved indifference sets may
be found working part time, along BCDE.
The individual faces a life-cycle labor supply problem, with each year
treated as a separate period. Both the budget constraints and individual
preferences change over time. Gustman and Steinmeier hypothesize that
the indifference curves steepen as the worker ages, and therefore that
most people eventually end up at point E, that is, out of the labor force.
In their empirical work, they estimated the parameters of a utility
function, which the individual maximizes subject to a changing budget
constraint. The parameters were chosen to maximize the likelihood of
observing the retirement patterns actually observed in a sample drawn
from the first four waves of the RHS. 7 Because of the complexity of
the estimation procedure, only one of every 10 eligible households was
chosen, and only a very sparse set of explanatory variables was used.
The variables determining the shape of the indifference curves in
cluded age, year of birth, and a dummy variable denoting a serious health
problem lasting a year or more. Compensation (separately for full- and
part-time work) had three components: wages, and pension and Social
Security benefits. Full-time and part-time wage profiles were imputed
from wage equations. 8 The pension and Social Security components of
compensation were defined as the changes in the present discounted
values of the streams of benefits that would occur with an additional
year's work. 9
The coefficient estimates were all significant in the expected direc
tion. As anticipated, they indicated that indifference curves steepen
significantly with age and with the onset of a health problem. The wage
terms were modest in size. The authors estimated that a 10 percent
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change in the wage rate in the year of retirement would change the date
of retirement by about five months.
The Gustman and Steinmeier model (1986a) had two innovative com
ponents: two different wage rates (for full-time and part-time work),
and variable hours on the part-time job. To isolate which of these features
was more important, they reestimated their equations in models in which
there is (1) one wage and fixed hours (a la Fields and Mitchell); (2)
one wage and variable hours (a la Gordon and Blinder); and (3) two
wages, but partial retirement hours are fixed. It turned out that the im
portant feature empirically was the introduction of the part-time wage
rate, an innovation that they consider essential to understanding actual
retirement patterns.
The authors (1986a) tested the overall quality of their model by
simulating retirement patterns based on their parameter estimates, and
comparing them with the patterns actually observed. Their results did
a remarkable job of duplicating the retirement peaks observed at ages
62 and 65 without the use of dummy variables denoting these two ages.
The simulated peaks were due entirely to smooth changes in the slope
of the indifference curves and to the sudden changes in financial incen
tives embedded in the Social Security and pension rules. When the ef
fects of Social Security, pension, and mandatory retirement were
eliminated from the compensation function, both simulated peaks disap
peared. When the single-wage model simulations were compared, they
did an inferior job of tracing actual retirement behavior.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985b) used their model to simulate the
effects of three components of the 1983 Social Security reforms:
(1) the increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 67,
(2) the increase in the annual delayed retirement credit after age 65
from 3 to 8 percent, and
(3) the decrease in the benefit reduction rate (the earnings-test tax) from
50 to 33 percent, which has already gone into effect for those
aged 65 to 69.
Their simulated impacts are long-run in that they assumed that workers
faced these rules all along. They are less than long-run, however, because
the model does not permit other institutions (like pensions) to adjust
to the new Social Security environment.
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Their simulations suggested a decline in retirement behavior around
65. The authors predicted that the percentage of Americans over age
65 working full time would increase and the percentages working part
time and fully retired would decrease. Disaggregation indicated that
most of the impact was due to the increase in the actuarial adjustment
for delayed retirement after age 65, which would reduce or eliminate
the surreptitious pay cut that Social Security imposes then. There was
very little effect prior to age 65 and a slight increase in retirement ac
tivity at age 67. In proportional terms, some of these predicted changes
were substantial, because the changes occurred on such a small base
of workers over 65. But because of the small base, the overall impact
of these changes on the labor force would be minimal. 10
The delay in the age of normal retirement is equivalent to a decrease
in Social Security benefits. With no other changes, it would decrease
the income levels of older Americans. But the increased incentives to
work beyond age 65, because of a delayed retirement adjustment that
is closer to actuarially fair, will induce some additional labor supply
and partly offset this income loss.
In a subsequent paper, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986b) simulated
the impact of the 1983 Social Security legislation on retirement behavior
and lifetime income. Without any labor supply response, all groups
would lose lifetime income equal to about 11 to 14 percent of Social
Security wealth because of the 1983 amendments. All of the groups
offset this loss, to some extent, with additional work. But the degree
of offset varied. Those in good health made up nearly half of the loss,
while those in poor health made up only a fifth.
In summary, Gustman and Steinmeier have added two important and
realistic dimensions to their behavioral models: minimum-hours con
straints and partial retirement at reduced wages. They have confirmed
that partial retirement is an important phenomenon among older
Americans (about one-third of their RHS sample reported themselves
as partially retired at some time between 1969 and 1975) and that most
people have to switch jobs in order to reduce hours. The price paid
for this additional flexibility is a decrease in hourly pay.
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Most of the previous research had ignored the partial retirement op
tion and labeled those in this intermediate category as either retired or
not retired. Gustman and Steinmeier have shown that this dichotomy
is unrealistic and that empirical results change when it is relaxed.
Partial Retirement as an Earnings Reduction
In a series of recent papers, Giora Hanoch, Marjorie Honig, and Cor
delia Reimers have emphasized the importance of partial retirement be
tween full-time employment and complete labor force withdrawal. They
also have found that partial retirement is common and that its duration
is significant, and concluded that traditional models of dichotomous
retirement miss important aspects of the story.
Honig and Hanoch (1985) adopted an objective definition of partial
retirement, in contrast to the subjective concept used by Quinn and by
Gustman and Steinmeier. According to Honig and Hanoch, retirement
means a reduction in earnings. They use as a measure of earnings reduc
tion "the ratio of current to potential earnings (in real terms), the latter
defined as the individual's maximum earnings during the greater part
of his adult life." They defined those with no earnings as fully retired,
those earning less than half of their highest annual real earnings as par
tially retired, and all others as not retired. For the ends of the spectrum—
those fully retired and those not retired—this definition correlates very
well with subjective self-definitions by the respondents themselves. But
fewer than half of those whom the authors defined as partially retired
described themselves in the same way. Nearly 40 percent called
themselves fully retired, despite their (usually small) positive earnings.
Decreases in earnings can result from lower wages, lower hours, or
both. Honig and Hanoch found that both occurred among older workers
and that the latter appeared both as decreases in hours per week and
in weeks per year. But they found the strongest association between
partial retirement and diminished hours per week. Those partially retired
averaged 34 hours compared to 43 for the nonretired.
With their definition, Honig and Hanoch found a significant amount
of partial retirement among older American men. During the four years
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between 1969 and 1973, between 14 and 27 percent (depending on age
in 1969) of the white married wage and salary men in the Retirement
History Study sample moved from nonretirement into partial retirement.
And this ignores those initially self-employed, who are more likely to
utilize a period of partial retirement.
Not only was partial retirement fairly likely, but it was also of signifi
cant duration. The average partially retired person had been so for over
two years, and nearly a fifth had been so for four or more years. And
since these respondents were still partially retired in 1973, the even
tual duration would be even longer.
The authors also found that partial retirement was very likely to con
tinue or to develop into full retirement. There were, however, a small
number of irregular patterns; for example, a transition from full retire
ment back to partial or to nonretirement, or a move from partial to
nonretirement. These odd patterns were most likely to occur among
the younger respondents.
Honig and Hanoch discovered some interesting differences between
the partially retired and others. Not surprisingly, the former were much
less likely to be on the same job they had had two years previously,
since some became partially retired by switching jobs. But they also
were more likely than the others to have experienced earlier interrup
tions in Social Security-covered earnings, were less likely to have pen
sion coverage, and were much more likely (than the nonretired) to report
health limitations.
The authors tested several models of the decisionmaking process. They
concluded that the most likely involved recursive decisions: first, peo
ple decide whether or not to continue working, and then, if they do
continue, they decide whether to work full or part time. Labor force
participation was correlated with good health, low family income, a
lack of pension coverage, and high Social Security entitlement. The
last finding may seem surprising, since high Social Security wealth can
finance leisure. Here it seems to encourage continued work. The answer
may lie in the intertemporal incentives embedded in the Social Securi
ty system. The annual Social Security benefit cannot capture the com
plicated impacts of current work decisions on future benefits and, hence,
on Social Security wealth.
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For those who did decide to continue working, the likelihood of par
tial retirement (as opposed to nonretirement) increased with age, the
onset of health limitations, education, and high family income, and
decreased with pension coverage and the size of the potential annual
Social Security benefit. 11
In more recent work, Reimers and Honig (1989) changed the time
unit of analysis and the definition of partial retirement and found even
more of the phenomenon. They utilized information in the RHS regard
ing the exact timing of job transitions to interpolate a month-by-month
job history, and then examined transitions from one month to the next.
They defined partial retirement to occur whenever real monthly earn
ings fell below 80percent of peak lifetime monthly earnings, compared
to the 50 percent annual threshold used above. This may be an overly
liberal definition of partial retirement, since monthly earnings can change
for many reasons other than an intentional change in labor supply status.
With this new definition, the authors concluded that men aged 58 to
61 leaving nonretirement were more likely to end up in partial retire
ment than in full retirement. This contrasts the Honig and Hanoch con
clusions mentioned above, in which transitions to full retirement were
always more frequent, and shows the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of time interval and the definition of partial retirement used.
Reimers and Honig found that most of the transitions from nonretire
ment to partial retirement occurred while the respondent stayed work
ing for the same employer. This implies a far greater degree of intrafirm hours flexibility than found by Gustman and Steinmeier, who claim
that most people have to switch jobs in order to reduce labor supply,
or by us (below), with a more severe "hours-only" definition of par
tial retirement.
Different definitions obviously lead to different estimates about the
magnitude of partial retirement. Reimers and Honig adopted a lenient
definition (less than 80 percent of one's highest real monthly pay) and
therefore found a lot of it. But nearly all of the evidence suggests
that partial retirement is important, and that by ignoring it, as much
of the retirement research does, one overlooks some very
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interesting behavioral responses. Reimers and Honig (1989) conclude
that
retirement has often been viewed as an "either-or" proposi
tion: either one is working full-time or not at all, with the
transition occurring in the early sixties for Americans. It has
become increasingly clear, however, that retirement in the
U.S. is a more complex phenomenon. In particular, signifi
cant numbers of older workers are spending time in the in
termediate stage of partial retirement.
Job Reentry after Retirement
In some recent work, George Sweeney, J.S. Butler, Richard
Burkhauser, and Kathryn Anderson (1989) have shown that a life-cycle
model modified to allow uncertainty about the date of one's death yields
good predictions about who returns to work after leaving the labor force.
They suggest that reentry after retirement may be part of a rational plan
of consumption over the life cycle. Behavior changes when new infor
mation becomes available. While aging, people must reevaluate their
own life expectancies and levels of assets, and may find that returning
to work after having been retired makes sense.
To test the model, the authors analyzed a sample of men and women
drawn from the RHS who were working in 1968, but later stopped and
reported themselves fully retired. They found that 23 percent of the
sample returned to work—most within two years after retirement. The
longer one was out of the workforce, the less likely was reentry. In
creases in Social Security and pension wealth significantly reduced the
probability of reentry, with Social Security having the larger effect.
The authors argued that this may reflect the fact that Social Security
benefits are reduced when earnings exceed the exempt amount, which
creates a work disincentive not found in most pension plans.
Butler, Anderson, and Burkhauser (1989) have brought the literature
on health and retirement to bear on the decision to return to work in
older years. The main innovation in this paper is the use of a competingrisks model that allows unobservables that influence both health and
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the probability of returning to work to be correlated. They found that
these unobservables are correlated, and that including this correlation
changes the impact of Social Security and pension income.
Both of these papers shed some light on the decision to reenter the
labor market at older ages. However, neither distinguishes between exits
from career jobs and exits from what may be one of several post-career
jobs. In addition, little information is provided on the type or duration
of the new jobs.
In our research discussed below, we also consider the extent of labor
market reentry, or "unretirement." We have a stricter definition of
the phenomenon, since we will define as retired only those who have
been out of the labor market for at least two years. Since Butler, Anderson, and Burkhauser report that most of their reentries occurred dur
ing the first two years, we will find fewer unretirements than they did.
It is really a matter of definition whether someone who moved from
one job to another with a six-month hiatus really retired and then
reentered, or merely switched jobs with a little time off in the interim.
For younger workers, we would certainly not label the interim as ' 'retire
ment" and we prefer not to here either. But the important point on which
we all agree is that very interesting patterns of labor market withdrawal
are being observed. People are leaving the labor market in many dif
ferent ways, and once out, some decide to return. This is in stark con
trast to most of the recent retirement literature in which the retirement
decision is modeled as dichotomous and permanent.
Although the research on partial retirement is limited, it has made
some important points. The authors all agree that the traditional
dichotomous treatment of the retirement decision that dominates the
literature is inadequate, that it overlooks some common and interesting
withdrawal patterns, and that it can result in misleading conclusions.
In fact, many people do utilize periods of partial retirement between
full-time work and full-time leisure. Most do so on new jobs, and often
at significantly lower wage rates. A primary reason appears to be the
hours flexibility that is unavailable in their career jobs.
In the section below, we describe in detail the exit patterns of a large
sample of older American workers, using all 10 years of the Retire-
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ment History Study. The evidence confirms that nontraditional retire
ment patterns are common and suggests that the scope of future research
should be broadened to include them.

Exit Patterns from Career Jobs
In chapter 1, we argued that career jobs are important in America.
Despite all the discussion about the mobility of American workers, most
spend a considerable amount of time on a single job. Among the men
in the 1969 wave of the Retirement History Study, for example, 55 per
cent remained on their longest job for at least 20 years, and nearly 80
percent stayed at least 10 years (table 1.6). For the women in the sam
ple, the analogous figures are smaller—28 and 55 percent—but still
substantial.
In this study, we are concentrating on the patterns of disengagement
from career jobs. Since we are utilizing the Retirement History Study,
which follows for 10 years a sample of people initially aged 58-63,
we observe exits only between ages 58 and 73. Before turning to the
topic at hand, we will discuss our definition of a career job and the
derivation of the samples used in the tables below.

Definition of a Career Job
Our definition of current employment on a career job is simple: the
respondent must be working full time (at least 35 hours per week) on
a job held for at least 10 years. We experimented with several alter
native definitions. We found that requiring 40 hours per week decreas
ed the sample size appreciably, but that relaxing the definition to 30
or 25 hours made very little difference. Since many full-time jobs now
involve fewer than 40 hours of work per week, the 35-hour definition
seemed most appropriate. Increasing the tenure requirement to 15 or
20 years on the job diminished the sample size significantly. Since we
consider a full-time job of 10 years' duration to represent a significant
commitment to an employer—even if the job is not the longest job held—
we chose the 10-year definition. 12 From this perspective, an individual
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could hold more than one career job; we are studying the transition from
the last one.

Sample
Of the more than 11,000 respondents in the 1969 RHS sample, near
ly 4,500 met our definition of current employment on a career job (table
5.2). Almost all of those individuals who did not fit our definition were
either out of the labor market altogether or working on jobs of less than
10 years' duration. Since the retirement patterns of wage and salary
and self-employed workers are very different, we disaggregated along
this dimension. About 21 percent of the men and 7 percent of the (nonmarried) women were self-employed. 13 Since the absolute number of
self-employed women is so small (50), they are excluded from further
analysis.
Table 5.2
Selection of Sample of Workers on Career Job in 1969
Number

Men

Women

Total

RHS sample in 1969
-not employed in 1969
-bad data on tenure or hours
-tenure less than 10 years
-hours less than 35 per week

8,131
1,550
365
2,239
216

3,021
1,315
73
807
115

11,152
2,865
438
3,046
331

RHS sample employed on a
career job in 1969
-wage and salary
-self-employed

3,761
2,956
805

711
661
50

4,472
3,617
855

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.

As seen in table 5.3, the vast majority (about 80 percent) of the wage
and salary men and women changed their labor force status between
1969 and 1979, the end of the RHS surveys. Of those who did not,
nearly all either died or disappeared from the survey while still on their
career jobs. Fewer than 3 percent remained employed full time until
1979.

Table 5.3
Disposition of Sample of Workers on Career Job in 1969
Wage and salary
men

Self-employed
men

Wage and salary
women

Total

-bad data on disposition

2,956
-75

805
-23

661
-12

4,422
-110

-good data on disposition

2,881

782

649

4,312

Total

Remained full time on career job
-until 1979

57 ( 2%)

113 (14%)

17 ( 3%)

187 ( 4%)

-until death

256 ( 9%)

95 (12%)

22 ( 3%)

373 ( 9%)

-until disappeared

306(11%)

92 (12%)

75 (12%)

473 (11%)

2,262 (79%)

482 (62%)

535 (82%)

3,279 (76%)

816

241

167

1,224

1,446

241

368

2,055

Left full-time status on career job
-without 4 years of additional
data after exit
-with 4 years of additional
data after exit
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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The disposition of those who were self-employed in 1969 is very dif
ferent. Only about 60 percent left full-time status on that job and of
the other 40 percent, over a third were still working full time in 1979.
The others died or disappeared.
We are primarily interested in those individuals who stopped doing
full-time work on their career jobs. As we will see below, those who
stopped did so in many different ways—some moved to part-time work
on the same job, others took new jobs, and still others left the labor
market and were never observed working again.
There is a potential problem here, however, since some of those whom
we never observed working again may have left the sample after leav
ing their jobs. Some died, some refused to be reinterviewed, and others
could not be located. For another group, those first observed out of
their full-time career jobs in 1979, the last year of the RHS, there was
simply not another opportunity to contact them again. Some of these
respondents may well have taken another job, but we do not know. To
diminish this problem, we have chosen a subsample of those for whom
we have four years (two RHS interviews) of data after their departure
from the career job. 14 There are 1,446 wage and salary men, 241 selfemployed men, and 368 wage and salary women in this category (table
5.3). With this sample, which we use below, we are more confident
that the transitions listed are accurate. "Out of the labor force" now
means out for at least four years.
Exit Patterns
In table 5.4, we show the exit patterns of the RHS respondents who
were still in career jobs in 1969, who subsequently left these full-time
positions and whom we could follow for four additional years. Of the
wage and salary men, over a quarter did something other than withdraw
from the labor force. More than 20 percent left and took a new job,
and those were about evenly split between new full-time and new parttime positions. A small proportion (5 percent) moved to part-time status
on the same career job—i.e., reduced their labor supply below 20 hours
per week. 15 The remaining 73 percent of the sample were never observed
working again.
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The least likely transition was to part-time work on the career job,
even though, as we will see, the earnings from this move usually ex
ceeded the earnings on a new part-time job. The low probability of
becoming a part-time worker on one's career job may be because this
choice was generally not available to wage and salary workers, as
Gustman and Steinmeier (1983) suggest, or because the workers chose
to leave in order to collect pension benefits and prevent a loss in pen
sion wealth. Pension accruals usually fall after early retirement age,
and the loss in pension wealth might be even larger for those who worked
part time on the career job. Not only would they be likely to face ac
tuarial adjustments that inadequately reward continued work, but the
part-time work might decrease the earnings base on which the pension
benefits are calculated, if they are based on the last (as opposed to the
highest) few years. Hence, for some workers, a lower wage on a new
job may exceed the true net wage for part-time work on the career job.
Table 5.4
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs, for Those
with Four Years of Subsequent Data
(vertical percentage)
Type of
transition

Wage and
salary
men

Wage and
salary
women

5%
10%
12%
73%

25%
13%
13%
49%

10%
10%
7%
74%

(1,446)

(241)

(368)

Part time on career job
Part time on new job
Full time on new job
Out of labor force
(Sample size)

Selfemployed
men

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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For self-employed men, the withdrawal patterns were very different.
Only half of the sample left the labor force when they stopped full-time
work on a career job, and of those who did not, a transition to parttime work on the same job was by far the most likely choice. A quarter
of the sample reduced their hours in this way, which undoubtedly reflects
the greater control over hours enjoyed by the self-employed. Another
quarter moved to a new job, equally split between full time and part time.
The fact that the self-employed were five times more likely than wage
and salary workers to continue to work part time on their career jobs
suggests that more of the latter might do the same if there were fewer
direct restrictions on part-time work, and if defined benefit pension plans
did not penalize that choice. This might substantially decrease the per
centage who move directly from full-time work to full retirement.
The (nonmarried) wage and salary women in the sample resembled
the wage and salary men. About three-quarters of them chose the tradi
tional labor force withdrawal. The quarter that did not was more even
ly divided among the three choices: part-time work on the career job,
or part-time or full-time work on a new job.
Age of Respondent
The exit patterns varied with the age of the respondent at the time
of departure (table 5.5). Most of these men and women left their career
jobs between the ages of 62 and 64, which is now normal retirement
age. Those who left earlier, between 58 and 61, were by far the most
likely to take another full-time job—about one in four of the wage and
salary men, one in three of the self-employed men, and one in five of
the women did so. Only one-half to two-thirds of these younger workers
left the labor market for at least four years.
In the older categories, new full-time employment was much rarer
and transitions to part-time work were more popular. Only a small
minority of the wage and salary workers stayed on career jobs past age
65 (6 percent of the men and 11 percent of the women). This group
was the least likely to leave the labor force for good. About 40 percent
made a nontraditional exit and over half of them moved to part time

Table 5.5
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Age of Worker at Time of Exit
(horizontal percentage)
Type of Transition

Group
Age

Part time on
career job
(%)

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

2
2
8
21

8
10
12
14

23
10
5
4

66
77
74
61

Wage and salary men
58-61
62-64
65
66-70
Self-employed men
58-61
62-64
65
66-70
Wage and salary women
58-61
62-64
65
66-70

Total

327
825
200
94

(
(
(
(

23%)
57%)
14%)
6%)

1,446 (100%)
11
19
44
40

7
18
16
4

35
11
0
4

48
52
41
51

46 (
118(
32 (
45 (

19%)
49%)
13%)
19%)

241 (100%)
1
10
7
21

12
8
19
5

17
4
0
12

70
77
74
62

69
215
42
42

(
(
(
(

19%)
58%)
11%)
11%)

368 (100%)
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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on their career jobs. This may seem odd, but the very fact that these
men and women stayed on their career jobs past 65 (a rare phenomenon
these days) indicates either that their preferences were different from
those of most older workers or that they held career jobs that were more
flexible with respect to retirement options. The popularity of the parttime option suggests that the latter may be the case.
The patterns of the self-employed also differed by age. Overall, about
half took nontraditional exits. Younger workers (58 to 61) who kept
working were most likely to move to another full-time job, and over
a third did; those 62 to 64 were most likely to drop to part-time employ
ment, either on the same or on a new job; and the older workers (65
and older) very rarely switched jobs. They either reduced hours on career
jobs or dropped out of the labor force completely.

Timing of Transitions
The transitions in table 5.4 could have occurred at any time within
four years of departure from full-time work on the career job. The RHS
data permit one to calculate exactly when each transition occurred, unless
the transition was to part-time on the same job. 16 In this case we assumed
it took place immediately. The distributions for the wage and salary
men are shown in table 5.6, along with the probability of each type
of exit occurring during each six-month period.
Most of the transitions happened immediately or soon after the depar
ture from the career job. Nearly half of the wage and salary men who
moved to a new part-time job and over 60 percent of those who took
a new full-time job did so during the first year. The same story is told
by the transition rates in table 5.6. The probability that someone leav
ing a full-time job took a new full-time job in the first six months was
nearly 7 percent. Of those who were still not working after six months,
only 2 percent took a full-time job during the next six months. The
likelihood of a new full-time job for those not working past one year
continued to fall. The probability of a move to new part-time work also
declined with time out of work, but not as dramatically.
The timing patterns for self-employed men were slightly different.
They took even less time off between jobs. Over 60 percent of those who

Table 5.6
Marginal Probabilities of Various Transitions Within Four Years of Leaving Career Job
Wage and Salary Men
(horizontal percentage)
Type of transaction
Months after exit
from career job

Number
entering period

Part time on
career job

Part time on
new job

Full tune on
new job

Still out of
labor force

0-6
7-12
13-18
19-24
25-30
31-36
37-42
43-48

1,446
1,236
1,191
1,156
1,125
1,101
1,082
1,064

4.7%

3.4%
1.9%
1.5%
1.5%
1.3%
1.0%
1.3%
0.6%

6.9%
2.0%
1.4%
1.2%
0.8%
0.7%
0.4%
0.4%

84.9%
96.2%
97.0%
97.3%
97.9%
98.3%
98.3%
99.0%

Total

(1,446)

(65)

(151)

(176)

(1,054)

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
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took a new part-time job and nearly 90 percent with new full-time
employment began the new job within a year. The patterns for women
were mixed. Those who claimed new full-time jobs generally did so
very quickly, like the men. But the women who moved on to new parttime jobs took their time. Fewer than 40 percent made this transition
during the first year.

Duration of the Transition Job
The tables above suggest that nontraditional exits from full-time work
on a career job are fairly common. About a quarter of the wage and
salary respondents and about half of the self-employed men did
something other than simply leave the labor force. One interesting ques
tion is whether these intermediate stages last long enough to be impor
tant and worthy of analysis. If workers use them to delay complete retire
ment by only a couple of months, then there is little here to study. On
the other hand, if the transitional steps last for several years, then this
is a phenomenon worth investigating.
The next three tables show the status of the transitional jobs one and
two years after the transition, for those who dropped to part-time status
on their career jobs (table 5.7) or took new part-time (table 5.8) or new
full-time (table 5.9) jobs. 17 In table 5.10, the data are aggregated across
demographic groups and transition types.
Several important points emerge. The main one is that these transi
tional jobs do last sufficiently long to be of interest. Nearly three-quarters
of those respondents who left their full-time career jobs for something
else were still on that transitional job a year later, and nearly 60 per
cent remained after two years (table 5.10). Some had quickly moved
on to a second transition job—11 percent after one year and 17 percent
after two years. The remainder had left the labor market altogether.
For the 18 percent of the sample who stopped working within a year
after starting the transitional job, this job may have been a mistakesomething that looked better than it turned out to be. Another 7 percent
left during the second year. But the other three-quarters of those careerjob-leavers who continued to work had at least another two years of
labor market activity ahead of them.
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Table 5.9
Tenure of Full-Time Status on New Job
(horizontal percentage)
Group

Status 1 and 2 years after transition

Tenure

Part time on
another
new job

Full time on
another
new job

Out of
labor force

Part time on
the new job

Still full time
on the new job

Wage and salary men (N=203)a
after 1 year
after 2 years

5
7

11
16

26
33

0
0

57
44

Self-employed men (N=34)a
after 1 year
after 2 years

9
12

9
9

6
15

0
0

76
65

Wage and salary women (N=30)a
after 1 year
after 2 years

7
10

3
7

20
30

0
0

70
53

6
8

10
14

23
30

0
0

61
48

Total (N=267)
after 1 year
after 2 years
SOURCE: Retirement History Study,
a. See chapter 5, footnote 17.
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Table 5.10
Tenure of First Transitional Job,
Status 1 and 2 Years After Transition
Tenure
(N=743)

On another
job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

Still on
transitional job
(%)

11
17

18
25

72
57

After 1 year
After 2 years
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.

The disaggregated tables reveal some interesting detail. For those who
became part time on their career jobs, that was usually the end of the
line (table 5.7). Some (16 percent) returned to full-time status on that
same job (primarily the self-employed) and others (20 percent) left the
labor market, but very few (4 percent) went on to a new job within
the next two years.
In contrast, many of those who moved from a career job to a new
part-time or full-time job (tables 5.8 and 5.9) continued to experiment.
Within two years, nearly a quarter of those respondents had moved on
to another postcareer job. The part-timers tended to stay part time, and
the full-timers, full time. The latter were slightly more likely to leave
the labor force within two years of starting the transitional job.

Unretirements
Most of the people who made labor market transitions late in life did
so soon after leaving their career jobs. But there is a small minority
who spent a significant amount of time out of the labor force, and then
reconsidered and reentered. Table 5.11 suggests that about 10 percent
of those out for at least two years "unretired." These estimates pro
vide a lower boundary for the phenomenon, because some additional
people may have reentered, but after they had ceased contact with the
RHS. 18
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Table 5.11
Unretirements—Labor Market Reentries
After At Least Two Years Out
Group
Time period

Part time
on new job

Full time
on new job

Stayed out of
labor force

Wage and salary men (N=l,125)
after 2-3 years
after 3-4 years
after 4 or more years

26
20
20

17
8
14

Total

66(6%)

39(3%)

1,020(91%)

Self-employed men (N = 126)
after 2-3 years
after 3-4 years
after 4 or more years

5
2
2

0
1
1

Total

9(7%)

2(1%)

115(91%)

Wage and salary women (N=286)
after 2-3 years
after 3-4 years
after 4 or more years
Total

6
6
8
20(7%)

1
2
1
4(1%)

262(92%)

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.

The likelihood of a late reentry was about the same for wage and
salary men, self-employed men, and wage and salary women. For all
the groups, unretirees were much more likely to return to part-time rather
than to full-time employment.
Summary
Most of the research by economists on retirement patterns in the United
States has viewed the individual's decision as either a dichotomous choice
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between work and leisure or as a choice of hours of labor supply along
a continuous budget constraint. Recent work suggests that both of these
modes of modeling assumptions can be misleading. In fact, older workers
take a variety of routes between full-time work and full-time retirement.
The paths are so varied that the phrase "retirement' '—defined by dozens
of authors in dozens of different ways—may well conceal more than
it reveals. What we are observing and describing are labor market tran
sitions, and they are not easily categorized by a single term.
Using data from the Social Security Administration's Retirement
History Study, we have analyzed the exit patterns of a large sample
of men and women who were aged 58 through 63 and still employed
on a career job in 1969. Career employment was defined as full-time
work on a job of at least 10 years' duration. We found that the vast
majority of these older workers (about 80 percent of the wage and salary
workers and 60 percent of the self-employed) were observed leaving
full-time career employment over the next decade. Of the remainder,
most either died (9 percent) or disappeared prematurely from the sam
ple (11 percent) while still fully employed. Only a very few (4 percent,
and predominantly the self-employed) stayed fully employed on a career
job through 1979.
The focus of this chapter is on the patterns of disengagement from
career jobs. In most of the tables, we required at least four years of
good data (two more waves of questionnaire information) after the in
itial transition. This left us with a sample of about 2,000 individuals
for study.
The primary finding is that a sizable minority of these older Americans
utilized a nontraditional route to leave the labor force. Although the
abrupt change from full-time work to complete withdrawal was still the
most frequent transition, over a quarter of the wage and salary workers
in the sample did something different. I9 Approximately 10 percent of
the men moved to part-time work on another job, and a similar propor
tion took a new full-time position. Relatively few (only 5 percent) were
able to reduce hours to part-time status on their career jobs. 20
The self-employed behaved very differently. Only half withdrew com
pletely from the labor force and of those who did not, a transition to
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part-time work on the same career job was by far the most likely
occurrence.
There were interesting differences by age at departure from full-time
work on the career job. Through age 65, part-time positions (new and
on the career job) became more likely the older the worker, while new
full-time positions became less so. Nontraditional exit routes (particularly
part-time on the career job) were the most likely for the few individuals
who stayed on their career jobs until after age 65.
Most of the transitions occurred very soon after departure from the
career job—usually within a year. Nonetheless, a significant minority
(about 10 percent) waited at least two years before returning to work,
and some even longer. These "unretirements" may have been planned
all along, or may have been responses to unforeseen changes in
circumstances.
These transitional jobs were of sufficient duration to represent an im
portant part of the retirement process. Nearly three-quarters of the jobs
lasted more than one year, and almost 60 percent lasted at least two
years. Part-time positions on the career job lasted the longest, follow
ed by part-time work on another job, and then by new full-time work.
But even half of the new full-time jobs lasted two years or more. These
intermediate jobs were most likely to end with complete labor force
withdrawal, although some individuals experimented with more than
one transitional position.
In summary, something is happening. Part-time and full-time work
on a new job is a serious alternative to continued work on the career
job and to complete labor force withdrawal. These findings suggest that
a substantial number of older Americans are willing and able to con
tinue working despite the financial disincentives that often penalize the
decision to do so.

NOTES
1. Over 99 percent of those who described themselves as not retired were in the labor force (Quinn
1981). Almost 90 percent of the completely retired were out of the labor force. Among the selfdefined partly retired, seven-eights of the self-employed and three-quarters of the wage and salary
workers were in the labor force. Some of those not in the labor force may have been part-year
workers who happened not to be working at the time of the survey.
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2. As we will see below, self-employment status is not exogenous, since many workers switch
to self-employment status late in life. Quinn (1980) found that about 12 percent of the self-employed
had become so within the previous 10 years. In the research we report below, we are only analyz
ing workers still employed full time on career jobs—jobs held for at least 10 years.
3. The primary advantage of this definition (fully retired, partly retired, or not retired) is its simplici
ty. It eliminates the need for arbitrary distinctions based on labor supply or earnings. Its disad
vantage is that in a small number of cases it does not correspond well to more objective measures.
For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) redefine as fully retired a few individuals who
called themselves partially retired, despite having held no job for two years or more.
4. Gustman and Steinmeier (198Sa) reported a significant wage drop for individuals who reported
themselves as not retired in one RHS wave, and partially retired two years later. The wage decrease
was observed for those partially retired on the same job and those partially retired on a new job.
More people were in the latter category, and the wage drops were larger for those who had changed
jobs.
5. This may underestimate the extent of minimum-hours constraints. Some of those who said they
could have worked less may have been working overtime and referring to a reduction to full time.
They may have faced a minimum-hours constraint below that. When the sample was limited to
only those working 42 hours or fewer per week, 61 percent said they could not work less (Gustman
and Steinmeier 1983).
6. In some early empirical work, Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a) estimated reduced-form equa
tions to explain individuals' choices to be retired, not retired, partially retired on their main jobs,
or partially retired on a new job. They then showed the importance of the definition by which
partially retired people would be assigned to a dichotomous retirement status. The magnitude—
and often the direction—of the effect on the probability of retirement of the main job wage rate,
the presence of mandatory retirement, marital status, and health condition changed depending
on whether those in the partially retired categories were counted as retired or not retired.
7. In each of the four waves of the RHS, each respondent was categorized as working full time
(f), working part time (p), fully retired (r) or status indeterminate (x). With four years and four
states, there are 256 potential patterns. In the full RHS sample, 49 percent of the observations
moved directly from full-time work to full retirement, and remained there. Another 9 percent
were fully retired in all four waves. Of the remaining, many had patterns involving partial retire
ment, the most common of which were Jffp, ffpp, ffpr, fprr and fppp (Gustman and Steinmeier
1986a).
8. Two full-time wage equations were computed, one for jobs started before age 55 and another
for jobs started after 55. The former was based on a sample drawn from the Panel Study on In
come Dynamics, the latter on an RHS sample. People were assumed to stay on their full-time
jobs until mandatory retirement age. After that age, where applicable, the full-time wage was
based on the full-time wage equation, with the variable "tenure on the job" set to zero. All of
the wage equations are shown in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a).
9. Annual pension benefit amounts were obtained from the RHS, and actuarial adjustments for
delayed retirement were based on industrywide averages. Benefits were assumed to be frozen
in nominal terms after retirement. The Social Security adjustments were based on Social Security
rules and the earnings records appended to the RHS. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a) for
additional details.
10. As noted above, the authors assumed that the incentives in pension plans would not change
in response to the 1983 Social Security reforms. If the age of normal retirement in pensions were
increased to age 67 as well, the changes at ages 65 and 66 would be augmented. On the other
hand, if pension incentives were altered to offset the Social Security changes, then the simula
tions presented here would be overestimates.
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11. In a related article, Honig (1985) reported very similar results for the nonmarried women
in the RHS sample.
12. In a series of very interesting papers on the transition from work to retirement, Chris Ruhm
(1988, 1989 and 1990) defined the career job as the longest job held, regardless of when the respon
dent left it. With this definition, he finds even more transitional behavior (bridge jobs, in his ter
minology) than we do.
13. The initial RHS sample included as respondents men and nonmarried women. Married women
were excluded because it was thought that their retirement would be defined largely in terms of
their husbands' behavior, and therefore that there was less to be learned from them than from
a larger sample of the included categories. For this reason, there are no married women in our
sample.
14. In this analysis, we are implicitly treating the RHS as a four-year longitudinal survey, but
one that starts for each respondent not at a particular calendar date, but rather at the moment
of departure from the career job. We include only those respondents on whom we have data over
this subsequent four-year period.
15. Our definition of a career job requires full-time employment, meaning over 35 hours per week.
Many of the respondents were very near 35 hours. We did not want to overstate the number of
job transitions by including those with small decreases, to just under 35 hours per week. Therefore,
for the purposes of this transition, movement to part time required a decrease to below 20 hours
per week. This probably understates the number of transitions, by excluding from the count some
workers who would have described themselves as moving from full to part time.
16. In this case, detailed questions on the timing of the move were not asked. We assumed that
all these transitions occurred within the first six months.
17. For these samples, we required only two years of data after the respondent left the career
job. If we knew that a respondent made a transition at any time within four years of leaving the
career job, then that respondent was included in this sample. Therefore, the sample sizes are slightly
larger here than in earlier tables.
18. For the individuals in table 5.10, we have a minimum of four years of good data after their
departure from the career job. For many, we have more than four years. But some may have
reentered after four years, but after the RHS had ceased (1979) or lost track of them.
19. With the career job defined as the longest job held, Ruhm (1988) concludes that the majority
of individuals leave their career jobs well before retirement, and utilize a transitional job-stopping
process before leaving the labor force. The qualitative nature of his results is consistent with ours.
The quantitative differences stem from the fact that we consider any full-time job lasting at least
10 years to be a career job, whereas Ruhm would define it a bridge job if the individual had
held a longer job earlier. We think that job transitions by middle-aged people (for
example, those in their 40s and younger, when nearly a quarter of Ruhm's sample leave their
"career" jobs) are not really part of the retirement transition.
20. Ruhm's (1988) results are perfectly consistent with ours on this point. He found that only
6 percent of his RHS sample partially retired on their career jobs.

- 6 Correlates of
Career Job Transitions
Nontraditional routes to retirement are important in America. As the
nation ages and the relative supply of younger workers diminishes, the
labor supply decisions of the elderly will become more and more im
portant. Over the past decade, Congress has moved in several impor
tant ways to encourage work at older ages. The 1983 amendments to
the Social Security Act will slowly reduce work disincentives after age
65. Legislation concerning labor-management contracts has also been
modified. Congress first raised the minimum age at which firms could
force mandatory retirement from 65 to 70, and then, for most workers,
outlawed mandatory retirement at any age. In addition, 1986 amend
ments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act require that
employees who work beyond a pension plan's normal retirement age
receive credit in the plan's benefit formula. This was intended to reduce
negative pension accruals and therefore reduce the disincentives to work
in later years.
Employers can also choose on their own to alter private pension in
centives and other personnel policies in order to entice older workers
to remain on the job. One attractive mechanism may be the introduc
tion of more flexible hours alternatives, to make the options faced by
wage and salary workers more like those already enjoyed by the selfemployed. Another would be to reduce even further the loss in pension
wealth that generally accompanies work at older ages.
Before proposing further changes, however, it is important to under
stand the rich diversity of withdrawals from career jobs that are possi
ble and the circumstances under which current choices are being made.
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As we have seen, many older Americans are already choosing to leave
the labor force in stages, by moving from full-time career employment
to part-time work or to a transitional new job. Others leave the labor
force entirely and then return later.
In this chapter, we first describe some of the correlates of these dif
ferent patterns. How did the choices vary with the health or education
of the individual? Did they differ by industry and occupation or by the
financial circumstances facing the worker? Did the decisions depend
on why the person left the career job? We then turn to a comparison
of the old and new jobs of those who actually changed employment.
Did these workers continue to do what they had done before, or were
they embarking on new and different careers?
Correlates of Transitions
Health
A major determinant of the well-being of the elderly is health. Health
status, defined in many ways, both subjectively and objectively, has
always played a central role in the retirement literature (see chapter
3). Its dominance has diminished somewhat during the past several
decades, as researchers have begun to concentrate on the financial in
centives surrounding the retirement decision, but no one would deny
that it is still a major factor. In a very recent study using all 10 years
of the Retirement History Study, for example, Gary Burtless (1987)
found that a self-defined health variable is a very significant and im
portant determinant of employment status. He estimates that "at age
62 the average probability of working full-time for a man in good health
is 82 percent. For a man with a health limitation the probability is only
63 percent, or nearly a quarter less." 1
The sample we are studying includes only individuals who were
employed full time on career jobs in 1969. Therefore, much of the
population with serious health impairments is excluded from our group
because most of them had already left the labor market before the start
of the survey. Within our sample, however, there is still a range of health
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conditions and, given the longitudinal nature of the data set, we are
able to observe subsequent changes in the health of those who started
out in good shape.
The health variable used here is subjective—the respondents' selfdescription of their health relative to that of their peers. 2 We measure
health in the survey prior to the individual's departure from the career
job—in different years and at different ages, therefore, for different
members of the sample.
As seen in table 6.1, only about 10 percent of these individuals claimed
health worse than that of their peers. We are studying a relatively healthy
cross section of the older population. Although the behavioral differences
were modest, men with poorer health were the most likely to withdraw
completely from the labor force. Those in better health were more likely
to remain on the career job part time or move to a new job. This was
particularly true of the self-employed, for whom the differences were
more dramatic. The patterns were less clear among the women, perhaps
due to the very small number (32) of these women in "worse" health.

Education
The patterns by level of education were not clear (table 6.2). Among
the largest group, the wage and salary men, the likelihood of a nontraditional route seemed to increase with educational attainment above
"some high school," and it was substantially higher for those with a
college degree. But this generalization did not hold for the other groups.
For the self-employed men (over half of whom had no formal high school
education, and many of whom were farmers), there was no pattern,
and among the women (with the highest average education), nontraditional paths decreased with years in school.

Pension and Mandatory Retirement Status
Current pension status appears to have played an important role in
the retirement decision. 3 According to table 6.3, those eligible to receive
a pension at the time they left their career jobs were much more likely

Table 6.1
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Health Prior to Exit
(horizontal percentage)

Group
Health status8
Wage and salary men
Better
Same
Worse
Self-employed men
Better
Same
Worse
Wage and salary women
Better
Same
Worse

£
n
I
£

Type of transition

<V3

Part time on
career job

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

Totalb

4
5
3

10
11
8

13
12
9

73
72
79

526 (38%)
724 (52%)
149 (11%)

29
23
24

18
11
9

15
13
9

37
54
58

65 (28%)
133 (58%)
33 (14%)

8
11
9

10
8
19

10
5
3

72
76
69

159 (44%)
173 (48%)
32 ( 9%)

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Self-defined health status, relative to peers, in the interview prior to exit from the career job.
b. Sample with good health data.
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Table 6.2
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Level of Education
(horizontal percentage)

Type of transition

Group
Educational attainment
Wage and salary men
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16+ years
Self-employed men
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16-1- years
Wage and salary women
0-8 years
9-11 years
12-15 years
16+ years
SOURCE: Retirement History Study,
a. Sample with good education data.

Part time on
career job
(%)

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

5
2
4
7

11
8
11
11

10
11
14
18

74
79
71
64

Total8

576
298
432
123

(40%)
(21%)
(30%)
( 9%)

26
19
27
29

13
14
10
18

12
19
14
6

49
48
49
45

120
42
59
17

(50%)
(18%)
(25%)
( 7%)

12
12
9
6

10
8
11
8

4
10
8
8

75
71
72
78

113
52
151
49

(31%)
(14%)
(41%)
(13%)

n
I
I
n
B?

H
3

1

a
o

Table 6.3
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Age and Pension Status
(horizontal percentage)
Group
Age at exit
Pension status8
Wage and salary men
58-61
Not eligible
Eligible
62 +
Not eligible
Eligible
Total
Not eligible
Eligible
Wage and salary women
58-61
Not eligible
Eligible
62 +
Not eligible
Eligible
Total
Not eligible
Eligible

Part time on
career job

Part time on
new job

Type of transition
Full time on
new job

Out of
labor force

Totalb

o
•-h

n

6
0

7
9

38
15

50
76

120
201

12
2

14
9

15
6

58
83

369
726

11
1

12
9

20
8

56
82

489
927

0
3

13
5

23
14

63
78

30
37

25
1

11
8

8
2

55
90

130
166

21
1

11
7

11

57
88

160
203

4

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Pension eligibility refers to eligibility for a pension on the career job when the individual left the career job.
b. Sample with good pension eligibility data.

a.
o
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to withdraw completely from the labor force. Over 80 percent of the
eligible men did, compared to only 56 percent of those not eligible. 4
The difference was even higher for women (88 versus 57 percent). Much
of the difference stems from the fact that those eligible were much less
likely to stay part time on the career job. The reason for this is clear—
unlike Social Security, most pensions require one to leave the job in
order to draw benefits. In addition, if benefits are based on the last several
years' earnings, a move to part time could lead to a substantial reduc
tion in pension wealth. But the probability of taking a new job (especially
full time) was also diminished by pension eligibility on the career job,
suggesting that a key motivation for the transitional jobs may be the
earnings they provide.
When the sample is further disaggregated by age (with age 62, the
earliest age of Social Security eligibility, as the cutoff), the same pat
terns are observed, although the younger workers were always more
likely to continue working. This was particularly true for new full-time
employment. Nearly 40 percent of the younger (aged 58 to 61) men
and nearly a quarter of the younger women who were ineligible for
a pension started a new full-time job. This was true for only 15 percent
of the men and less than 10 percent of the women aged 62 and older.
Pension eligibility and mandatory retirement frequently came handin-hand prior to the 1983 legislation that virtually outlawed mandatory
retirement before age 70. As seen in table 6.4, both current pension
eligibility and mandatory retirement increased the likelihood of a tradi
tional retirement—directly from full-time career work to complete labor
force withdrawal—among men. Pensions appear to have had the larger
effect, and when they were combined, they were complimentary but
far less than additive. The influence of the two together is dramatic—
the proportion continuing to work after leaving the career job dropped
from nearly one in two to only one in eight when both factors were
in effect. But mandatory retirement only increased the probability of
movement out of the labor force by 6 percentage points once pension
eligibility was already established. This suggests that these two institu
tions may be viewed as alternative means to the same ends, and that
changes in the mandatory retirement laws should have only marginal
effects while the pension incentives remain in effect. 5
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Industry and Occupation
Transition patterns differed dramatically by industry and occupation,
as shown in tables 6.5 and 6.6. Among wage and salary workers, over
half of those in the agricultural and private household industries and
over 40 percent of those in construction and retail trade chose a nontraditional route to retirement. This contrasts the experience of those
in manufacturing, transportation, and public utilities and mining, where
only about one in five did so. When the industries are ranked in ascend
ing order of traditional retirement, as they are in table 6.5, the industries
go loosely from service to manufacturing, and from low to high union
presence. This is interesting in view of recent trends in America toward
a more service-oriented economy—and one in which the proportion of
the work force that is unionized has shrunk—and suggests that nontraditional retirement routes may increase in importance in the future.
Certain figures stand out in table 6.5. Part-time work on the career
job was very rare, except in agriculture and private household work
(both of which are small industries) and in finance, insurance, and real
estate. In the latter, employees are often paid on commission, so firms
are less interested in imposing hours constraints. Among women, parttime work on career jobs was more common, especially in private
household work and retail trade.
In several industries, movement to a new job was very common. About
a third of the men in construction, retail trade, and public administra
tion did so. For some reason, it was much less common among the
women in these same industries.
The distribution by occupation tells a similar tale. Nontraditional retire
ment patterns were more likely among white-collar than among bluecollar workers. About a third of managers, sales, and service workers
did not leave the labor force in one move. Laborers, craftsmen, and
foremen were much more likely to do so.
Gary Burtless (1987) has pointed out that the relationship between
industry and occupation and labor force status may have an intermediate
factor—health. It may be that certain jobs cause bad health, and that this,

Table 6.5
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Industry
(horizontal percentage)

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force

Totalb

19
14
5
8
3
13
7
5
3
1
3
7

24
14
7
15
12
8
10
14
11
11
7
7

14
29
30
17
17
10
12
8
13
8
10
4

43
43
58
60
69
69
71
73
74
80
80
82

21
14
97
84
108
83
120
37
238
403
213
28

5

10

12

73

1,446

Part time on
career job

Wage and salary men
Private household
Agriculture
Construction
Retail trade
Public administration
Finance, insurance & real estate
Other service
Wholesale trade
Manufacturing-nondurable
Manufacturing-durable
Transportation & public utilities
Mining
Total

II

Type of transition

Group
Industry8

n
o

o
o
CP

a.
o

Wage and salary women
Private household
Retail trade
Public administration
Finance, insurance & real estate
Other service
Manufacturing-nondurable
Manufacturing-durable
Transportation & public utilities
Other
Total

37
16
0
6
5
10
0
0
c

4
9
0
10
13
8
5
15
c

11
2
5
13
8
5
8
0
c

10

10

7

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. In ascending order of "out of the labor force" for wage and salary men.
b. Sample with good industry data.
c. Cells with sample sizes smaller than 10.

48
73
95
71
73
77
87
85
c
74

27
45
20
31
119
60
39
13
14
368

n
8H
3

Table 6.6
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Occupation
(horizontal percentage)

Part time on
career job

Wage and salary men
23
Farm labor & managers
9
Sales workers
6
Managers
6
Service workers
4
Professional & technical
3
Clerical workers
Transportation equipment operators 6
4
Craftsmen & foremen
7
Nonfarm laborers
1
Operatives
c
Private household workers
Total

2.

Type of transition

Group
Occupation8

o
o

Part time on
new job

Full time on
new job

Out of
labor force

Totalb

15
12
14
13
12
12
13
8
6
10
c

23
23
14
15
12
12
8
13
9
9
c

38
56
66
66
72
12
73
75
78
81
c

13
43
200
93
139
97
62
439
102
252
3

10

12

73

1,443

B
s,

o

§•

Wage and salary women
Sales workers
Managers
Service workers
Professional & technical
Clerical workers
Operatives
Private household workers
Other
Total

24
14
10
4
7
7
47
c

6
0
17
8
13
7
7
c

0
19
5
8
6
4
7
c

71
67
68
79
74
82
40
c

17
21
41
73
116
72
15
11

10

10

7

74

366
O

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. In ascending order of "out of the labor force" for wage and salary men.
b. Sample with good occupation data.
c. Cells with sample sizes smaller than 10.
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not the job per se, is responsible for the difference in retirement pat
terns. He tested this hypothesis and found that there are, in fact, signifi
cant correlations between industry and occupation and current health,
and that the differences can be extreme. 6 Nonetheless, even though health
is an important determinant, he found that the impact of industry and
occupation remained strong in a multivariate framework. There was
an independent influence over and above the indirect effect through
health.
Olivia Mitchell, Phillip Levine, and Silvana Pozzebon (1988) have
also found important occupational and industrial differences in retire
ment patterns. They suggest that part of this may be due to differences
in job risk (those on the riskier jobs retire earlier) or age/productivity
profiles.

Wage Rate, Earnings, and Wealth
In table 6.7, we disaggregate our three samples by the wage rates
that the respondents were earning prior to the job transition. An in
teresting, nonlinear pattern emerges among the male wage and salary
workers. Those at the ends of the wage spectrum were the most likely
to continue working when they ended full-time employment on a career
job. For example, nearly 40 percent of the men earning less than $7.50
per hour (the bottom quintile) and 30 percent of those earning more
than $20 per hour (the top 7 percent) stayed in the labor force after
this transition. In contrast, only about 20 percent of those earning be
tween $7.50 and $20 per hour did so. The same pattern appears at the
bottom end of the women's distribution—low-wage women were the
most likely to continue working. Since only 5 percent of the women
earned more than $15 per hour, it is difficult to draw conclusions here.
For the smaller number of self-employed men, no pattern appears.
Data on annual earnings on the career job prior to the transition tell
a similar story (table 6.8). Among the wage and salary men, the prob
ability of complete labor force withdrawal increases through the $20,000
to $30,000 category and then falls, although the decrease at the top is
smaller than in the wage rate data. The data for women are similar,
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although the smaller sample sizes, especially at the top, reduce our con
fidence in the results.
In table 6.9, we disaggregate by the level of traditionally defined wealth
in the survey year prior to departure from a career job. This wealth
includes financial assets and real estate, including the home. It excludes
human capital, durables, and the asset value of retirement income rights.
The figures are adjusted for inflation and are all expressed in 1971
dollars.
A similar pattern emerges, although it is not as distinct as it was in
the wage data. Those most likely to move directly out of the labor force
were those in the middle wealth categories. The very poor (including
those in debt) and the very wealthy were the most likely to utilize in
termediate stages.
These findings suggest that nontraditional exit routes may be popular
among two very distinct groups—those at the bottom and those at the
top of the socioeconomic scale. The motivations may be very different.
The poor may have no choice but to continue working because they
have so few assets to spend during retirement. The rich, on the other
hand, may choose postcareer work even when there is no financial need,
either because their commitment to work is greater or because the jobs
they can choose are more enjoyable or amenable to part-time work.
In addition, there may be a cause in common among members of these
diverse groups. It may be that the relative scarcity of defined-pension
benefit plans among very low- and very high-wage workers means that
there is relatively little change in their true wage rates if they work parttime on their career jobs. Note that those earning less than $5 per hour
are the only wage and salary group more likely to work part time on
a career job than part time on a new job (table 6.7). The same is true
for those in the highest wealth category (table 6.9). While low-wage
workers are unlikely to have employer pensions of any kind, the wealthy
may have pensions related to profits or stock prices rather than tradi
tionally determined pension benefits. Although this evidence is far from
conclusive, it is consistent with the hypothesis that subtle changes in
compensation late in life affect labor supply decisions.

Table 6.7
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Wage Rate before Exit
(horizontal percentage)

Type of transition

Group
Wage rate8
Wage and salary men
Less than $5/hour
$5-7.50/hour
$7.50-10/hour
$10-15/hour
$15-20/hour
More than $20/hour
Total
Self-employed men
Less than $5/hour
$5-7.50/hour
$7.50-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Total

Part time on
career job
(%)

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

Total5

18
7
2
3
2
5

13
11
9
11
6
9

14
15
8
9
15
15

55
67
81
77
77
70

77
187
351
537
125
91

4

10

11

75

1,368

15
33
25
25
21
22

10
16
30
4
5
12

15
12
0
4
11
11

60
40
45
67
63
55

92
43
20
24
19
198
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Table 6.8
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Annual Earnings before Exit
(horizontal percentage)

K>

O

o
O

Type of transition

Group
Annual earnings8

Part time on
career job
(%)

Part time on
new job
(%)

Full time on
new job
(%)

Out of
labor force
(%)

Totalb

Wage and salary men
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-40K
$40-50K
More than $50K

22
4
2
4
4
4

20
8
10
11
6
11

14
11
10
10
19
16

44
77
78
75
72
70

64
501
548
157
54
57

4

10

11

75

1,381

16
24
28
14
18
21

15
13
9
0
18
12

12
16
6
0
9
11

57
47
56
86
55
56

75
62
32
14
11
194

Total
Self-employed men
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-50K
More than $50K
Total

o.

§

Wage and salary women
Less than $10K
$10-20K
$20-30K
$30-40K
More than $40K
Total
SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Earnings in 1984 dollars.
b. Sample with good annual earnings data.

18
7
2
13
13

10
10
7
7
0

7
8
2
0
13

65
76
90
80
75

71
196
59
15
8

9

9

7

75

349

n
o
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Reasons for Exit from the Career Job
The Retirement History Study asked those who left a job why they
did so. (The question was not asked of those who became part-timers
on the same job.) The answers appear in table 6.10, listed in order of
frequency of response by the largest subsample, wage and salary men.
The most popular answer was retirement benefits—precisely the answer
that was almost never mentioned in the old days of retirement research,
as we saw in chapter 2. Thirteen percent of those mentioning benefits
took a new part-time job, and only 7 percent a new full-time job. This
is consistent with workers being sensitive to Social Security benefit reduc
tions after an exempt amount is earned.
Among the wage and salary men who claimed that they left the job
because of age or health or simply because they wanted to, only 16
percent remained in the labor market. But among those who were laid
off (only 4 percent of the sample) or left for "other" reasons (another
11 percent), more than half continued to work, primarily by embark
ing on new full-time jobs. Here is where many of the interesting tran
sitions occur. It is unfortunate that the reasons are unknown for most
of these workers.
A Comparison of New and Old Jobs
About one-quarter of the men and women in our sample who left career
jobs took other jobs within four years of the exit. Most did so very soon
after the departure. In this section, we compare the old and the new
jobs to see whether people were primarily continuing old careers with
new employers, or beginning new lines of work.

Class of Worker
Table 6.11 documents some transitions that have been discussed by
Fuchs (1982). About 10 percent of the wage and salary men who switch
ed jobs became self-employed. The percentage was about the same
among those coming from the private sector and those from govern
ment. The percentages were smaller for women. What is surprising is
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Table 6.10
Exit Patterns from Career Jobs by Reason for Exit
(horizontal percentage)
Type of transition

Group
Reason
Wage and salary men
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Laid off
New job
Other
Total
Self-employed men
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Other
Total
Wage and salary women
Retirement benefits
Age
Health
Wanted to stop
Laid off
Other
Total

Out of
Part-time Full-time
on new job on new job labor force
(%)
(%)
(%)
13
11
8
8
9
13
12
11

7
6
8
8
40
87
40
13

80
83
84
84
52
0
48

19
9
11
22
25
17
13
10
8
5
13
16
11

SOURCE: Retirement History Study,
a. Sample who left their career jobs.

Total8

76

429
325
252
150
58
16
151
1,381

( 31%)
( 24%)
( 18%)
( 11%)
( 4%)
( 1%)
( 11%)
(100%)

0
9
12
0
36
17

81
83
87
78
39
66

16
23
65
18
59
181

( 9%)
( 13%)
( 36%)
( 10%)
( 33%)
(100%)

2
3
4
5
27
30
8

85
86
89
90
60
53
81

95
86
53
41
15
43
333

( 29%)
( 26%)
( 16%)
( 12%)
( 5%)
( 13%)
(100%)
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Table 6.11
Class of Career and New Jobs by Sex for Those Who Changed Jobs
(vertical percentage)
Sex
Class of new job
Men
Private sector
Government sector
Self-employed
Total
Women
Private sector

Government sector
Self-employed
Total

Private
sector

Class of career job
Government
Selfsector
employed

87%
3%
9%
261
(67%)

66
(17%)

69%
16%
15%
62
(16%)

82%
14%
4%

a
a
a

a
a
a

51
84%

10
16%

0

71%
18%
11%

0%

Total
318 ( 82%)
31 ( 8%)
40 ( 10%)
389
(100%)
50 ( 82%)
8 ( 13%)

3 ( 5%)
61
(100%)

SOURCE: Retirement History Study,
a. Cells with sample sizes less than 10.

that 85 percent of the former self-employed who switched jobs became
salaried workers, most in the private sector. The net result, in this sample
at least, was a net decrease in the number of self-employed, contrary
to what those who studied just wage and salary workers have found.
Of course, these figures exclude those who became part-timers on the
career job. This is only a small proportion of the wage and salary men
and women (5 and 10 percent, respectively), but a significant fraction
of the self-employed (25 percent).
Occupation and Industry
Table 6.12 suggests that there are a lot of changes underway. About
60 percent of the men who switched jobs changed occupations and an
equal number changed industries, defined by one-digit categories. 7 Wage
and salary workers were more likely to change industry and occupa-
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tion if they were undertaking a new part-time (as opposed to full-time)
job. The self-employed, on the other hand, were more likely to change
with a new full-time job. Women were slightly more stable, and only
half of them moved to a new occupation or industry.
Table 6.12
Occupation and Industry8 Change for Those Who Changed Jobs
(vertical percentage)
Group
Status
Wage and salary men
Same occupation
Different occupation
Same industry
Different industry
Sample size
Self-employed men
Same occupation
Different occupation
Same industry
Different industry

Type of transition
Part time
on new job

Full time
on new job

Totalb

36%
64%
30%
70%

48%
52%
48%
52%

42%
58%
40%
60%

151

176

327

29%
71%
42%
58%

16%
84%

23%
77%

29%
71%

35%
65%

Sample size
Wage and salary women
Same occupation
Different occupation

31

31

62

47%
53%

58%
42%

52%
48%

Same industry
Different industry

47%
53%

65%
35%

55%
45%

36

26

62

Sample size

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. One-digit Census industry and occupation codes.
b. Sample with good industry and occupation data on career and new jobs.
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When we ranked jobs by white-collar and blue-collar status and by
skill level (table 6.13), we observed job-changers moving toward bluecollar and toward less-skilled categories. 8 Fewer than half of the men
in skilled white-collar career positions remained there. 9 About a quarter
moved into sales and clerical jobs, and another quarter became bluecollar workers. Nearly all (92 percent) of those originally in less-skilled
white-collar positions either remained there or moved to blue-collar
employment. And almost none of the blue-collar workers moved up
into white-collar jobs. A third of those in blue-collar skilled work dropped
to less-skilled categories, and 70 percent of those in the bottom category
remained there. Fewer than 10 percent of them became white-collar
workers in the new job.
When we analyzed specific occupational categories, we found that
the largest net outflow occurred in manufacturing. Of the men originally
in durable and nondurable manufacturing, only about a third stayed there
on their next job. Seventeen percent moved into trade, 16 percent into
finance, insurance, and real estate, and nearly 20 percent went into other
services. Other large percentage net outflows were found in transpor
tation and public utilities and in public administration. The largest net
gainers were finance, insurance and real estate, and other services.
Wage Rates
In table 6.14, we compare the wage rates before and after the job
transition. Using four categories of hourly pay, we observed declines
for both male and female wage and salary workers. For men, the pro
portion of earnings less than $5 per hour rose from 10 to nearly 40
percent; for women, from less than 30 to more than 50 percent. Although
most workers did stay in the same category, those who moved were
much more likely to slide down than to climb up. 10
We then disaggregated further by the type of the transition, for male
wage and salary workers only (table 6.15). The wage changes were
the smallest for the small minority who moved to part-time status on
their career jobs. This is as expected, since the specific human capital
acquired on the job remains applicable. For those who began a new
job, especially a part-time one, the wage losses were often severe. 11

Table 6.13
Occupational Change
Wage and Salary Men Who Changed Jobs
(vertical percentage)

Career job
New job
White-collar skilled
White-collar other
Blue-collar skilled
Blue-collar other
Total

White-collar
skilled8

White-collar
other

Blue-collar
skilled

Blue-collar
other

47%
28%
13%
11%

8%
44%
13%
36%

7%
9%
50%
33%

0%
9%
20%
70%

89
(27%)

39
(12%)

152
(47%)

45
(14%)

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. See chapter 6, footnote 7 for definitions.
b. Sample with good occupation data on career and new jobs.

Total5
55
60
103
107

(17%)
(18%)
(32%)
(33%)

n

o

o
>-*>

n

3
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Only about one in 10 of those who moved to new part-time employ
ment was earning less than $5 per hour before the move; over half of
them were afterwards. The decreases were significant but less severe
for new full-time work.
In table 6.16, we show the actual wage rate losses, in dollars per
hour, by type of transition. We have aggregated small wage rate changes
(less than $2.50 per hour) into a central category and looked at gains
and losses larger than that. Over 40 percent of the wage and salary men
who remained on the same job, but reduced their hours to part-time
status, continued to earn approximately the same wage. Of those who
did not, more enjoyed an increase than suffered a loss.
This was very different from the experience of those who found new
employment. Of the new part-timers, two-thirds lost more than $2.50
per hour and 45 percent lost at least $5 per hour in the transition. Only
one in 10 found work at a higher hourly wage. For new full-time
workers, nearly half approximated their old wage, but among the others
there were many more losers than gainers. These results are entirely
consistent with those of Gustman and Steinmeier (1985a), who reported
wage decreases among RHS respondents who described themselves as
partially retired. The decreases were especially large for those who had
changed jobs.
Earnings and Social Security Thresholds
Some of this loss in earnings may have been intentional. Most workers
aged 62 and over are eligible to receive Social Security benefits. If they
earn less than a threshold amount, they can work and receive the entire
benefit to which they are entitled. After that exempt amount of earn
ings, benefits are reduced by 33 percent (for those aged 65-69) or 50
percent (for those aged 62-64) of additional earnings, until the benefits
are reduced to zero. At this point, the individual ceases to be a Social
Security recipient.
In tables 6.17 and 6.18, we compare each individual's earnings with
the threshold for the appropriate year. Before the transition, nearly all
of these respondents were earning well above the threshold. This is not
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Table 6.15
Change in Wage Rate
Wage and Salary Men Who Changed Jobs3 by Type of Transition
(vertical percentage)
Career job wage rateb

Transition
New job wage rateb
Part time on same job
Less than $5/hour
$5-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Totalb
Part time on new job
Less than $5/hour
$5-10/hour
$10-15/hour
More than $15/hour
Totalb

ii

$0-5
per hour

$5-10
per hour

$10-15
per hour

$15 +
per hour

71%
21%
7%
0%
14
(25%)

24%
33%
33%
10%
21
(37%)

14%
43%
14%
29%
14
(25%)

12%
12%
0%
75%
8
(14%)

18 (32%)
17 (30%)
10 (18%)
12(21%)
57

70%
20%
0%
10%
10
( 7%)

57%
35%
4%
4%
51
(38%)

48%
41%
5%
5%
58
(43%)

47%
20%
7%
27%
15
(11%)

71 (53%)
47 (36%)
6( 4%)
10 ( 7%)
134
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Table 6.16
Absolute Change in Wage Rate
Those Who Changed Jobs8
(vertical percentage)
Type of transition

Group
Change hi
wage rate1*
Wage and salary men
-$10/hr. or more
-$5 to -$10/hr.
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr.
+$5 to +$10/hr.
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec
Self-employed men
-$10/hr. or more
-$5 to -$10/hr.
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr.
+$5 to +$10/hr.
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec
Wage and salary women
-$10/hr. or more
-$5 to -$10/hr.
-$2.5 to -$5/hr.
-$2.5 to +$2.5/hr.
+$2.5 to +$5/hr.
+$5 to +$10/hr.
+$10/hr. or more
Sample sizec

Part tune on
career job

18
4
42
11
9
16
57

| 24
3

5
12
37
12
7
21
43

124
3

1
1 36
3

^40
3

6y

6 J 18
6 '
69

Part time on
new job
11
34
23
21
2
4
5
134

1
I 68
3

17
8
46
13
4
8
24

J 29
3

32

11
18
13
46
10
1

1
J 42
3
1
J 12

i 3

151

| 25
3

9
5
50
14
18
0

| 19
3

J 32
3

22

0 ^
28 j 41
13 3
44
\)

0 J 12
9 3

J 11
3

Full tune on
new job

^

3 f 16
13 3
32

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.
a. Including pan time on career job.
b. Wage rate in 1984 dollars.
c. Sample with good data on career and new job wage rates.
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surprising, since our sample included only full-time workers on career
jobs. After the transition from full-time career work, however, many
of the people who moved to part-time employment were earning just
below the amount where the earnings test went into effect. 12 Among
the male, (formerly) wage and salary workers, nearly half of those work
ing part time earned between 50 and 100 percent of the threshold. For
the small number of women, the proportion in this range was even higher
(55 percent), and it was somewhat lower for the self-employed men.
Among those who moved to new full-time work, not surprisingly, nearly
all were above—and most considerably above—the threshold.
If this is due to a Social Security effect, we expect the behavior to
be correlated with age. Those below age 62 suffer no Social Security
loss with continued work; in fact, their Social Security wealth rises
because of the effect of the additional earnings on future benefits. Those
over 65 suffer the most when earning over the threshold, because the
actuarial adjustment for delayed receipt of benefits after age 65 is far
from actuarially fair. The sign and size of the penalty in the 62-to-64
age range are matters of debate, as we discussed earlier. It depends
on whether the adjustment to future benefits is sufficient to compen
sate for the loss of current benefits. The effect on Social Security wealth
of earning more than the earnings-test threshold goes from positive to
ambiguous to negative as we consider those less than age 62, those 62
through 64, and those 65 and over.
Table 6.18 is certainly consistent with the Social Security hypothesis.
The proportion of wage and salary men who earned just under the
threshold (between 0.5 and 1.0) after leaving full-time career employ
ment rises from 9 to 27 to 36 percent as we consider the three age groups.
If we include those earning less than half of the appropriate threshold
(between 0.0 and 0.5), the numbers climb from 16 to 34 and 49 per
cent. Similar patterns exist for the smaller numbers of women and selfemployed men. Of course, this could be just an age effect—older workers
prefer fewer hours and therefore earn less than younger workers. There
is undoubtedly an age effect in these figures, but the dramatic differences
between those under and over 62 and the smaller differences at the age
65 break suggest that there is more than age at work. Many people eligi-
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Table 6.18
Earnings/Social Security Threshold on New Jobs8
by Age at Return
(vertical percentage)

Group
Earnings/SS threshold

Age at exit
58-61

62-64

65 +

Wage and salary men
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0

7
9
4
4
76

7
27
11
8
47

13
36
15
15
22

Sample sizeb

76

130

143

0
8
17
8
67

18
25
8
15
35

32
30
14
16
8

12

40

37

8
23
8
8
54

8
58
8
0
26

17
39
25
11
8

13

38

36

Self-employed men
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0
Sample sizeb
Wage and salary women
0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
More than 2.0
Sample sizeb

SOURCE: Retirement History Study,
a. Including part time on career job.
b. Sample with good data on the earnings/threshold ratio.
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ble for Social Security benefits seem to be designing their work careers
late in life to avoid the high tax rate in the official Social Security earn
ings test.

Job Characteristics
The 1969 wave of the Retirement History Study included the threedigit industry and occupation codes for all the employed recipients. A
cross-classification matrix made it possible to calculate the probability
that an individual fell into each of the approximately 14,000 jobs listed
in the Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Each
of these jobs, in turn, was linked to a set of specific job characteristics.
Therefore, we could calculate the expected values of these characteristics
for each of the three-digit Census categories.
Unfortunately, subsequent waves of the RHS included only the very
broad one-digit categorizations. One can take another set of expected
values and calculate the expected job characteristics for each one-digit
occupation. We have done this and asked how the characteristics on
the career and new jobs compared. 13 But the level of aggregation re
quired to do this makes the conclusions suggestive at best. 14
Table 6.19 is consistent with our other evidence about the career and
the new jobs. The new jobs, for those working both full and part time,
generally required lower levels of specific vocational preparation (SVP)
and general educational development (GED). 15 For example, among
those who moved to new part-time jobs, nearly one-quarter were in
positions requiring fewer than six months training. Only 13 percent had
left jobs like this. At the other end of the spectrum, 27 percent had left
jobs requiring at least four years of vocational preparation, and only
14 percent ended up on such jobs. It is interesting to note that the quality
of the new jobs, measured by SVP or GED, was generally higher among
those with new full-time positions.
This table also suggests the workers had less personal discretion in
carrying out their duties on the new jobs. They were less likely to ex
ercise "direction, planning, and control" or perform a "variety of duties
characterized by frequent change." Conversely, the new employment
was more likely to involve "repetitive or short-cycle operations" or
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Table 6.19
Comparisons of Job Characteristics on Career and New Jobs
Wage and Salary Men
Part time on
new job

Full time on
new job

Job characteristic

Career
job

New
job

Career
job
(%)

New
job
(%)

Direction, planning,
and control
Variety of duties
Repetitiveness
Specific instructions

32
70
41
37

17
64
59
48

30
78
37
33

25
74
44
37

Specific vocational preparation required
0-6 months
13
7-12 months
30
13-48 months
30
48 months +
27

24
38
24
14

9
31
37
23

18
29
35
18

General education development
Levels 1,2
Level 3
Level 4
Levels 5,6,7

23
42
25
10

11
32
47
11

19
29
43
9

SOURCE: Retirement History Study.

required
16
28
45
12
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"doing things only under specific instructions." Because of the extreme
level of aggregation involved in these statistics, it would be unwise to
draw conclusions from these numbers alone. But they are useful as con
firmation of a picture already drawn.

Summary
Nontraditional retirement transitions are common in the United States,
even though abrupt changes from full-time work to complete labor force
withdrawal are still more likely. The patterns of exit we observed were
correlated with individuals' circumstances at the time of the change.
Those in relatively poor health were more likely to drop out complete
ly, as were those eligible for employer pensions or subject to mandatory
retirement. There were interesting differences by industry and occupa
tion, with intermediate stages most likely among workers in the nonu
nion service sectors. There was weak evidence suggesting that nontraditional transitions were more common among those at the ends of the
socioeconomic scale (the poor and the rich) than among those in the
middle, suggesting that the motivations for partial retirement stages may
differ.
When we compared the old and new jobs of those who changed
employment, we found a great deal of industrial and occupational move
ment. When the sample was analyzed by white-collar/blue-collar status
and by skill level (skilled/other), the most common transition involved
remaining in the same general category. But most of the movement that
did exist was down—toward blue-collar and less-skilled positions. Rough
estimates of job characteristics suggested that the new jobs had lower
specific vocational and general educational requirements. They also ap
peared to be jobs on which workers exercised less personal discretion
in performing their duties, and were more likely (than on the career
jobs) to be doing repetitive tasks or working under specific instructions.
Wages showed similar decline; most workers earned less, and often
considerably less, after the transition, especially those who took new
part-time positions. Large flows were noted out of manufacturing and
into finance, insurance and real estate, and other services. These oc-
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cupations, we suspect, allowed more hours flexibility than did the jobs
the individuals had left. And they did so while permitting the individuals
to collect pension benefits, and thus avoid the wealth losses (and im
plicit pay cuts) that would have accompanied continued work on their
career jobs.

NOTES
1. Burtless (1987) acknowledged that the measure of health that he used (the answer to a question
on whether health limited the respondent's capacity for work) is suspect, since some people may
use health as a socially acceptable reason for retirement even when other factors were key. To
diminish the importance of this phenomenon, Burtless also estimated his employment equation
using a predetermined index of health—the answer to the same health question from the previous
questionnaire. The estimated health effect remained strong and statistically significant.
2. See Stem (1989) for some evidence on the usefulness of these subjective health variables.
3. Filer and Petri (1988) have proposed another interpretation of the correlation between pension
eligibility and retirement age. They contend that the causation may not be from pensions to retire
ment, but rather from basic job characteristics to both pensions and retirement. Those in jobs
with intense physical demands, stress, or repetitive working conditions, they hypothesize, plan
to retire early and therefore have employment contracts (i.e., pensions) that anticipate this.
4. The self-employed are excluded from the pension tables, since so few of them had formal pen
sion plans.
5. This is consistent with a much more detailed analysis of the impact of mandatory retirement
and the effect of the 1983 legislation found in Burkhauser and Quinn (1983b).
6. Burtless (1987) found that "a miner aged 62 is 50 percent more likely to suffer a work limita
tion than is the average worker . . . and he is twice as likely . . . than is a worker in a profes
sional industry. Similarly, a worker in a professional occupation is one-third less likely to face
a work limitation than is an average worker . . . and he is 57 percent less likely to be limited
than a laborer."
7. This is very similar to the results reported by Fames and Less (1985b), who used data from
the National Longitudinal Surveys. They reported that almost two-thirds of their postretiremen!
job-changers crossed broadly defined industry lines.
8. Using the 1970 Census occupational codes, we defined our categories as follows:
White-collar skilled:
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
Teachers
Managers and officials (excluding farm)
White-collar, other:
Sales workers
Clerical and kindred workers
Blue-collar skilled:
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
Operatives and kindred workers
Transportation equipment operatives
Farm managers
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Blue-collar, other:
Nonfarm laborers
Private household workers
Service workers
Farm laborers
Omitted:
Members of the armed forces
9. These results are also consistent with those of Parnes and Less (1985b), who found the majori
ty of NLS job-changers moved down the socioeconomic hierarchy.
10. Parnes and Less (198Sb) found that most of the NLS men they studied had lower real wages
on the new job. Ruhm (1990), with a sample from the RHS, reported the same for those who
switched industry or occupation or both.
11. Herz and Rones (1989) reported that hourly wages tend to decline by 30 to 40 percent when
full-time workers become part-time employees.
12. Burtless and Moffitt (1985) and lams (1987) have also reported this clustering around (and
primarily below) the exempt amounts. lams also showed that the earnings of benefit recipients
aged 65 to 71 were consistently higher than the earnings of those aged 62 to 64. The median
earnings for the younger group was $4,391, only $9 less than their (1982) exempt amount of
$4,400. For the older recipients, with $6,000 in exempt earnings, the median earnings were about
$5,500.
13. Holden (1988) has shown that those in physically demanding jobs in the year before they
started receiving Social Security benefits were less likely to continue working in retirement. Since
the analysis here includes only those who did change jobs and continue working, the distribution
of job attributes for this sample will differ from that of the older population as a whole.
14. For the job held in 1969, we had both the one-digit and three-digit job descriptions, and therefore
could calculate expected job characteristics for each person at the detailed or at the highly ag
gregated level. Since the new jobs were at only the one-digit level, we used only the one-digit
information for the career jobs in table 6.19. The conclusions drawn from an analogous table
with the more accurate three-digit descriptions of the 1969 characteristics, however, were very
similar to those drawn above.
15. The specific vocational preparation descriptions refer to the actual number of months of training
time required for the worker to acquire the knowledge and abilities necessary for average perfor
mance on the job. The general education development descriptions, on the other hand, are not
in units of time. Rather, each gradation (1 through 7) is characterized by higher levels of
mathematical and language development. The numbers, however, are merely ordinal.

-7Summary and Conclusions
A major goal of this book is to summarize and discuss recent research
by economists on individual retirement decisions and aggregate retire
ment trends. This is a fascinating time to study these phenomena. As
we saw in chapter 1, dramatic demographic shifts are underway in the
United States. The population is aging and the ratio of those of tradi
tional working age to those of traditional retirement age is falling
significantly. In addition, the work and retirement patterns of older
Americans, especially men, have undergone major changes. During the
past two decades, the labor force participation rates of men aged 62
to 70 have dropped by well over a third. Percentage declines are also
substantial for those as young as 55. For older women, participation
rates have remained fairly stable, but have declined relative to the labor
supply increases of younger women.
Among the declining numbers still in the labor force, other changes
are underway. The proportion of older employees working part time
(and nearly all voluntarily so) has increased steadily. Older workers
are disproportionately self-employed, and those who are have retire
ment patterns very different from those of wage and salary workers.
What is responsible for these dramatic changes in the work behavior
of older Americans? On what do individual retirement decisions and
aggregate trends depend? Circumstantial evidence points to our public
and private retirement income systems as likely influences. At the same
time that participation rates were declining, both Social Security and
employer pensions were growing substantially. Real Social Security ex
penditures (excluding Medicare) have increased about fivefold since
1960 and have more than doubled since 1970. Retirement patterns reveal
definite spikes at ages 62 and 65—the ages of early and normal Social
Security eligibility. In addition, since 1950, employer pension coverage
233
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has increased from one-quarter to nearly one-half of private sector
workers, and the number of pension recipients has increased significant
ly. It seems very likely that these large and growing institutions, aimed
specifically at the labor supply decisions of older workers, would have
had some impact on individual and aggregate retirement behavior.
On the other hand, years of surveys by the Social Security Administra
tion and others found very little mention of these retirement programs.
When asked why they had stopped work, most retirees named health
or an employer-initiated separation as the primary reason and very few
mentioned Social Security or pension benefits. Were they important or
not?
The stage was set. Several interesting and important demographic
phenomena were underway. Past research yielded some insights, but
circumstantial evidence led in other intriguing directions. Two outstand
ing new microeconomic data sets appeared with which to test alternative
hypotheses. The result was the dramatic increase in economic research
on retirement issues that we have discussed. What have we learned?
Work, Retirement, and Pensions: A Life-Cycle View
A major advance, we believe, is a growing consensus that the finan
cial incentives embedded in our Social Security and employer pension
plans influence work decisions throughout an individual's life. Social
Security and pension plans certainly affect labor supply late in life, and
they probably do so earlier as well.
The key to understanding these relationships is the recognition that
retirement income eligibility—the right to a future stream of income—is
a component of compensation. For employees covered by Social Security
or a defined benefit pension plan, the value of these rights varies in
nonlinear ways with continued employment with the firm. Workers can
control both the timing and the magnitude of these benefits, subject to
the rules of the plan. Benefits claimed later are fewer in number, but
generally larger in size. Their total value can rise or fall with continued
work (delayed receipt), depending on whether the future increments
are sufficient to compensate for the earlier benefits foregone.
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Since retirement benefits are paid out over time, the entire income
stream is best viewed in present discounted value terms—as the asset
or stock of wealth that could generate this stream. The value of this
asset depends on when it is first claimed. In each year of continued
employment with a firm, an individual's pension and Social Security
wealth changes. These changes in retirement income wealth are part
of annual compensation. If the asset values are increasing, pension (or
Social Security) accrual is positive, and true compensation exceeds the
paycheck by the amount of the increase. On the other hand, if the wealth
values are declining, true compensation is less than it appears.
An important advance in the theory of pensions is the realization that
pensions can influence the decision to leave the firm throughout one's
career. If one follows Richard Ippolito (1987) and makes the distinc
tion between the "quit" and the "stay" value of a pension, then the
penalty in foregone pension wealth for quitting "too soon" rises through
middle age and then falls. During early years with the firm, the "quit"
accrual—that is, the change in the present discounted value of the pen
sion required by law—is less than the wages foregone by the worker
to finance the eventual ("stay") value of the pension (the value receiv
ed by a worker who remains until retirement age). The firm owes the
worker. Around middle age, the accruals equal and then surpass the
implicit wage reductions, as the firm begins to make up the previous
shortfalls in compensation. After the age of eligibility for early retire
ment, defined benefit pension accruals usually fall and often turn
negative. The decrease in accrual is like a pay cut. It discourages con
tinued employment with the firm.
Robert Clark and Ann McDermed (1988) and others have shown how
much pension wealth workers can lose from job changes. The losses
occur because pensions are backloaded—accruals rise until the age of
early retirement eligibility. Therefore, overall compensation on a job
already held for 20 years will exceed that on a new job with the iden
tical wage and pension plan. Workers who switch jobs lose because
they move from the gravy of one plan to the gruel of another and miss
out on the pension accrual repayment they had coming.
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Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1989a) have an additional
perspective on the cost of job mobility. They agree that losses in pen
sion wealth can occur, but disagree with the conclusion that these losses
are significant. Rather, they argue, mobility is discouraged much more
by the fact that wages on the new job are likely to be lower than on
the previous job.
These various models all agree that pensions can change the pattern
of lifetime compensation. They predict that pension incentives should
reduce turnover at younger ages and encourage it later. The authors
differ, however, on the magnitude of the effect and the strength of the
evidence. Thus far, a consensus view has not emerged.
There has been a great deal of empirical research on the financial
incentives of the Social Security system. Although the rules are com
plicated, there is only one set of rules and researchers know them. There
is general agreement that the Social Security system subsidizes work
prior to age 62, since future benefits are rising and there are no benefits
foregone, and penalizes it after age 65, often severely. Between ages
62 and 65, the delayed retirement credit is close to actuarially fair, and
whether Social Security provides a small subsidy or a small tax on earn
ings depends on assumptions about life expectancies and discount rates.
The pension side is much more complicated. There are hundreds of
thousands of employer pension plans, each with its own rules and regula
tions, and these details are frequently unknown to the researcher.
Economists who have chosen to use the large microeconomic data sets
(such as the Retirement History Study and the National Longitudinal
Surveys) must rely on assumptions rather than facts on many pension
plan details. Industrywide averages about key parameters (for exam
ple, the rewards for delayed receipt) are frequently used, but the rich
variety that exists in the individual plans is lost. Fortunately, other re
searchers have taken another tack and analyzed the complex details of
a smaller number of actual plans. They know more about the actual
financial incentives but are less able to discern the impact of the plans,
because they do not have as much other information about the individuals
in their samples.
The consensus on pensions is that defined benefit plans are rarely
actuarially fair. Their asset values generally rise or fall with continued
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work—they are affected by the timing of initial benefit receipt. But there
is tremendous variety among the individual plans. We now know that
the accrual values of defined benefit pensions usually peak around the
earliest year of benefit eligibility. Income from working exceeds in
come from retiring, but the difference between the two declines over
time. In other words, true compensation remains positive but diminishes
after some age, even if simple wage growth is constant. Most workers
can continue to work after that age, but only for smaller and smaller
pay, and many decide to leave.
That these work incentives and disincentives exist does not necessarily
mean that they are understood or, even if they are, that they influence
individual behavior. This is the empirical question that has been the
focus of much of the recent work by economists. The consensus is that
these financial incentives do influence individual retirement decisions.
When the changes in Social Security and pension wealth that would ac
company another year of work are entered as explanatory variables in
behavioral equations, they are generally statistically significant. Older
Americans behave as though they understand and respond to these in
centives. They are sensitive to their true compensation, and when this
falls, as it inevitably does because of retirement income wealth losses,
they are less likely to stay on the job.
Although these financial incentives are statistically significant, they
are only part of the story. Individual decisions obviously depend on
a vast number of factors, only some of which we can observe and
measure. Physical and mental health, social networks, attitudes toward
work and leisure, living arrangements, job characteristics, dependents,
local labor market conditions, climate, and expectations about the future
are all undoubtedly important. They interact with the financial incen
tives on which we have focused to bring about the final result.
Several economists have used their empirical models to estimate the
aggregate impact of various Social Security reforms that have been pro
posed and, in some cases, enacted. They use simulation methods to
predict individual decisions on the basis of the behavioral equations they
have estimated and the new policy parameters that have been propos
ed. In these experiments, the Social Security amendments do affect
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aggregate behavior, but only modestly. The delays in the average retire
ment age are on the order of months, not years.
Why then do we concentrate so much attention on an issue of limited
influence? There are several good reasons. First, unlike many of the
factors listed above, these financial incentives are the direct product
of specific public policy initiatives. Congress created the Social Security
system and all of its details, and Congress can change it. This is in stark
contrast to many of the other important factors in the retirement deci
sion, such as attitudes, job characteristics, social networks, and expec
tations. Even with those that are subject to public policy, such as labor
market conditions and health, the linkages between government action
and the eventual outcome are much more tenuous. It is much easier
to change ages of eligibility, benefit reduction rates, or delayed retire
ment credits than it is to improve the general level of health or expecta
tions of older Americans.
In addition, the simulations on Social Security reform estimate firstround effects only. The researchers have altered Social Security rules
but have left the employer pension environment unchanged. We are
convinced that pension incentives, which exhibit considerably more
variety than does Social Security, are extremely important in determining
individual and aggregate behavior. A key variable about which little
is known is how the employer pensions will respond to amendments
in Social Security rules. Will pension changes augment or offset Social
Security initiatives? Will pension changes be nullified by other com
ponents in the compensation package? In short, how will the long-run,
general equilibrium impacts compare to the short-run effects that have
been studied?
This is an area of extreme uncertainty. It involves predicting both
personal and corporate behavior. What we now know is that such deci
sions by firms, unions, and workers will make a difference. Most peo
ple do not retire because they can no longer find or perform work, as
we once thought. Some do, but many others now retire voluntarily,
when they are still able to work and there is demand for their services.
They do so partly because of the tradeoffs they see in the market. There
are always people at the margin, and these people will alter their behavior
in response to changes in the choices they face.
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Exit Patterns from Career Jobs

A second goal of this book is to discuss the ways in which older
Americans leave their career jobs. We pointed out in chapter 1 that most
workers spend a considerable portion of their employed life with a single
firm. The departure from this position is therefore an important event.
We decided to concentrate on this transition, rather than on retirement
per se, and thereby sidestep the debate on the appropriate definition
of retirement. We defined a career job as a full-time job held for at
least 10 years. Our primary focus was on the subset of the Retirement
History Study sample who were still employed on career jobs in 1969,
when they were all between 58 and 63 years of age.
Complete retirement from a career job is only one form of job exit.
What makes transitions at older ages different from those earlier is that
many workers do go from a full-time career job to full-time retirement—
they leave the job and the labor force simultaneously. But this is not
the only way to leave. The other transitions—to part-time work on the
same job or part-time or full-time work on a new job—are very impor
tant, but poorly understood. Policy research that has concentrated on
labor force participation has missed the importance of Social Security
and pensions on the paths that workers take between career work and
complete retirement.
It is ironic that while our understanding of the determinants of retire
ment, particularly the importance of financial incentives, has grown
so dramatically, relatively little work was being done on describing the
actual behavior under study. Most of the effort has concentrated on the
right-hand side of the equation and relatively little on the left. Most
researchers (including ourselves) described retirement as an either-or
phenomenon. They disagreed on how retirement should be defined, but
agreed that an individual either is or is not retired, whatever the defini
tion. Our current analysis of the actual exit patterns chosen by career
workers shows that this dichotomy can be misleading and will lead one
to overlook some very interesting retirement transitions.
The traditional retirement pattern involves a one-time movement from
full-time labor market activity to complete labor market withdrawal. We
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found that this was still the modal pattern during the 1970s—about 70
percent of those who left their career jobs did so in this fashion. Dur
ing the subsequent four years they did not report working again.
The other 30 percent, however, exited in nontraditional ways. Over
20 percent of the wage and salary men found new work when they left,
and they were evenly distributed between full-time and part-time status.
Only a few (5 percent of the total) were able to reduce their hours to
part-time (less than 20 hours per week) on their same career jobs. The
experience of the (nonmarried) women in the sample was similar. About
one-quarter did not leave the labor market completely. They were more
able than the men to stay part time on their career jobs. The selfemployed men were the most likely to keep working after leaving fulltime career work. Only half of this group left the labor force during
the decade they were observed. One-quarter found new employment,
and the other one-quarter reduced their hours of work to part time on
their career jobs.
We found that these intermediate jobs were not just brief way sta
tions on the road to retirement. Although most of these workers even
tually did leave the labor force, only one-quarter of them did so within
the first two years after the transition. The majority of the remainder
were still employed on their first transitional job after two years, and
about one-fifth had moved on to yet another job.
Whether or not those who leave full-time career status but continue
to work should be labeled as retired or not is a matter of debate. In
some ways they do not seem retired. They are still employed, often
for a considerable number of hours per year, and some are working
full time, but on a new job. In other ways they do seem retired. Many
claim pension benefits, some collect Social Security, and most earn
significantly less than they had prior to the transition. Some describe
themselves as retired, but many do not.
Exit patterns varied by the age at transition. The youngest and the
oldest groups were the most likely to do something nontraditional. Nearly
a quarter of those aged 58 to 61 found new full-time jobs, compared
to fewer than 10 percent of those 62 to 64, and fewer than 5 percent
of those 65 and over. The oldest category (aged 66-70) contained the
workers least likely to leave the labor force completely. This may be
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surprising until one realizes that these people had already chosen to work
beyond age 65, which makes them a very nonrepresentative sample of
the population—probably individuals with a particular propensity to work
or with insufficient resources to stop.
We saw this pattern when we looked at the wage rates, earnings, or
wealth of our sample. For all three variables, those in the tails of the
distributions were the least likely to leave the labor force completely.
We suspect that those at the bottom continued to work because they
had to; they did not have the financial means to do otherwise. They
were also unlikely to face dramatic age-specific wage cuts, since they
were usually not covered by employer pension plans. Those at the up
per end could afford to retire, but had either jobs or hours flexibility
that made continued work the more attractive alternative. It is interesting
to note that men in the highest wealth category (more than $250,000)
were the most likely to stay on in part-time employment on their career
jobs.
Health and pension status were both important. Those with poor health
were the most likely to leave the labor force. Those in good health (the
same or better than their peers) were the most likely to move on to a
new job. The health differences in this sample were modest and great
ly understate the overall impact of health on the retirement decision.
The reason is that our sample included only those still employed full
time on their career jobs at ages 58 to 63. Most of those with severe
health problems would have already left their career jobs by then, and
therefore be excluded from the study.
Pension status was highly correlated with transition patterns. Those
eligible for pension benefits when they left were much more likely to
leave the labor force completely. Very few remained part time on the
career job, since employer pensions rarely permit one to do so and draw
benefits. Earnings from other jobs, however, usually do not affect
eligibility. The fact that relatively few pension recipients took new parttime or full-time positions suggests that the pension benefits had the
usual income effect, increasing the demand for leisure.
There were interesting differences by industry and occupation. Tradi
tional retirement was most common in the unionized manufacturing
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sectors, and least likely in construction, trade, and services. By occupa
tion, nontraditional transitions were more frequent among white-collar
workers. This is an interesting finding since the labor market is mov
ing toward more white-collar service employment. This may mean that
traditional retirement will be even less common in the future.
Retirement History Study respondents were asked why they had left
their last jobs. Since much of the earliest research was based on ques
tions of this nature, it is interesting to note that the most frequent
response, among wage and salary men and women, was retirement
benefits. Age and health were the next most common reasons given.
This is in stark contrast to the early research findings, in which health
always dominated and retirement income sources were rarely mentioned.
We looked carefully at the subset of our sample who switched
employers. With the exception of the self-employed, most had to do
this in order to keep working after leaving full-time status on their career
jobs. (Many of the self-employed just reduced the hours on their same
jobs.) Most did so with very little time between jobs, although a few
returned after as many as four years out of the labor force. A com
parison of the career and new jobs reveals that most of these job-switchers
moved to different lines of work. About three of every five wage and
salary men moved to a new (one-digit) industry and occupation. The
percentage was even higher for self-employed men—three-quarters began
new occupations, as did about half of the women.
When we ranked jobs by skill level and by white-collar/blue-collar
status, we noticed a drift down the occupational scale. Although about
half of the job-changers stayed in the same category, many more slid
down than climbed up. Wages told the same story. They were general
ly lower on the new jobs, especially for those moving to part-time work
with a new employer. Over half of the part-timers earned less than $5
per hour, even though only 7 percent had on their previous jobs. Com
parisons of the new earnings levels with the thresholds for the Social
Security earnings test hinted that some of the earnings loss may have
been intentional. Many earned just under the threshold, and this behavior
was correlated with age. Only 9 percent of those less than age 62 (and
therefore ineligible for Social Security retirement benefits) did so,
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compared to over a quarter of those 62 through 64 and over a third
of those 65 and over.
The data on specific job characteristics are not very precise, because
they are one-digit industrywide averages. These averages, however,
indicated that job-switchers were moving from jobs in which they had
a variety of different duties and control over the tasks performed to
ones more likely to involve repetitive tasks under specific instructions.
The levels of specific and general training required were noticeably lower
in the new positions.
In summary, we find that nontraditional retirement patterns are com
mon among older Americans. Many workers stay in the labor force
after they leave their career jobs. Of those who remain employed, most
take on a new position quickly and stay in it for several years. The new
positions often represent a new line of work, lower on the socioeconomic
scale and often at considerably lower pay. Many workers augment these
earnings with Social Security and/or pension benefits.
This research suggests that work after retirement—after departure from
ftill-time status on a career job—is a common occurrence. But such tran
sitional jobs are still in the minority, and substantial changes in both
Social Security and pension structures are required before the majority
of workers are likely to stay at work beyond their early 60s.

What Will Future Retirement Behavior Look Like?
It is little wonder that the labor force participation rates of older
workers have fallen dramatically over the last two decades, given the
weak labor markets of the 1970s and the incentives embedded in our
retirement income programs. But we have seen that despite the overall
trend, many older workers who left their career jobs went on to work
at new jobs, which they then held for a considerable length of time.
Very little empirical evidence exists on the influence of Social Security
or pension policy on these nontraditional job transitions, because they
have not been the major focus of study. What is known is that current
attempts to increase the labor force participation of older workers by
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changing Social Security rules alone are likely to have only modest ef
fects. Changes in the earnings-test exempt amount, the benefit reduc
tion rate, the age of normal retirement, and the delayed retirement credit
after age 65 will not by themselves create dramatic changes in the length
of stay on the career job. And it is this labor market decision that primari
ly determines work effort at older ages.
Most defined benefit pension plans continue to encourage workers
to leave the career job at the earliest possible retirement age. It is like
ly that changes in pensions, rather than Social Security, will have the
greater effect on full-time career work. If employers are concerned about
a shortage of labor early next century, as they well might be, then we
may see substantial changes in pension policy. If they are not concern
ed, then employers may tilt lifetime benefits even more toward those
who leave at early retirement age in order to offset the scheduled reduc
tions in Social Security work disincentives.
Current pension rules sometimes offset Social Security changes
automatically. This happens when employer pension plans are "in
tegrated"; that is, when pension benefits depend on the size of an in
dividual's Social Security payment. If Social Security benefits decline,
the pension increases and makes up a portion (usually half) of the loss.
The majority of full-time participants in defined benefit plans are in
such integrated plans (Herz and Rones 1989). A smaller percentage
receives pension supplements if they retire early, to compensate for the
loss in Social Security benefits (Bell and Marclay 1987). If employers
want to buck the Social Security trend even more than these integra
tion features already do, it will not be easy to prevent them from doing
so. For instance, the 1986 Omnibus Budget Act requires firms with
pension plans to continue providing service credit to those who con
tinue with the firm past normal retirement age. 1 But this does not pre
vent the firm from making early retirement benefits even more generous
in order to offset this rule.
The ability to offset government policy, however, does not necessarily
mean that employers will do so. In fact, one might well argue that private
pensions will conform to the new Social Security incentives, even if
they have not yet. They often have in the past. For example, age 65
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has most frequently been chosen (in domestic pension plans) as the nor
mal retirement age because the Social Security system adopted that age
initially. One of the original goals of Social Security policy was to en
courage older workers out of the labor force. Until 1972, earnings above
a small amount were taxed at 100 percent, and benefits postponed beyond
age 65 earned no actuarial credit at all. Given these strong disincen
tives to full-time work, it is not surprising that private firms developed
institutions that conformed. To do otherwise would have required them
to pay workers higher wages after age 65 to offset the losses in Social
Security wealth.
The establishment of early Social Security benefits at age 62 may have
encouraged private firms to do likewise, to the degree that workers
perceived Social Security pension accrual to fall past that age. The
changes in Social Security benefit rules scheduled for the next decade
will reduce work disincentives and alter the institutional structure on
which private pensions are built. How employer pensions respond will
determine how work at older ages will change in the next century.
A final issue concerns the influence of retirement income benefit
changes on the type of work we can expect at older ages. If pension
rules do not adjust, we foresee increased part-time and full-time work
on new postcareer jobs. This is because the easing of Social Security
disincentives will make work more attractive, while pension rules con
tinue to penalize those who stay on their career jobs. Workers will leave
the firm, collect the career job pension while its asset value is high,
and move to another employer. If private firms, rather than doing
nothing, actually counter Social Security changes with even stronger
retirement incentives of their own, then we will see even more of this
postcareer employment. But if firms foresee labor shortages ahead and
match the Social Security initiatives by flattening their own pension ac
crual patterns across the life cycle, then the age at which workers leave
career jobs will begin to rise.
An important variation on this theme is the possibility of part-time
work on the career job, a pattern that is already common among the
self-employed. We suspect that many workers would find this an at
tractive alternative. 2 A gradual rather than instantaneous reduction of
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hours from full time to zero makes sense, and the option of doing so
on the same job reduces the loss in specific human capital and the wage
reduction that usually accompanies a job change. Current pension rules
make this a poor choice for workers in defined benefit plans. Part-time
employment with the firm usually prevents the receipt of any pension
benefits, and future benefits are often a function of the last few years'
earnings. But current pension rules are not written in stone.
Other nations have introduced programs to promote partial or gradual
retirement. Barry Mirkin (1987) points out that many of them were in
itially designed to encourage earlier retirement in nations with high and
persistent levels of unemployment. But they can be used to encourage
later retirement as well. In Norway, for example, with a normal retire
ment age of 67, traditionally low levels of unemployment, and an age
structure considerably older than that in the United States, workers ag
ed 67 to 70 could claim various fractions of their old-age pensions, as
long as the sum of pensions plus earnings did not exceed 80 percent
of previous pay (Ginsburg 1985). Denmark (Petersen 1989) and Finland
(Sundberg 1989) have similar plans.
In 1976, Sweden introduced a much more popular partial pension
option designed to smooth the transition from full-time work to fulltime retirement (Laczko 1988; Kruse and Sbderstrbm 1989). Under this
plan, eligible workers aged 60 to 64 who reduce their hours to parttime have 65 percent of the loss in earnings made up by a partial pen
sion. 3 Because of the high tax rates, the change in net pay is often small.
Since 1977, between 12 and 27 percent of those eligible have opted
for the plan each year. It is popular among both blue- and white-collar
workers, and especially among women. Because it enjoys the support
of both the unions' and the employers' confederations, the hours' reduc
tions have proceeded smoothly. Employees usually work fewer days
per week or alternate weeks, although shorter days are popular among
women. Nearly all of these workers stay with the same employer and
on the same job. Helen Ginsburg (1985) reported that both recipients
and firms were pleased with this alternative. Workers' health and pro
ductivity improved while absenteeism and disability declined.
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Partial retirement is possible under Social Security rules in the United
States, although the earnings test is more restrictive for those aged 62
to 64 than for those 65 and over. It will be even more attractive now
that the benefit reduction rate has dropped from one-half to one-third
for those 65 and older. But employer pensions rarely offer these op
tions. This implies that partial retirement usually means a job change
and, as we have seen, a significant decrease in pay.
In the United States, there is a trend away from work disincentives
for older workers. This is good, as long as our policies do not neglect
those who cannot continue to work. Mandatory retirement has virtual
ly been eliminated. Social Security changes scheduled to go into effect
over the next several decades will make the system much more age
neutral so that the value of Social Security rights will depend much less
on when the benefits are first claimed. In the pension world, there is
a trend toward defined contribution plans, which do not have the kind
of work disincentives we have emphasized. But defined benefit plans,
which generally do, still remain the dominant form of primary coverage.
The research on the retirement decision over the past decade shows
the power of applied microeconomics. Our society has built programs
with strong retirement incentives, and people have responded to them
as economic theory and common sense would predict. As pension and
Social Security accruals, and therefore total compensation, decline with
age, some workers decide to stop working. We now know a great deal
about this decision, but relatively little about the many other possibilities
that exist—options involving job changes and second careers that some
people already use as intermediate stops on the road to complete retire
ment. Other nations have been more imaginative than the United States
in designing flexible programs that support workers' efforts to withdraw
more gradually from the labor force. We are convinced that older
Americans would respond to changed incentives in the future as they
have in the past. What remains to be seen is whether the market—firms
responding to labor shortages on the horizon—will introduce the ap
propriate changes themselves, or whether a more active government
role is required.
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NOTES
1. The law still permits caps on the total number of years of tenure that are counted in the benefit
calculation formula and limits on the maximum benefit, so it is still possible for workers who
stay on to get no increment to future pensions (Herz and Rones 1989). The difference is that
this situation can no longer be a direct function of age.
2. According to Morrison (1983), Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987), and the U.S. Special
Committee on Aging (1988, p. 90), national surveys suggest that many older workers indicate
a strong preference for part-time work after their career jobs, and that many are interested in
jobs the same as or similar to their preretirement employment. They conclude that many workers
would take advantage of more flexible work policies if they were more widespread.
3. An important detail of the scheme is that these part-time earnings usually have little effect on
the eventual state earnings-related pension, since the benefit is based on the 15 years of highest
earnings, not the IS final years of employment. A partial retirement plan in Great Britain failed
partially because most employees in occupational pension schemes have their benefits based on
their final salary, whether it be full time or part time (Laczko 1988).
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